Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma

Paul Roe

Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma

Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma explores how the phenomenon of ethnic violence can be understood as a form of security dilemma by shifting the focus of the concept away from its traditional concern with state sovereignty to that of identity instead.

The book is divided into theoretical and empirical chapters, beginning with the categorisation by the author of the security dilemma concept into 'tight', 'regular' and 'loose' formations, and its combination with the Copenhagen School's notion of societal security. This reconceptualisation of the traditional security dilemma then provides a framework capable of explaining conflictual dynamics between ethnic groups and how some cases can be resolved without recourse to outright war.

It includes case studies on:

• Ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats in the Krajina region of Croatia, August 1990;
• Ethnic violence between Hungarians and Romanians in the Transylvania region of Romania, March 1990.

This book will interest students and researchers of ethnic violence and the security dilemma.

Paul Roe is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Central European University, Hungary.

Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma

Paul Roe

Contents

Series editor's preface

The author of this book sets himself the ambitious goal of exploring the link between ethno-national politics and international relations. He engages in an enterprise that is major departure from standard approaches to ethnic conflict, which have tended to ignore the international dimension. At the same time, it is a departure from the typical academic bias of scholars of international politics, who, in concentrating on the state – frequently (and incorrectly) defined as the 'nation-state' – as the primary unit of action, have ignored the ethnic dimension. In this study, a major focus is on conflict, not primarily between states but between the state and society, and more specifically, the 'ethnonation'.

The book is divided into two major parts: the examination of theory, or rather, of competing theories, about the security dilemma; and the application, from a neo-realist perspective, of theory to real life – specifically, the conflict between the Serbs in Krajina (Croatia) and the Hungarians in Transylvania (Romania). These two cases of ethnic minorities are analysed in impressive detail and in comparison.

The author defines the security dilemma as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the threat to the territorial integrity of a state posed by the demands of an ethnic minority for the protection of its collective cultural-linguistic identity; and on the other hand, the challenge to that identity posed by an étatist policy that is culturally monolithic and exclusivist. These positions are perceived to be mutually incompatible – a perception that, in assuming a worst-case scenario, leads to negative reactions that can trigger violent conflict and, in so doing, produce a self-fulfilling prophecy. It can also provoke a reaction by a neighbour, which, in 'transnationalizing' the conflict, aggravates it and makes the threat to political unity and state security even greater.

A major contention of the author is that the security dilemma is often a false one. He argues that states may exaggerate an adversary's hostility and ignore the threatening nature of their own actions. The author points out that while societal interests (such as ethnic identity) and political imperatives (such as territorial integrity) are not always congruent, they are not necessarily incompatible.

Whether justified or not, the perceptions or misperceptions of the intentions of the two antagonists create a security dilemma. In the past such a dilemma gave rise to interstate conflict often leading to war; but in the cases examined here, the dilemma was relocated to the interior of the state, producing a radical nationalism within the dominant ethnie marked by cultural oppression, ethnic cleansing and massacres; and irredentism within the subordinate one – a situation that exacerbated the feeling of insecurity on both sides.

There are numerous factors involved in the creation and perception of security dilemmas, which may be approached from a primordialist, constructivist or rational-choice perspective. These factors include mass preferences and fears, which are often based on negative stereotypes of the adversary; the existence of ancient hatreds; and the behaviour of elites, who may instrumentalize these hatreds in behalf of what they perceive to be the collective interest or in order to promote their political self-interests. Another factor is the structure of the domestic system, which creates possibilities for political action and establishes limits to it.

The countries that are the focus of this study have a number of features in common that invite comparison. Both emerged from the wreckage of multinational empires, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman, and were the beneficiaries of territorial changes produced by war – changes that recall Ambrose Bierce's definition of the cannon as 'an instrument employed in the rectification of national boundaries'. Both contain societies composed of two or more communities divided by language, religion, and rival historical narratives; and both experienced a succession of authoritarian regimes, including, at the end, Communist ones. During the Cold War, the expression of individual and collective grievances, including ethnic ones, was sharply curtailed; but thereafter, ethnic rivalries came to the surface again. The articulation of these rivalries was informed by memories of persecution during World War II – those of fascist Croatia on one side, and collaborationist Hungary and opportunistic Romania on the other. Subsequent attempts to create a *modus vivendi* between the dominant majority ethnonational group and the subordinate minority were impeded by conflicting priorities. The former was concerned with preserving political unity under its leadership, whereas the latter was interested in securing its cultural autonomy. The former controls the state; but the latter has a neighbour most of whose population are the kinfolk of the ethnic minority that considers itself oppressed, and whose intervention is feared. Such a fear is not baseless, if one looks at the past.

The author presents a fairly detailed survey of the histories of Serbia, Croatia, Romania, and Hungary, and discusses the efforts of these countries at state formation and nation-building. These efforts were not particularly notable for tolerance of diversity; rather, they were marked by false promises to ethnic minorities, oppression, forcible relocations of populations, and patterns of cultural-linguistic discrimination. They were also marked by irredentism and counter-irredentism, especially in Hungary and Romania.

The author pays considerable attention to the impact of empire, the role of religion and language, and the place of competing ethnonational narratives and their manipulation by rival elites. He also stresses the importance of individual leaders and their acts – the bloodthirstiness of Ante Pavelic and his Ustashe colleagues in Croatia; the federalist experiments of Tito in Yugoslavia; and the authoritarian behaviour of Ion Antonescu and Nicolae Ceausescu – all of which impacted on the policies of the post-Communist leaders of these countries. The security concerns of minorities were aggravated by recent events; these included provocative measures aimed at systematic Croatisation, reflected in the attack on minority languages, the rewriting of history, and the use of fascist symbols such as flags and street names. These measures, promoted by President Franjo Tudjman in the name of Croatian political integrity, were rightly interpreted as an effort to stamp out Serbian cultural identity. There were similar efforts by Hungarian and Romanian governments stretching over a century – respectively Magyarisation and Romanisation – to undermine the cultures of their ethnic minorities in the name of national security. Such measures, adopted by political leaders who represented the ethnonational majorities in their states, were reflections of the security dilemma: the fear of a kind of 'policy creep' – that is, the belief that the demand for greater autonomy would escalate and lead to secession, as happened during World War II.

These perceptions and fears, and the memories that underlay them, were not uniform; indeed, the author points to the existence of divisions within each camp, which injected an element of doubt about the interpretation of the security dilemma. Nevertheless, the perceptions were operational enough to determine the policy choices of political leaders, specifically of Tudjman in Croatia and Ceausescu in Romania, who misused the security argument to mask other goals, among them territorial expansion and increased personal power.

The author examines the efforts of third parties in modifying perceptions, as shown by the Dayton Accords, whose achievements and failures he addresses. He ends his analysis on a hopeful note, as he looks at the development of a new Romanian cultural tolerance, which has greatly diminished, and perhaps even ended, Hungarian irredentism. This suggests that with more accurate perceptions and proper policies, the security dilemma may be resolved after all.

In sum, the book, a thoroughly documented combination of theory, history and case analysis, is a major achievement. It is a significant contribution to the study of the roots of ethnic conflict, and it will doubtlessly serve as a model for the study of other cases, whose number is likely to grow.

William Safran
University of Colorado at Boulder

Acknowledgements

Introduction

In the West and the East, at the centre and the periphery, cultural identity and societal security have become the central theme of political attitudes and conflicts.[1]

Context and goals

This book is concerned with societal security. It is about matters of security and identity: how the defence of ethnic identity can trigger threat perceptions in others, how escalatory dynamics ensue, and how this comes to manifest itself in violence and, ultimately, even war. I view this process through the perspective of the security dilemma, a concept central to the International Relations (IR) discipline for the past 50 years or so and, since the beginning of the 1990s especially, employed by many scholars in explaining conflict between ethnic groups. Unlike most writers on the security dilemma, though, my main goal in this respect is not simply to apply but to reconstruct the concept itself, to bring questions of identity to the fore. In short, this book is about an identity security dilemma, or, a 'societal security dilemma'.

The concept of the security dilemma was first expounded at the beginning of the 1950s by the British historian Herbert Butterfield,[2] and the American political scientist John Herz.[3] In essence, the security dilemma defines a situation whereby one actor – in its traditional manifestation, the state – in trying to increase its security, causes a reaction in a second, which, in the end, decreases the security of the first. As a result, a (spiral) process of action and reaction is manifest in which each side's behaviour is seen as threatening. For both Butterfield and Herz, the key to the security dilemma is *misperception*; defensively motivated actions are misinterpreted as offensive moves, thus requiring some kind of countermeasure. Butterfield, in this way, described the situation as a 'tragedy', inasmuch as the protagonists seek to avoid conflict of any sort. Hence, Charles Glaser's description of the concept as 'the key to understanding how in an anarchical international system states *with fundamentally compatible goals* still end up in competition and war'.[4]

Since Butterfield and Herz's original observations, the security dilemma has come to occupy a central space in IR. This is mainly due to the Cold War period: arms racing between the United States and the Soviet Union and the concomitant theoretical hegemony of the Realist and neo-Realist paradigms. For many writers, the security dilemma seemed to explain well political–military relations between the two superpowers. But with the end of the Cold War, the security dilemma saw its usual site of application wither. Thus, as superpower competition diminished, analysts duly turned their attention elsewhere: to *within* the state.

Following the collapse of Communism beginning in 1989, many countries in central and Eastern Europe witnessed an upsurge of ethnic violence and war. This provided a new context in which to test the explanatory value of the security dilemma concept. Indeed, as Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis point out, 'the security dilemma, widely used to explain conflict between states in an anarchical international system, provides analytical insights into civil wars as well'.[5] In fact, so much so that the concept has arguably turned out to be *the* favoured tool for Realist/neo-Realist analysis: a quick flick through the IR literature might well leave the impression that the security dilemma is at work in most, if not all, such cases. Stuart Kaufman, for example, argues that the security dilemma is one of three required elements for ethnic war,[6] while Barry Posen posits that the security dilemma has a 'considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires'.[7]

This book is very much located within this existing body of literature. Crucially, though, I make two – what I consider significant – departures from the existing literature. The first is to identify not one but three different types of security dilemma, what I call 'tight', 'regular' and 'loose' security dilemmas. This (re)categorisation of the concept essentially derives from a refocusing of the security dilemma away from the fundamental compatibility of 'goals' to the fundamental compatibility of 'security requirements' instead. In other words, I shift the emphasis of enquiry from the general, *whether security is being sought*, to the more specific, *the means by which security is being sought*.

A tight security dilemma can be said to occur when two actors, with compatible security requirements, misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures based on – and borrowing from Kenneth Boulding – an 'illusory incompatibility'.[8] It is this type of security dilemma that fits most with Butterfield's original conception. In a regular security dilemma, while the protagonists may still be seen as security-seekers, there exists a 'real incompatibility' in terms of their security requirements; that is to say, security for one side may well necessitate insecurity for the other – what I call in the book 'required insecurity'. Finally, in a loose security dilemma what is most important is that 'offense–defense variables still play a role in explaining war'.[9] States are either compelled or deterred from employing (intended) aggressive policies depending on whether offence or defence has

the advantage. This loose security dilemma is by far the most problematic formulation of the three, in that it addresses power-seekers as much as those wanting security only.

The value of this threefold typology is that it provides a more nuanced conceptual tool for the analysis of ethnic conflict. On the one hand, it avoids the often-undifferentiated categorisation of some conflicts: lumped together simply by virtue of being called security dilemmas. While, on the other hand, it nonetheless enables theoretical engagement with certain cases that a 'Butterfieldian' – that is, purely 'tight' – interpretation of the security dilemma might well fail to capture. In this way, my thinking on the matter is similar to that of Snyder and Jervis. In a recent work, the two writers provide a broad range of interpretation regarding the concept:

> The purest type of security dilemma is a situation in which security is the overriding objective of all the protagonists, yet attempts by one party to increase its security reduce the security of others. At the opposite end . . . some conflicts may be driven entirely by the desire of one or both the parties to exploit or dominate the other for reasons that would not diminish even if security were not in jeopardy. In between are a variety of situations in which security and non-security motives are both present.[10]

For Snyder and Jervis, the importance of an expanded conception of the security dilemma is that, among other things, it enables decision-makers better to grasp both when and how to (potentially) intervene in conflict situations:

> We are mindful of the risk of concept stretching: we acknowledge that the value-added of the security dilemma decreases as situations from the ideal-type purely security driven behavior. Nonetheless, we contend that understanding the interaction between predatory and security motives is valuable for designing effective strategies of intervention.[11]

Like Snyder and Jervis, I argue that the three security dilemmas each describe a different type of conflict: 'resolvable short of war' (tight security dilemma), 'difficult to resolve short of war' (regular security dilemma), and 'irresolvable short of war' (loose security dilemma), and that each type of conflict indeed poses different challenges for conflict resolution.

The second departure I make in the book is to maintain an overriding emphasis on identity concerns. Traditionally, the focus of the security dilemma has been with threats to state sovereignty; in short, with external dangers posed to political autonomy and territorial integrity. This has produced an overwhelming concentration on questions of military security. (The matter is somewhat complicated at the intra-state level of analysis; this I deal with in Chapter 2.) During the 1990s, however, the preoccupation of

security studies with the utility of military force was subject to sustained challenge. So-called 'wideners' sought to shift the focus of study to other areas traditionally neglected by the security analyst: to the environment, to migration, and to matters of basic human well-being (food security and so forth). Other sectors of security were thus able to come to the fore; in particular, the relationship between security and ethnic identity came to achieve a much greater salience.[12]

Perhaps the most prominent theoretical approach to the security–identity relationship has been that of the so-called 'Copenhagen School', a collection of scholars working at or in conjunction with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, and headed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Their foundational concept in this respect, 'societal security', is set out most extensively in the 1993 book *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*.[13] In the book, the Copenhagen School argues that in contemporary Europe, societal insecurities – threats to significant ethnic, national and religious identities – have become ever more prominent in relation to more traditional, military-centric security concerns. As Buzan writes:

> Traditional fears about military revival still lie in the background, and savage subregional conflicts already disturb Europe's complacency. But more important than these leftovers from the old security agenda is the exposure, and in part creation, of a new focus for insecurity. This focus is not primarily on the state. It is not a concern about the military overthrow or the political subversion of governments. . . . Nor is it in any conventional sense about defending disputed boundaries, or about power rivalries or *security dilemmas between states*, though all of these are still important. The principal focus of the new insecurity is society rather than the state. In the extraordinary conjuncture created by the emergence of new political configurations in both halves of Europe . . . it is societies that have become exposed to the main causes of insecurity.[14]

With European security no longer concerned so much about 'security dilemmas between states', *security dilemmas between societies* thus seem to acquire some importance. But how much? Indeed, what does a security dilemma between societies even look like? How does it operate? How is it different – if at all – to the traditional (state) security dilemma? And what effects might it produce? It is these questions that constitute the focus of this book.

In *Identity, Migration*, Buzan suggests that by analogy with relations between states it may be possible to talk of 'societal security dilemmas', and that societal security dilemmas might explain why some ethnic conflicts come to 'acquire a dynamic of their own'.[15] However, having proffered what seems to be a definite link between societal security dilemmas and ethnic violence and war, Buzan provides no further explication as to the more specific nature of this relationship. Thus, a crucial gap is apparent: while a new concept is

proposed, and its potential implications duly alluded to, such a proposition is still to be fully explored. This book seeks to fill that gap.

Case studies

The relationship between societal security dilemmas and ethnic conflict is explored through two case studies. The first is the Krajina region of Croatia. Krajina was arguably the core struggle in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. While the bulk of international attention was to shift to the horrific war in neighbouring Bosnia-Hercegovina, many of the key factors in the break-up of federal Yugoslavia can be found in Croatia's prior conflict. Clashes between Serbs and Croats in many parts of the republic's Krajina region in August 1990 marked the first significant outbreak of hostilities between the two groups since the end of the Second World War. And perhaps more than any other single event, it was Croatia's subsequent move towards secession that triggered the eventual dissolution of the Yugoslav state.

   The second case study is the Transylvania region of Romania. Transylvania has not enjoyed nearly the same attention as its Krajina counterpart. This is largely due to the fact that the violence between Hungarians and Romanians in the region did not escalate to the kind of widespread hostilities that were eventually manifest in Croatia. Nevertheless, for scholars and policy-makers alike its (potential) implications for European security were, and arguably very much still are, every bit as important. As Tom Gallagher contends: '[T]he Romanian–Hungarian dispute [in Transylvania] is the paradigm case of an inter-ethnic dispute in Eastern Europe'.[16] Clashes between the two groups in the city of Tirgu Mures in March 1990 at that time represented the worst incidence of ethnic violence throughout the whole of post-Socialist Central and Eastern Europe. And, together with the former Yugoslavia, many were thus watching Romania as a further, likely site of ethnic war. Again, as Gallagher points out:

> The terrible nature of events in the former Yugoslavia have obscured a long-running quarrel between Romania and Hungary which strengthened the forces of radical nationalism in both countries during the early 1990s. So bleak were the prospects of reconciliation between the two apparently estranged neighbours that the US Defence Secretary, William Perry, observed in 1995 that there had been a time when he was concerned about the possibility of an armed conflict between them.[17]

   In addition, due to their geographical and historical–cultural similarities, Krajina and Transylvania lend themselves well to comparative study. As part of South Eastern Europe, Croatia and Romania, have, at times, endured similar historical experiences. Most revealingly, throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, and Romanians formed the main frontline populations between the Habsburg and

Ottoman Empires. Indeed, the Austrian military frontier districts, the *Vojna Krajina*, ran from Croatia in the west, through Slavonia, Vojvodina, and the Banat to Transylvania in the east. Additionally, the majority of Croats and Hungarians are Roman Catholic, and before both nations came to enjoy independence from the collapsed Habsburg Empire,[18] much of their cultural inheritance was derived from Austrian influences. By contrast, most Serbs and Romanians are Eastern Orthodox, and both have a history more of Ottoman rule. Moreover, a significant number of Serbs and Romanians lived in Krajina and Transylvania separated from their fellow nationals by imperial divide. Thus, Serbian and Romanian history alike has been marked by the struggle to unite their populations in a single, unified state.

My argument here is that while both Krajina and Transylvania are not unproblematic in terms of fitting neatly into the tight, regular and loose (societal) security dilemma typology, taken together they highlight well how, in particular, the tight (Transylvania) formulation can be distinguished from the regular one (Krajina) in terms of both the dynamics that drive the conflict as well as the resultant prescriptions for its resolution. Tight (societal) security dilemmas, such as the Transylvania case, can arguably be resolved through revealing to the parties the misperception that exists. However, regular cases, like Krajina, must involve measures whereby the actors can be induced to change their security requirements to a situation of compatibility.

Structure of the book

The first part of the book deals with the task of concept building. Chapter 1 explores those writings on the security dilemma: primarily those of Butterfield, Herz, Jervis, and Glaser, together with Alan Collins and Randall Schweller. It starts with an elucidation of the concept's constitutive elements, before proceeding to construct the tight, regular and loose security dilemma formulations, which I will be working with throughout. Chapter 2 goes on to examine the more recent move in IR of operationalising the security dilemma at the intra-state level, concentrating for the most part on the work of Posen, Kaufman and Erik Melander, with specific regard to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The purpose here is to critically evaluate the employment of the concept outside of its usual inter-state setting.

Chapter 3 introduces the relationship between security and ethnic identity through focusing squarely on the Copenhagen School's societal security formulation. Initially, the chapter looks at how societal security is defined, and questions whether ethnic, national and religious manifestations of group identity are indeed feasible as referent objects for security analysis. The second part of the chapter concentrates on threats to societal security: it shows how by suppressing the ability of societies to express and/or reproduce their culture, group identity can be brought into question. Having done so, in Chapter 4 – the conceptual core of the book – the building of a societal security dilemma can be fully tackled. This chapter seeks to combine the

security dilemma and societal security dynamics. It questions how societies might try to defend their identity, and how, as a consequence, others might come to misinterpret this behaviour as threatening. It then deals with the action–reaction process, exploring the nature of the escalatory dynamic between societies.

The fifth chapter marks the beginning of the empirical and case study material. Together with Chapter 6, it deals with the applicability of the societal security dilemma in the case of Krajina. In more specific terms, Chapter 5 is an historical analysis of relations between Serbs and Croats prior to and following the creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918. Its main purpose is to provide a grasp of the historical record, with a view in Chapter 6 to showing the utility of historical accounts in Serb and Croat alike attributing intentionality to one another's behaviour. Chapter 6 begins with a brief account of events directly preceding the outbreak of the August 1990 violence. Next, it seeks to establish first Croat and then Serb (societal) security requirements, with the final section addressing the tricky question of the compatibility/incompatibility of these requirements.

Chapters 7 and 8 follow the same structure as the previous two. This time, though, the societal security dilemma is applied to the Transylvania case study. Again, Chapter 7 looks historically at the relationship between Hungarians and Romanians, highlighting how certain aspects of history have come to shape the identities of the two groups. Like Chapter 6, Chapter 8 then deals with the actual operability of the societal security dilemma, likewise too seeking to determine the compatibility/incompatibility of Hungarian and Romanian (societal) security requirements.

In the Conclusion, attention is given to the (potential) relationship between the societal security dilemma and the different outcomes of the two case studies: the Transylvania case as an instance of localised violence; the Krajina case escalating to a situation of outright war. It is here I suggest that the applicability of either a tight, regular or loose security dilemma is highly significant both in terms of its correspondence to the nature of the conflict and in the means for conflict resolution.

1   The security dilemma

> Of all the dilemmas in world politics, the security dilemma is quintessential. It goes right to the heart of the theory and practice of international relations.[1]

Like security itself, the security dilemma might also be regarded as an 'essentially contested concept', with several different formulations apparent in the IR literature. Apart from a security dilemma itself, the interested reader will find a 'structural' security dilemma, 'a perceptual security dilemma', a 'state-induced security dilemma', a 'system-induced security dilemma', and a 'security paradox'. Besides which, there is a 'power struggle', a 'security struggle', a 'spiral model', and a 'deterrence model'. But despite the often confusing array of terms and models, the 'basic' nature of the concept is accepted by most scholars. And this is summed up neatly by Barry Posen: 'This is the security dilemma: what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure'.[2]

In this chapter, my purpose is essentially twofold: first, to provide a brief overview of the security dilemma concept; and second – and crucially so – to propose a new categorisation of the security dilemma into three types: 'tight', 'regular' and 'loose'. This re-categorisation of the security essentially derives from some degree of dissatisfaction I have with much of the concept's application to instances of ethnic conflict, where arguably quite disparate cases have been erroneously lumped together simply by virtue of exhibiting the security dilemma label. In distinguishing between tight, regular and loose security dilemmas, my intention is to thus provide a more nuanced conceptual tool in accounting for ethnic violence and war.

The chapter is split into four main sections. In the first section, I outline some of the security dilemma's main constitutive elements. In the next three sections, in turn I elucidate the notions of tight, regular and loose security dilemmas.

The security dilemma: constitutive elements

There are a number of elements common to most definitions of the security dilemma. The following sections will deal with each in turn. The starting

point for the concept might be seen as the inherent ambiguity of military preparations – although the security dilemma is invariably informed as much by political as by purely military postures – what is mostly referred to as the 'indistinguishability of offence and defence'.

The indistinguishability of offence and defence

States usually try to increase their security by building up their arms. But most arms that can be used for defence can also be utilised for offensive purposes too. A tank, for example, can just as easily be employed to attack a neighbour's territory as it can be to defend my own. Thus, as Robert Jervis points out:

> Unless the requirements for offense and defense differ in kind or amount, a status-quo power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor. For this reason others cannot infer from its military forces and preparations whether the state is aggressive.[3]

Arms, therefore, can be seen as essentially ambiguous in nature: on the one hand, they can be a means to protect myself, while on the other hand they can also be an instrument to harm others. It is the crucial role that arms play in being able to generate both security and insecurity that has led the vast majority of writers to conceive of the security dilemma in almost exclusively military terms.

Uncertainty

The ambiguity of some military postures results in what Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth call 'unresolvable uncertainty'. They explain:

> The military preparations of one state [can] create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security), or whether they are for offensive purposes [to weaken its security].[4]

In much the same way, Erik Melander writes that as a prerequisite for a security dilemma, 'there must exist enough *uncertainty about the intentions of one's adversaries* that a hostile move can neither be excluded, nor guaranteed'.[5] Faced with the indistinguishability between offence and defence, decision-makers must therefore come to distinguish between 'status quo states' and 'revisionist states'.

Those factors that determine how such uncertainty might ultimately be resolved can be readily identified on each of IR's three traditional levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the structure of the international system.

Uncertainty and human nature

According to 'classical' Realists such as John Herz and Herbert Butterfield, uncertainty can manifest itself at the level of the individual. Butterfield describes the uncertainty that decision-makers feel in trying to determine others' intentions:

> It is the peculiar characteristic of . . . Hobbesian fear . . . that you yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party but you cannot enter the other man's counterfear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you yourself know that you mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realise or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurances of your intentions that you have. As this operates on both sides . . . neither sees the nature of the predicament that he is in, for each only imagines that the party is being hostile and unreasonable.[6]

Uncertainty produces the fear in both parties that the other wishes to harm them: each side misperceives the other's intentions. On top of this, the actors themselves fail to realise their predicament: each party is unaware that they themselves are creating insecurity in the other. This suggests that security for both sides could be achieved if only they could come to see the nature of the situation they are in.

Butterfield's concentration in this respect lies with the nature of the individual. Keeping with the classical Realist view that humans are ultimately both greedy and fallible, the essence of Butterfield's argument is that people are basically insecure: uncertainty as to others' intentions is therefore considered as an inherent product of this condition. Like Butterfield, Herz also originally conceived of the security dilemma at the individual level.[7] He argues that while on the one hand human interaction is of course both desirable and necessary, on the other hand it is also tremendously risky, as each person possesses the capability to do harm to others. Herz claims, therefore, that humans can be faced with a security dilemma, inasmuch as they may find themselves in a situation of kill first or run the risk of being killed.[8]

To make the point again briefly: for classical Realists, uncertainty is mainly attributable to human nature, human fallibility that precludes entering the 'other man's counterfear'. In this same regard, their particular view of human nature enables classical Realists to indeed resolve Wheeler and Booth's *unresolvable uncertainty*: people are inherently greedy, aggressive and therefore highly dangerous. This determines that decision-makers must assume the worst, or risk suffering the consequences.

Uncertainty and international anarchy

While classical Realists tend to locate explanatory value at the individual level, neo-Realists instead see outcomes being driven by the anarchical nature of the international system. Under the condition of anarchy, states cannot look to any higher authority to provide their security: they are in a 'self-help' situation. While decision-makers may very well wish to cooperate with others, because they cannot know for sure their intentions, there is a tendency towards mistrust. Buzan notes how this 'structural imperative lies at the core of the power–security dilemma'.[9]

Among others, Posen's work epitomises the neo-Realist approach to the security dilemma: 'Often statesmen . . . do not empathize with their neighbours; they are unaware that their own actions can seem threatening. Often it does not matter if they know this problem. The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do'.[10] In other words, even if decision-makers come to realise their predicament, anarchy and self-help nevertheless deter them from entering into a cooperative relationship through an overriding fear of being cheated or taken advantage of. This is a particular powerful line of argument in as much as it implies that security dilemmas are an inherent part of the international system.

In short, for Neo-realists structural imperatives always force decision-makers to assume the worst, always to play it safe. Intentions are, indeed have to be, directly equated with capabilities. Moreover, uncertainty concerning others' current intentions can be separated from uncertainty as a more general product of the system: a friendly neighbour today might just as easily become a dangerous enemy tomorrow.[11]

Uncertainty and state structures

In addition to the classical Realist and neo-Realist positions concerning the security dilemma, Charles Glaser's work highlights a further level of analysis, what might be described as the Liberal position.

Focusing on military insecurities between states, Glaser refers to worst-case scenarios resulting from 'overall national evaluative capabilities'. He notes how in terms of the state there are certain organisations dedicated to the analysis of others' foreign policies and military capabilities; 'analytical units within the government, think tanks, and universities', for example.[12] The quality of a country's evaluation, Glaser goes on, depends not only on the information supplied by these organisations, but on the influence that particular organisations have. In other words, decision-makers' perceptions will be negatively shaped when: one, national evaluative capabilities are poor; and/or two, when certain institutions dominate in policy debates, thereby producing misleading information.

Glaser argues that organisational behaviour and domestic political dynamics can be used to explain why 'states often exaggerate an adversary's

hostility and overlook the threatening nature of their own policies'.[13] Referring to militaries, Glaser notes that there is a tendency for them to over-estimate others' capabilities, and that the worst is invariably ascribed even when the nature of others' military forces is ambiguous. Moreover, '[i]nterest groups that would benefit from large investments in military capabilities and/or expansion are often in control of their state's policy; they then advance self-serving strategic arguments that exaggerate the state's insecurity and the benefits of expansion'.[14]

Other Liberal arguments tend to revolve around whether states are either overtly democratic or not, or, more specifically, how culture and identity impact on actors' sense of self and other; what is often referred to as strategic or security culture.[15]

While all three levels of analysis are invariably important in explaining why decision-makers might be disposed to assume the worst, the security dilemma literature is, in the main, dominated by the influence of neo-Realist scholarship and its emphasis on structural imperatives. In the next chapter, when switching the focus to the intra-state level, the pertinence of the role of anarchy is explored more fully; in particular, I assess the Constructivist challenge to the security dilemma. For the moment, though, it is appropriate to introduce some of Alexander Wendt's contentions.

Wendt argues that there is nothing inevitable about anarchy leading directly to worst-case scenarios, as threats in the international system are not natural but socially constructed. By this, Wendt means that state behaviour is determined by actors' conceptions of their own identities, and state identities are constituted in relation to others. In simple terms, as Wendt himself puts it: 'States act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not'.[16] In this way, state behaviour is a product of the nature of relations with others (both past and present). Perceptions concerning others' intentions are dependent on interaction. Wendt makes his point to this effect by creating a scenario in which two actors, humans and aliens, encounter each other for the first time. He claims that prior to either side taking any substantive action, there is no reason to assume that the other is a threat. Wendt poses the question:

> Would we assume . . . that we were about to be attacked if we were ever contacted by members of an alien civilization? I think not. We would be highly alert of course, but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched a counter-attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security . . . [as] prior to their gesture, we have no systemic basis for assigning probabilities.[17]

Wendt's central claim in this respect is that there is nothing prior to interaction.[18] This leads him to conclude: 'We do not begin our relationship in a security dilemma; security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature'.[19]

Indeed, the role of anarchy in generating security dilemmas is still very much open to debate: for Wendt and Constuctivists, it plays no part; for neo-Realists, however, it is seen as fundamental. For the moment, it suffices to quote Alan Collins:

> For some anarchy is not a cause of the security dilemma but rather a necessary condition. That is, because anarchy promotes self-help behaviour and leaves states uncertain of others' intent it creates propitious conditions for the security dilemma, but is itself not a cause. . . . [But] whether a cause or a necessary condition what is clear is that its role is important.[20]

That is, although anarchy may not in itself be a direct cause of worst-case assumptions, self-help pushes decision-makers into a position where they must repeatedly make judgements as to others' intentions. In such a situation, actors may or may not come to perceive others as a threat (this will likely depend on the mix of factors together with the other two levels). As such, given the existence of international anarchy, the occurrence of security dilemmas always remains a possibility.

The advantage of offence over defence

The propensity for decision-makers to assume the worst can also be affected by what is commonly referred to as the *advantage of offence over defence*. According to Jervis, the advantage of offence over defence holds when 'it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than to defend one's own'.[21] As such, the uncertainty that initially derives from the indistinguish-ability between offence and defence is ultimately resolved through the advantage of defensive measures: being unsure as to the nature of my neighbour's military preparations, I now see that they have something to gain by striking first. The basic situation is summed up well by Stephen van Evera:

> [W]hen the offense dominates, states are cursed with neighbours made aggressive by both temptation and fear. These neighbours see easy gains from aggression and danger in standing put. Plagued with such aggressive neighbours, all states face greater risk of attack. This drives them to compete still harder to control resources and create conditions that provide security.[22]

Together with Jack Snyder, Van Evera posits the advantage of offence over defence with reference to the First World War. In what both writers label the 'cult of the offensive', Great Power mobilisation in 1914 is explained by offensive strategies 'largely domestic in origin, rooted in bureaucratic, political and psychological causes'.[23] What is important to note here is

that the advantage of the offence is not so much considered in terms of military technology (as with Jervis), but more in military doctrines rooted in domestic structures: 'The lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, since doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of prevailing weapon technology'.[24]

The action–reaction dynamic

Accordingly, the assumption of a worst-case scenario provokes an *action–reaction dynamic* between the parties involved. Countermeasures are required to deter or defend against an apparently hostile neighbour. For the most part, this process is seen to manifest itself as arms racing: the more that you increase your arms, the more I have to increase mine if I am at least to maintain the same level of security.

Buzan and Eric Herring note how the 'action–reaction model is the classical view of arms-racing':

> The action–reaction model posits something like an international market in military strength. States will arm themselves either to seek security against the threats posed by others or increase their power to achieve political objectives against the interests of others. Military power can be used to achieve objectives through use of force, implicit or explicit threats, or symbolism.[25]

In this sense, and in keeping with the security dilemma, arms races occur because of the perception of *external* threat: weapons procurement is a direct response to others' military postures. However, arms-racing is not always necessarily the product of security-dilemma dynamics; it 'does not mean that intentions with regard to weapons acquisition are necessarily oriented towards competition with other states: they may also be a deliberate part of domestic politics'.[26]

The so-called 'domestic structure model' posits that arms races are generated by forces within the state. As Buzan and Herring explain in terms of the Cold War:

> The proponents of the domestic structure model did not argue that the rivalry between the superpowers was irrelevant, but that the process of the arms dynamic had become so deeply institutionalized within each state that domestic factors largely supplanted the crude forms of action and reaction as the main engine of the arms dynamic.[27]

Military procurement has thus a self-perpetuating dynamic whereby arms production is simply 'absorbed' into the domestic economic and political processes of the state.

Nevertheless, arms-racing and the action–reaction dynamic certainly plays a crucial role in the concept of the security dilemma inasmuch as it seeks to explain how an already conflictual situation can escalate to the point of actual hostilities.

Pre-emptive strike

In trying to break out of the action–reaction dynamic, actors may decide to launch a *pre-emptive strike*: because I believe you are going to attack me, I can counteract this threat by hitting out at you first. Hence Melander's suggestion that a 'specific precondition of any security dilemma is that in the case of confrontation it is better to move first than to wait for the adversary to make . . . [its] move'.[28] And this again refers to the advantage of offence over defence. Melander continues:

> If there were no such first-strike . . . advantages, a defensively motivated actor could never lose anything from waiting and observing the adversary's move before taking action on its own. There would thus be no incentive to undertake any efforts to gain security until . . . an adversary revealed hostile intentions, and a defensively motivated actor would not be pushed to unwillingly undermine the security of others.[29]

Unintended consequences

The culmination of the security dilemma is embodied by what is often called *unintended consequences*. Buzan explains that: 'In seeking power and security for themselves, states can easily threaten the power and security of other states'.[30] Similarly, Charles Glaser defines the security dilemma as a situation in which 'the military forces required by a state to protect itself threaten the forces other states need to protect themselves'.[31] In other words, states can decrease the security of others *because* of the actions they themselves take to strengthen their military posture. In doing so, moreover, they can also end up making themselves more insecure. This is because the measures that states take to increase their security, 'their neighbours and rivals resort to the same means', and, as a result, 'this tends to make all states less secure'.[32]

In this sense, then, the security dilemma is primarily concerned with the juxtaposition of the actors' intentions (security) and the outcome of their policies (insecurity).[33] Moreover, many writers stress that neither side, to begin with at least, necessarily wishes to aggress against the other; that a security dilemma, and eventual hostilities between the parties, comes about somehow 'inadvertently'. Robert Jervis makes the point, noting how 'most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its security have the *unintended* effect of decreasing the security of others'.[34]

This element of inadvertency is central to both Herbert Butterfield and John Herz's conceptions of the security dilemma. In his book *History and*

Human Relations, Butterfield begins to explain it thus:

> The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm to the world. It could be produced between two Powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid conflict of any sort.[35]

For Butterfield, this constituted a tragedy: 'the tragic element in modern international conflict'.[36] Similarly, Herz comments that 'it is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about what is feared the most'.[37] The pursuit of more security has the unintended effect of each actor ending up with less.

To sum up briefly, then. The concept of the security dilemma is usually defined by a combination of most, if not all, the above elements: the indistinguishability between offence and defence; uncertainty; the advantage of offence over defence; an action–reaction dynamic; a pre-emptive strike; and unintended consequences. From this general formulation, my argument now moves to distinguish between three different types of security dilemma: a 'tight', a 'regular' and a 'loose' security dilemma.[38]

A 'tight' security dilemma

A tight security dilemma can be said to have occurred when two (or more) actors with *compatible security requirements* misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures based on an illusory incompatibility. In other words, what each party believes it needs to be secure does not, in fact, conflict with what is required by its neighbour.

The foundation of a tight security dilemma rests upon the division of actors into those with 'compatible security requirements' and those with 'incompatible security requirements'. To explain what I mean by this, the starting point is what Kenneth Boulding describes as 'two very different kinds of incompatibility':

> The first is what might be called 'real' incompatibility, where we have two images of the future in which realization of one would prevent realization of the other. . . . The other form of incompatibility might be called 'illusory' incompatibility, in which there exists a condition of compatibility which would satisfy the real interests of the two parties but in which the dynamics of the situation or illusions of the parties create a situation of . . . misunderstandings, which increase hostility simply as a result of the reactions of the parties to each other, not as a result of any basic differences of interests.[39]

In the context of the security dilemma, real incompatibility exists when security for both sides cannot be realised. By contrast, illusory incompatibility refers to a situation where security for both sides is possible if only they could come to see that this is indeed the case. Within the security dilemma literature, the distinction between compatible and incompatible security requirements is often neglected: instead, most conceptions are premised on the more general assumption that security dilemmas involve actors with compatible goals.

Herbert Butterfield's formulation of the security dilemma is built upon the importance of states' 'intentionality': that the actors involved harbour no aggressive (expansionist) desires. Hence, Butterfield characterises the security dilemma as a tragedy, where neither party to the conflict originally intended the other harm. For Butterfield, throughout history this fundamental human predicament has led 'to a serious conflict of wills even if all men had been fairly intelligent and reasonably well-intentioned. . . . [It] is a certain situation that contains the elements of conflict irrespective of any special wickedness in any of the parties concerned. . . .'[40] And it is only some time after the event that the observer (in Butterfield's case, the historian) can reveal the misperceptions of those involved:

> While there is battle and hatred men have eyes for nothing save the fact that the enemy is the cause of all the troubles; but long, long afterwards, when all passion has been spent, the historian sees that it was a conflict between one half-right that was perhaps too wilful, and another half-right that was perhaps too proud; and behind this even he discerns that it was a terrible predicament, which had the effect of putting men so at cross-purposes with one another.[41]

In similar terms, Jervis emphasises the distinction between what he calls the 'spiral model' and the 'deterrence model'. While both models describe a process of action and reaction between the parties involved, their core dynamic is, in each case, something quite different. In the spiral model, the actors are non-expansionist. In the deterrence model, however,

> The aggressor, of course is hostile because its expansion is blocked, but this does not develop the unfounded fear that the . . . [other] is menacing its existence. It may increase its arms because its sees that its foreign policy aims have outrun its military strength, and the increase of arms and tensions can continue for several cycles as each side matches the other's belligerence. But this process resembles that explained by the spiral model only superficially. It is completely rational. Each side is willing to pay a high price to gain its objectives and, having failed in its initial attempt to win a cheap victory, is merely acting on its unchanged beliefs about the value of the issues at stake. The heightening of the conflict does not represent, as it does in the spiral theory, the creation of

an *illusory incompatibility*, but only the *real incompatibility* that was there from the beginning.[42]

In the deterrence model, the second state, by arming, is deterring a real aggressor: it is employing the correct countermeasures. By contrast, in the spiral model the hostility of the first state is merely 'apparent', not real. According to Jervis, only spiral model dynamics equate to a security dilemma.

Jervis demonstrates how 'historians have seen a number of cases which fit the spiral model', using the example of the Anglo–German naval race prior to the First World War:

> In 1904 President Roosevelt noted that the Kaiser 'sincerely believes that the English are planning to attack him. As a matter of fact, the English harbour no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intends to form an alliance against them with France and Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet. . . . It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge of war'.[43]

In this case, 'mutual distrust and fear' was likely the product of a combination of factors deriving from all three levels of analysis: individual, state and international system. Determining more precisely what combination is not my task here. Rather, what is important to note is Jervis' allusion that neither side wished to aggress against the other. Indeed, Jervis' description approximates quite well to a tight security dilemma. Both actors, England (Great Britain) and Germany, misperceive a situation of compatible security requirements: security for Great Britain (at least according to Roosevelt) does not necessitate attacking the German fleet, with or without France, and security for Germany does not require destroying the British Navy, in possible alliance with France and/or Russia.

In this sense, tight security dilemmas strongly embody the notion of 'unintended consequences'. Misinterpreting others' intentions as aggressive brings about insecurity and, in some cases, violence and possibly war. And this when the initial desire, peace and security, was quite to the contrary. As Collins succinctly argues: 'The essence of the security dilemma is the tragedy that unknown to either participant their incompatibility, while appearing real, is actually illusory.'[44]

Similarly, Randall Schweller writes:

> The crucial point . . . is that the security dilemma is always apparent, not real. If states are arming for something other than security; that is, if aggressors do in fact exist, then it is no longer a security dilemma but rather an example of a state or coalition mobilizing for purposes of expansion and the targets of that aggression responding and forming alliances to defend themselves.[45]

Schweller correctly points out that those actors arming for reasons other than security must be treated as aggressors. But what about those states arming *for* security? Might the pursuit of security sometimes necessitate expansionist measures? This is brought into focus when shifting the emphasis of enquiry from goals to security requirements: the fundamental question thus becomes not 'Is this actor interested in security?' but 'In what way (through what means) is this actor interested in security?' This becomes clearer when comparing a 'regular' security dilemma with this tight one.

A 'regular' security dilemma

Jervis, in keeping with Schweller, notes 'the tendency to assume that a desire for security, rather than expansion, is the prime goal of most states'.[46] The corollary of this is that actors can neatly be split into two types: 'security-seekers' and 'power-seekers'. For the most part, it is also assumed that these two types equate more or less accurately to 'status quo states' and 'revisionist states': security-seekers ordinarily have no desire to expand, while power-seekers do. Glaser labels states as 'greedy' and 'not greedy' in apparently much the same way. He uses 'the term greedy for a state willing to incur the costs or risks for non-security expansion; by contrast a not greedy state is unwilling to run the risks for non-security expansion'.[47]

Crucially, though, Glaser goes on to qualify his classification. He duly notes the difference between *intentions* and *motives*. Security-seekers can, according to Glaser, be further divided into 'secure not greedy' and 'potentially insecure not greedy'.[48] The importance of this division lies in Glaser noting that not all security-seekers are indeed status quo actors: if not greedy states become insecure, then aggression (expansion) might well be the solution to their insecurity. Indeed, Glaser writes that: 'As . . . insecurity increases, expansion becomes more attractive if acquiring additional territory would provide a buffer zone against invasion or additional resources for defence and/or would deny those resources to the defender'.[49] Or, put another way, states' security can sometimes require hostile actions, such as occupying neighbouring territory and/or taking others' resources. This situation I refer to as 'required insecurity': my security necessitates your insecurity. Similarly, Jeffrey Taliaferro points out how '[t]he historical record abounds with cases of states that pursued security-driven expansion or preventive war'.[50]

Taliaferro's work is particularly pertinent as it cuts to the very core of what separates tight security dilemmas from regular ones. Taliaferro's approach is set within the distinction between 'offensive Realism' and 'defensive Realism'. 'Offensive realism holds that anarchy . . . provides strong incentives for expansion. . . . They [states] pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs'.[51] Whereas '[d]efensive Realism holds that the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions'.[52] It is within this context that Taliaferro challenges Schweller's basic assumption.

The key to Schweller's approach concerning the security dilemma is primarily twofold: first, (ontologically) there can be no place for power-seekers; and second, the *perception* that revisionist states exist must nevertheless be present. As Schweller explains:

> [I]f an expansionist state exists, there is no security dilemma/spiral effect. Moreover, if all states are relatively sure that no one seeks expansion, then the security dilemma similarly fades away. It is only *the misplaced fear that others harbor aggressive designs* that drives the security dilemma.[53]

Set against this, Taliaferro's reading of Schweller seems to miss the point, yet in a very interesting way. This is captured when Taliaferro writes: 'He [Schweller] argues that if all states seek security, "the security dilemma is always apparent, not real" '.[54] Taliaferro then goes on to note how security-seekers, however, 'face real uncertainty not only about one another's present motives but also about their future motives and relative capabilities',[55] and hence, according to the neo-Realist argument, are compelled to assume the worst.

Taliaferro's argument is thus that the security dilemma has the potential to occur precisely because incentives exist for security-seekers to expand. He notes Japan's expansion in the 1930s as a classic case 'of how security-driven policies and fears of adversaries' future intentions can provoke conflict':

> The notion that Japan could best provide for its security through empire and autarky originated in the lessons that its military planners drew from Germany's defeat in World War I. If future conflicts resembled that war, a state's ability to win would depend largely on its ability to mobilize economic resources. The Japanese home islands, however, lacked the natural resources needed to fight a prolonged war, which in turn made Japan vulnerable to exploitation or attack from the United States, the Soviet Union . . . or Great Britain. To that end, elements of the Japanese Imperial Army pursued a measured expansionist strategy. . . .[56]

Assuming – and this seems highly debatable in itself – that Imperial Japan was indeed a security-seeker, Taliaferro's description of events nevertheless embodies an unambiguous example of required insecurity: Japanese security, as seen by Tokyo at the time, necessitated insecurity (invasion and conquest) for some of its neighbours.

When Schweller writes that the security dilemma is 'not real', he does not mean, as Taliaferro seems to think, that the security dilemma does not exist in an international system full of security-seekers. Rather, what he means is that the security dilemma exists only according to the (mis)perceptions of decision-makers: when actors mistakenly believe their status quo neighbours to be revisionist. Put another way: security dilemmas occur when actors are perceptually insecure but ontologically secure. For Schweller, and this is the

crux, security dilemmas do not occur while states wish to pursue expansionist policies.

The presence of required insecurity has significance inasmuch as it necessarily precludes the compatibility of actors' security requirements. In a tight security dilemma, security-seekers behave according to an illusory incompatibility concerning their security requirements. In a regular security dilemma, security-seekers act more in accordance with a real incompatibility. In other words, regular security dilemmas are not marked by 'misperception' in the same way as tight ones. And this would seem to place regular security dilemmas somewhere in between Jervis' spiral and deterrence models: although still dealing with security-seekers, a second state, in assuming the worst, is correctly interpreting the security requirements of the first (expansion). Thus, by employing countermeasures, the second state is taking the correct course of action.

As alluded to by Taliaferro, the belief that security might be achieved through military aggression can often be the result of the state's strategic situation. Indeed, Jervis places much importance on this particular factor. He notes how before the First World War 'even a status quo Germany' could well have been compelled to attack its neighbours.[57] Given the presence of less than friendly powers on either side, France and Russia, strategic necessity dictated that one be defeated quickly, regardless of whether either country intended to attack Germany. Thus, as Jervis writes: 'The security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion. Status quo powers must then act like aggressors.'[58]

Jack Snyder and Charles Reynolds also talk of the security dilemma in terms of expansionist states (although they both prefer to use the term 'imperialist state'). Reynolds argues that imperialist states will pursue expansionist policies in order to counter their vulnerability to changes in the relative power of their neighbours.[59] Similarly, Snyder argues that while an aggressor (imperialist state) might well begin with the intention of attacking another, because this second state employs countervailing measures, what can then ensure between the two sides is 'a testing of will and capabilities'.[60] Snyder claims that in such a situation both sides will fear being taken advantage of. As such, the expansionist state arms further for both defensive (to deter the other) and offensive (a pre-emptive strike) purposes.

In tight security dilemmas, the actors involved wish for both peace (defined as the absence of war) and security, but instead end up feeling insecure and in a conflictual situation they never originally intended. In regular security dilemmas, however, the way to security may very well be through war itself (expansionist policies).[61] The element of inadvertency might still be applicable to imperialist states, inasmuch as the nature of the resultant conflict may not be that originally envisaged: I am now facing an adversary military stronger and more resolute than would otherwise have been the case and/or that might choose to pre-empt and attack me first. In this way, for

regular security dilemmas the notion of unintended consequences may still have some relevance, but not in the same way as with tight security dilemmas. Indeed, Snyder himself sums up the basic difference when he defines a security dilemma as 'a situation in which each state believed that its security *required the insecurity of others*'.[62]

A 'loose' security dilemma

In tight security dilemmas, security-seekers have compatible security requirements. In regular security dilemmas, matters are complicated somewhat by virtue of security-seekers having incompatible security requirements. In 'loose security dilemmas', however, whether actors are security-seekers at all may well be inconsequential.

For regular security dilemmas, it was noted how actors might choose expansion as a means of pursuing security. Jervis recognises that this choice is significantly influenced by the offence–defence balance: with offence having the advantage, it makes perfect sense to go on to the attack. 'Conversely, when defense has the advantage, status quo states can make themselves more secure without gravely endangering others.'[63] Jervis is specific in elucidating the effects of the offence–defence balance purely in terms of security-seekers. But not all others take the same approach.

In 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', Glaser builds upon his earlier work concerning greedy and not greedy states. Although Glaser first discusses the ways in which security-seekers can generate unintended consequences, he then goes on to focus on the relevance of power-seekers to the security dilemma: 'The security dilemma does not become unimportant in a world with greedy states'.[64] The importance of the security dilemma does seem to depend, though, on just how greedy states are: the greedier the actor, the less relevant the security dilemma is in explaining state behaviour. Glaser is not clear as to what exactly more greedy and less greedy are. He is clear, however, in his claim that greedy states and the security dilemma can go together. Indeed, as a counter to Schweller's work, Glaser writes that 'Schweller's conclusions are somewhat exaggerated, because he believes incorrectly that greedy states rob the security dilemma of all its explanatory value'.[65]

Glaser's argument in this respect is that 'with greedy states, offense–defense variables still play a role in explaining war'.[66] What Glaser seems to be getting at is that depending on whether offence or defence has the advantage, power-seekers will either be encouraged or discouraged from employing (intended) aggressive policies. In other words, the benefits of going to war are either increased or decreased by offence–defence variables. But while the offence–defence balance might well affect the propensity for states to go to war, it does not, on its own, add much in explaining why actors desire expansion in the first place.

This closely resembles what Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn refer to as the 'declining-prize dilemma'. Rather than acting out of fears of being

harmed by others, in the declining-prize dilemma 'it is incentives to win that compel the actors to initiate violence or maintain fighting'.[67] Angstrom and Duyvesteyn continue:

> Actors are thus not necessarily mere security seekers, but rather power-maximizers. The declining-prize dilemma suggests that under anarchy (implying incomplete information about the counterparts' preferences) and, crucially, under suddenly reduced resources, it becomes rational for any actor to try to win, because even . . . [some] prize is better than none. This can explain why actors are prepared to accept huge costs, that is, war. . . . This results in a dilemma, because as one group strives to win the prize, the violence decreases the prize further, thereby inviting others to try to win it.[68]

In this way, actors engage in and continue fighting not because of strategic considerations – whether offence has the advantage – but simply to secure the ever-decreasing spoils. Nevertheless, in both the loose security dilemma and the declining-prize dilemma, power considerations are at the core.

The loose formulation of the security dilemma is the weakest embodiment of the notion of unintended consequences. If power-seekers want war and mobilise towards this end, then what can be unintended? For some scholars, therefore, a loose security dilemma is not a security dilemma at all.

Violence, war, and the security dilemma

Categorising the security dilemma into tight, regular and loose interpretations arguably provides for a more differentiated approach to cases of (ethnic) violence and war. This threefold typology enables the observer to account for both power-seeking and security-seeking behaviour, as well as the expansionist and non-expansionist manifestations of security seeking. As Snyder and Jervis also point out:

> No individual case is ever entirely of one type or another. Actors feel they need to expand in order to be secure. Sometimes such beliefs are rationalizations for more purely predatory moves; at other times they are not, and it is extremely difficult for later analysts, let alone contemporary observers, to tell which is which.[69]

Finding an answer to the question 'What kind of security dilemma?' is, as Snyder and Jervis recognise, often an extremely difficult undertaking. Even in the case of the Cold War, for example, for which analysts have come to have access to increasing amounts of information, the application of the security dilemma is still very much a point of contention. Writing in the *New York Times* in 1973, Butterfield proposed that

there could be a United States and a Russia [Soviet Union] standing at the top of the world, exactly equal in power, exactly equal in virtue, and each could fear with some justice that the other might steal a march on it, neither of them understanding for a moment – neither of them even crediting – the counterfear of the other. Each could be sure of its own . . . intentions, but might not trust the other, since one can never really pierce the exterior of anybody else.[70]

Jervis' conclusion is that superpower competition contained elements of a security dilemma, but that fundamentally it was a clash of political systems and that security for both sides was, in the end, thus effectively precluded:

Mutual security in these circumstances was a goal that could not be attained. For the Soviet Union, mutual security was not a goal at all if 'security' is equated with maintaining the status quo. The basic Soviet view of politics . . . as class conflict meant that 'socialism in one country' could never be sufficient. . . . Although analogous desires were present in the United States, they were instrumental rather than intrinsic. The United States had enough of what it valued, and it would have gladly frozen the status quo if that had been possible. But because it was not possible, the United States often pursued offensive tactics.[71]

For Jervis, then, the Cold War was not a Butterfieldian tragedy: even if the actors indeed came to realise their predicament, security for both sides could not be achieved.

The value, though, of asking that tricky question, 'What kind of security dilemma?', is that it brings with it the important issue of actor responsibility. The security dilemma's notion of unintended consequences readily implies that something was not supposed to happen; that, for decision-makers, the situation was not of their own making. Thus, to some degree at least, actors might then be excused from the responsibility of causation. As such, scholars, I suggest, must be especially mindful when assigning the security dilemma to actual cases. Reassessing the causes of, say, the First World War through the tight, regular, and loose security dilemma typology would probably appear as much an interesting academic exercise as anything else. But for more contemporary conflicts, such an undertaking has a much more pragmatic purpose to it. What is profitable is to show how different interpretations of the concept manifest themselves as distinct implications; in this case, varying degrees of actor responsibility. And, for recent ethnic conflicts, this may be of special importance.

The next chapter duly turns its attention to the intra-state context, with particular attention to the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

2 The 'ethnic' security dilemma and the former Yugoslavia

During the period of the Cold War, the concept of the security dilemma came to occupy a central position in explaining the emergence and escalation of international (inter-state) conflict. However, with the collapse of Communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the main site of application for the concept, superpower rivalry, soon disappeared. Thus, the challenge for those within the IR discipline was to find a new context for a concept that, somewhat abruptly, seemed to have lost much of its *raison d'être*.

In 1993, Barry Posen's article 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict' appeared.[1] In it, Posen proposed furthering the application of the concept to incorporate the intra-state level, proffering an explanation for the outbreak of violence and war between neighbouring ethnic groups. Since Posen, other writers have followed; utilising what can be labelled as an 'ethnic security dilemma'. The application of the ethnic security dilemma has been focused predominantly on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia: those in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In this chapter, I critically examine existing approaches to the ethnic security dilemma largely through these particular cases, focusing mainly on the work of Posen, plus Stuart J. Kaufman, and Erik Melander. In doing so, I qualify the approaches of the three writers using the 'tight', 'regular', and 'loose' security dilemma categorisation. I then go on to argue that the utility of the ethnic security dilemma is somewhat limited by its failure to explicitly address those insecurities deriving from threats to 'societal' identity.

To begin with, though, it is necessary to see how the role of the security dilemma fits alongside other explanations for ethnic violence and war. Here, I follow Kaufman's example by setting different approaches in the framework of IR's traditional three levels of analysis.

Approaches to ethnic conflict

According to Kaufman, existing approaches to ethnic violence and war can profitably be viewed through relocating Kenneth Waltz's classic three 'images' of international conflict[2] to the intra-state context. Kaufman argues that 'first image' (human nature), 'second image' (the nature of states and elite

behaviour'), and 'third image' (the nature of the international system) explanations might easily be transferred to ethnic conflict: equating to 'mass preferences' (first image), 'ethnic elites' behaviour' (second image) and the 'structure of the (domestic) political system' (third image). And I now look at each of these in turn.

Mass preferences

Mass preferences is an essentially bottom–up explanation for ethnic conflict. It posits members of the ethnic group incited to violence on the basis of 'long-held chauvinistic (stereotyped) and militaristic beliefs . . .'.[4] Kaufman, borrowing from Donald Horowitz, identifies four common sources of mass hostility: an 'external affinity problem'; 'the historical domination of one group by another'; 'the presence of negative ethnic stereotypes'; and 'conflict over ethnic symbols'.[5] Kaufman argues that mass preferences (informed by the aforementioned factors) can put pressure on political leaders to adopt extreme positions, which leads to increasing levels of violence and ultimately ethnic war.

The notion of mass hostility is often conflated with the so-called 'ancient hatreds' thesis. The ancient hatreds thesis is not unlike a 'primordialist' account of conflict. For some primordialists, war is biologically driven. In this sense, group (ethnic) markers are ascribed, given at birth, and not chosen. However, other primordialists also note culturally derived markers. What is learned is so deeply entrenched within the society that recourse to certain ways of behaviour seems almost automatic: in other words, they are seen as being in the group's nature. The ancient hatreds thesis gained particular prominence in the early to mid 1990s, shortly after the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflicts. Providing a typical example in this respect, Maria Todorova quotes American journalist Roger Cohen and his amazement at the apparent 'savagery' of the Balkan peoples: '[T]he notion of killing people . . . because of something that may have happened in 1945 is unthinkable in the Western world. Not in the Balkans'.[6] In similar fashion, Edgar O'balance writes that:

> When aroused, the Bosnian combatants reacted in much the same way as their forebears, as confirmed by events in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. King Alexander's rule and Tito's firm administration were misleading interludes of comparatively peaceful coexistence – but old hatreds, feuds and prejudices had not been eradicated, they simply lay dormant.[7]

In the vividly titled 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', Dusko Doder describes Yugoslavia as a land that has 'long been haunted by conflict', and of the present conflicts as 'a savage religious and tribal war'.[8] Moreover, Doder also notes how 'imperial, religious, and racial interests' have always clashed in the Balkans.[9]

The conception of the Balkans as some kind of 'conflict fault-line' is expressly manifest in Samuel Huntington's now famous *Clash of Civiliz-ations*. Huntington argues that the pattern of future conflicts in the world will not be shaped by differences in political systems – ideological and economic, as in the Cold War – but by cultural, more specifically religious, differences embodied in civilisational entities. As Huntington explains: 'To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in . . . the former Yugoslavia . . .'.[10] While Huntington's thesis seeks to propound a systemic explanation for violence and war, his conclusions appear every bit as deterministic as those who proffer ancient hatred explanations. As Florian Bieber points out: 'Huntington's theory is . . . the academic articulation of a number of more crude journalistic explanations for conflicts between the West and the mainly Islamic world, as well as in former Yugoslavia'.[11]

The ancient hatreds and clash of civilisations explanations have come in for much criticism,[12] and there are now arguably few scholars who sub-scribe wholly to these approaches. Moreover, it is important to note that primordialism must not be seen as completely synonymous with the mass hostility thesis. Indeed, for authors such as Kaufman mass preferences are very much learned (and thus subject to manipulation), not natural.

Ethnic elites' behaviour

Kaufman also stresses that wars occur because there are aggressive actors that wish to start them. Referring to a more top–down strategy, Kaufman's starting point in this respect is Stephen van Evera's re-working of Jack Snyder's 'diversionary theory of war' (that elites may adopt aggressive policies purely to stay in power). Van Evera points out that mass preferences may well be the result of elite policy.[13] In this way, leaders secure support for their policies by exploiting state mechanisms: offering incentives such as jobs and career paths to potential supporters, utilising large organisations such as pressure groups to support their causes, and using threats of violence, or indeed actual violence itself, in order to intimidate rivals.[14]

That political elites manipulate and mobilise members of the ethnic group toward violence and war is sometimes referred to as 'conflict entrepreneur-ship'. V. P. Gagnon's 1995 article, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict', is prominent in this respect. With a specific focus on those strategies employed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Gagnon argues that: 'The challenge for elites is . . . to define the interests of the collective in a way that coincides with their own power interests. In other words, they must express their interests in the "language" of the collective interest'.[15] Moreover, political elites must not only try to win popular support, but must also defend themselves against other political challengers: to guard against what Robert

Hislope calls 'ethnic flanking'.[16] The most effective strategy for doing so, Gagnon goes on to explain, is 'to shift the focus of political debate away from issues where ruling elites are most threatened; for example, proposed changes in the structure of domestic economic or political power, towards other issues, defined in cultural or ethnic terms, that appeal to the interests of the majority in non-economic terms'.[17]

Gagnon characterises the process of conflict entrepreneurship as a kind of rational, cost–benefit exercise, wherein leaders must weigh the benefits of success domestically against the cost of provoking conflict internationally. In this way, Gagnon and others have been criticised by more Constructivist writers. Although my intention here is not to discuss Constructivist critiques in terms of second-image explanations (as they will be discussed further in the specific context of the security dilemma), it must suffice to say that rationalist explanations posit identities and interests as givens, and thus are not concerned with the process whereby ethnic identities are constituted and reconstituted.[18]

The ethnic security dilemma

In moving on to third-image explanations, the structure of the (domestic) political system, James Fearon notes how the collapse of central governments 'has in several places created a *commitment problem* that arises when two groups find themselves without a third party that can credibly guarantee agreements between them'.[19] Fearon explains that in some cases ethnic majorities are unable to convince others that they will not exploit minority groups. Ethnic minorities 'anticipate that regardless of what the ethnic majority leaders agree to now, there is no solid guarantee that the leaders will not renege in the future, due to the play of majority politics in the new state to come'.[20] Also drawing on the former Yugoslavia, Fearon notes that the 'rapid polarization' of Serbs and Croats in Croatia in the months directly prior to the 1991 Serb–Croat War presents a problem: it is inconsistent with the ancient hatreds explanation, according to which hostilities are waiting to explode at any time. Likewise, it also poses a challenge to the conflict entrepreneurship explanation, as ethnic elites were unable to easily manipulate the masses prior to this particular period of time. Thus, Fearon argues that the answer lies with the new Croatian government and 'how there was nothing credible they could do to commit themselves not to pursue policies detrimental to Serb welfare and security in the future, after the Croatian state had grown stronger'.[21]

The notion of 'commitment problems' is sometimes taken together with that of the security dilemma. Indeed, that there can be no guarantees as to others' future behaviour is much emphasised by neo-Realists in the context of the security dilemma concept. However, and as Fearon himself points out, the two approaches can be differentiated. In the security dilemma, actors 'have no fundamentally aggressive or revisionist desires':

By contrast, for the commitment problem I describe to operate, there must be some set of substantive issues over which the minority and majority have conflicting preferences, either in the present or in the future. Otherwise, the minority has nothing to fear concerning what policies the majority will implement in the new state, and the fact of anarchy is then inconsequential.[22]

Although there are certain similarities between the commitment problem and the 'regular' and 'loose' security dilemma formulations, further exploration of them is not the main task in hand. I shall instead return to the specific application of the security dilemma.

Kaufman concentrates exclusively on the role of the ethnic security dilemma, arguing that mass preferences and the behaviour of ethnic elites create the necessary conditions (anarchy and self-help) for a security dilemma to occur.[23] The next three sections critically evaluate security dilemma explanations for ethnic violence and war, looking specifically at the work of Barry Posen and Erik Melander, in addition to that of Kaufman.

Posen's approach

Posen's approach focuses primarily on the relationship between Serbs and Croats: the outbreak of hostilities between the two groups culminating in the 1991 Serb–Croat War. Posen characterises the situation in the former Yugoslavia as having been one of 'emerging anarchy': the absence of effective central government meant that the country's various ethnic groups (in this case, Croatia's Serb and Croat populations) were compelled to provide for their own security.[24] Set against this, Posen's conception of the security dilemma is premised on the following three elements: 'the indistinguishability of offence and defence', 'the superiority of offensive over defensive action', and 'windows of vulnerability and opportunity'.

Concerning the first aspect, the indistinguishability of offence and defence, Posen argues that to begin with newly independent groups must try to determine their neighbours' intentions, and that they will usually do so by examining one another's military capabilities. Clear distinctions between offensive and defensive capabilities are often difficult to make, and especially so in terms of lightly armed, often irregular forces. As Posen points out, as 'the weaponry available to such groups will often be quite rudimentary, their offensive military capabilities will be as much a function of the quantity . . . of the soldiers as the particular characteristics of the weapons they control'.[25] In such circumstances, Posen goes on, intentionality is ascertained largely by reference to the historical record.

Posen describes how the historical views taken by ethnic groups often turn out to be inaccurate and misleading. First, regimes in multi-ethnic states may well have suppressed or manipulated the historical record in order to consolidate their own position. Second, within the groups themselves old

rivalries will have been preserved more in stories, poems and myths than in 'proper' written history, and will thereby have been 'magnified in . . . [their] telling'.[26] Third, because of this each group will have difficulty in adhering to another's view of the past. And fourth, 'as central authority begins to collapse and local politicians begin to struggle for power, they will begin to write down their versions of history in political speeches. Yet stories are likely to be emotionally charged.'[27] Thus, the result is likely to be a worst-case analysis.

Posen then considers those circumstances in which offensive action is likely to be preferred to some form of defence. Here, Posen is keen to stress the importance of what he calls 'ethnic islands': where '[i]slands of one group's population are stranded in the sea of another'.[28] He goes on to explain:

> Where one territorially concentrated group has 'islands' of settlement of its members distributed across the nominal territory of another group (irredenta), the protection of these islands in the event of hostile action can seem extremely difficult. These islands may not be able to help one another; they may be subject to blockade or siege, and by virtue of their numbers relative to the surrounding population and because of topography, they may be militarily indefensible.[29]

In such a situation, incentives will exist to rescue these islands before the other is able to take advantage of their relative vulnerability. In other words, the presence of ethnic islands make preventive war (a first-strike) more likely.[30]

Posen's final consideration is windows of vulnerability and opportunity:

> The relative rate of state formation strongly influences the incentives for preventive war. When central authority has collapsed or is collapsing . . . [t]he material remnants of the old state (especially weaponry, foreign currency reserves, raw material stocks and industrial capabilities) will be unevenly distributed across the territories of the old empire. Some groups may have held a privileged position in the old system. Others will be less well placed.[31]

In a situation where preventive war might be desirable, calculations must be made as to the relative power of one side against the other. If the other is militarily weaker, but over time is expected to become much stronger, then it is desirable to strike sooner rather than later. Moreover, whether the other has potential allies, and, if so, how soon their forces could be mobilised, will also have considerable influence on the timing of an armed attack.[32]

Posen writes that given their past behaviour, Croatia's Serb and Croat populations each came to view the other as a threat. In addition, on the part of Serbia proper offence appeared to have the advantage, particularly in terms of rescuing islands of their fellow nationals in Croatia. As such, and given

Serbia's relative power advantage over the Croatian republic, '[p]reventive war incentives were relatively high'.[33]

In short, then, Posen's application of the security dilemma is predicated for the most part on first-strike incentives against what is believed to be a hostile neighbour. And while briefly discussing those reasons as to why both Serbs and Croats had cause to see the other as malevolent,[34] Posen fails to arrive at any explicit conclusion as to whether these perceptions were in fact correct. Indeed, Posen's application of the security dilemma is not made any more conclusive by his claim that 'there were plenty of signals of malign intent'.[35] Signals of malign intent when actions are in fact benign (misperception) is fundamental to the 'tight' conception of the security dilemma I outlined in the previous chapter. But Posen offers no subsequent evidence to make his position clear: were these signals real or were they merely apparent? As such, he seems only to *assume* that the scenario is being driven by the spiral model.

To reiterate: what is most problematic concerning Posen's application of the security dilemma is his failure to reach a conclusion as to intentionality. Were the parties involved security seekers? And, if so, were they security seekers with compatible or incompatible security requirements? Without a substantive answer to these questions, whether there existed a tight, regular or loose security dilemma cannot be established with any degree of certainty. This is important, not only in terms of determining the nature of the conflict with much greater precision, but also in being able to attribute actor responsibility. I will return to this later in the chapter.

Kaufman's approach

Kaufman's point of reference in his application of the security dilemma is much the same as that of Posen, again focusing on the process of action and reaction between Serbs and Croats in the Croatian republic. In conceptual terms, however, Kaufman's approach is far trickier than that employed by Posen. Kaufman begins by dividing the security dilemma into two types: a 'structural security dilemma', and a 'perceptual security dilemma'. A structural security dilemma refers to a situation that has occurred not by state design but as a result of the anarchic nature of the system in which it exists. Whereas a perceptual security dilemma takes place when decision-makers 'fail to recognize the degree to which their security measures threaten other states'.[36]

Kaufman goes on to argue that both types of security dilemma were at play in the outbreak of the 1991 Serb–Croat War. His claim is that conflict in the former Yugoslavia occurred because of the *deliberate* policies of Slobodan Milosevic (perceptual security dilemma), with this creating the conditions in which a structural security dilemma could then take place: 'Once the first few shooting incidents were over . . . Serbs and Croats [in Croatia] could not really protect themselves without threatening the other'.[37] In short, what Kaufman

seems to be saying is this: to begin with, decision-makers fail to realise the extent to which their policies generate fear in others. Fear provokes certain measures and counter-measures, which in turn spill over as outbreaks of ethnic violence. Ethnic violence in itself creates anarchical conditions (the dissolution of the state) in which the parties involved are compelled to initiate policies that threaten the existence of the other. And in this regard, Kaufman's approach comes strongly to resemble that of Posen's.

Of the two security dilemmas employed, taken alone Kaufman's structural security dilemma seems to fit more closely with either a tight or regular formulation. Indeed, Kaufman himself is keen to emphasise its benign aspect: 'The key point is that the conflict *need not be the result of aggressive intent*: it is a result of the structure of the situation'.[38] In other words, the actors involved are security seekers. But in taking both types of security dilemma together (perceptual and structural), Kaufman's approach betrays the tendency for a somewhat loose interpretation.

The first problem lies in Kaufman's application of the perceptual security dilemma. Kaufman ties the concept to the former Yugoslavia, that case being what he describes as an example of 'elite-led violence'. Kaufman divides ethnic war into mass-led and elite-led cases. With mass-led cases, hostilities emerge inadvertently: hostility and fear 'trigger spontaneous outbreaks of violence, activating a security dilemma which in turns exacerbates hostility and fear'.[39] With elite-led cases, however, 'the process is different because elites *intentionally cause* both mass hostility and a security dilemma, rather than reacting to them'.[40] In mass-led wars, therefore, the implication is that uncertainty causes both sides to mistakenly view the other as a threat. With elite-led wars, though, the goal seems clearly to harm the other: 'belligerent leaders . . . [provoke] mass hostility . . . creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leaders' belligerence'.[41]

There is thus a strong link between elite-led conflicts and intended hostilities. Indeed, Kaufman explicitly refers to Milsoevic's 'war policy',[42] and by doing so clearly demonstrates the malign nature of the Serbian president: if Milosevic wanted war, then any countervailing measures taken by the Croats will have constituted the right course of action (deterrence model). In this sense, Kaufman's application of a perceptual security dilemma is premised on an action–reaction dynamic initiated intentionally: Kaufman referring to 'Milosevic's skill in creating a security dilemma in Croatia'.[43] Given the presence of aggressive intentions, Kaufman's description of the Serbian president taking certain steps to 'ensure war'[44] equates at best with a regular security dilemma, but more likely with a loose interpretation of the concept – accepting that Milosevic was indeed a power seeker, not a security seeker.

The second problem relates more to Kaufman's structural security dilemma. As was noted, Kaufman's interpretation of a structural security dilemma is that anarchy and self-help compel actors to employ certain policies. However, his corollary to this is different to that described by Robert

Jervis in terms of the spiral model. Jervis's argument in this respect is that structural imperatives tend to exacerbate the inherent sense of fear already felt by decision-makers. In this way, Jervis shows how neo-Realism's emphasis on structural anarchy reinforces that of classical Realism's focus on human nature:

> The benefit of combining [the classical Realist and neo-Realist conceptions] is in seeing how the basic security dilemma becomes overlaid by reinforcing misunderstandings as each side comes to believe that not only is the other a potential menace – as it must be in a setting of anarchy – but that the other's behavior has shown that it is an active enemy.[45]

The structure of the international system forces actors to play it safe, it accentuates misperception. In a different way, though, Kaufman effectively concludes that in such a situation security for one party necessarily precludes security for another: where nationalists on both sides 'have defined security for themselves to require the insecurity of others'.[46] And, as I argued in Chapter 1, the presence of 'required insecurity' locates the security dilemma firmly in its regular interpretation: while the ultimate goal may well be security, the action–reaction process nonetheless closely resembles that of the deterrence model.

To sum up briefly: Kaufman's description of the 1991 Serb–Croat War as an elite-led conflict, where leaders deliberately employ revisionist policies, suggests a loose interpretation of the security dilemma (actors are power seekers with expansionist goals). And this is only confirmed given the way in which Kaufman employs his perceptual security dilemma. The structural security dilemma that consequently ensues by contrast recommends a more regular interpretation. Nevertheless, this sits somewhat awkwardly given the malign implications of the previous perceptual security dilemma dynamics.

Melander's approach

Melander's concentration, unlike Posen and Kaufman, lies with the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Melander is careful to identify the actors involved and to define the separate hostilities between the parties. As a result, he proposes two different cases: between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, what he calls the 'Serb nationalist faction' versus the 'Croat nationalist faction'; and between the Bosnian Serbs and the *Bosniaks* (predominantly the Bosnian Muslims), what he calls the 'Serb nationalist faction' versus the 'Bosnian government'.[47] As Melander himself comes to dismiss the relevance of the security dilemma to the second case of hostilities, concentration here will duly rest on the war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats.

Melander's conception of the security dilemma is best captured by his following assertion: 'If it can be convincingly demonstrated that the

escalating side was a basically defensively-motivated, non-revisionist actor, then the security dilemma is the only rationalistic mechanism which can explain an outcome entailing war'.[48] To elaborate further, Melander states three preconditions for the presence of a security dilemma: defensively motivated actors, the indistinguishability between offensive and defensive preparations, and the existence of first-strike incentives in a situation of uncertainty.

Melander's main point of reference in this respect is the March 1991 meeting between President Franjo Tudjman of the Croatian republic and his Serbian counterpart, Milosevic. During the meeting, the two presidents secretly negotiated the partition of Bosnia between what in effect would be Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian states.[49] If successfully implemented, the so-called 'Karadjordjevo Agreement' would act as a barrier to hostilities between the Bosnian Serbs and Croats: both parties carving up Bosnia at the expense of the republic's majority Muslim population.[50] As a result, the Serb and Croat nationalist factions would derive great advantage in sticking to Karadjordjevo. For the Serbs, the agreement would allow them to concentrate fully on their primary objective; preventing the Bosnian government from dragging the republic away from the rest of Yugoslavia. For the Croats, it would enable the creation of several ethnically pure autonomous regions, in the main carved out of Croatian majority areas in western Hercegovina, without the unwarranted intervention of the more powerful Serb forces.[51]

Concerning Karadjordjevo then, Melander's argument is that the agreement reached between Tudjman and Milosevic defined a status quo situation between them and, crucially, that both sides' best interests were served by not seeking a revision to the agreement. For Melander, the corollary of this assertion is that the outbreak of major hostilities between the two parties in April 1992 can thus only be explained by a security dilemma: the Bosnian Serbs came to view their Croatian counterparts as having strong incentives toward defecting from the agreement. And this, according to Melander, is a misinterpretation of Bosnian Croat intentions.

What also needs to be considered, though, is the broader context of the general Serb–Croat relationship at the time. The agreement at Karadjordjevo and the subsequent war in Bosnia itself both took place against the wider background of Serb–Croat enmity. In the framework that Melander proposes, the leaders of the belligerent 'Croatian nationalist' and 'Serbian nationalist' groupings in Bosnia are the very same protagonists as in the previous 1991 Serb–Croat War: Tudjman and Milosevic. As such, the implementation of the terms of Karadjordjevo seems to indicate merely a short-term decision on the part of Bosnian Serbs and Croats, designed to provide a temporary halt to hostilities within their overall conflictual relationship. By doing so, both would be able to make gains at the expense of the Bosnian government faction.[52] In these terms, Karadjordjevo delayed the violence more than anything else. The agreement was designed to postpone for a while what both

sides were fully expecting to happen sooner or later: a full-blown Serb–Croat war in Bosnia. And there is some acknowledgement from Melander himself as to the distinct possibility that a Serb–Croat war would have take place regardless:

> Whatever the secret details of the agreement from Karadjordjevo, there was thus an apparent incompatibility in the publicly declared territorial claims of the Serb nationalists and their Croatian counterparts. This conflict could have been viewed by the Serbs as serious enough to necessitate a military solution.[53]

Indeed, other writers have also expressed their reservations concerning Milosevic's genuine commitment to the agreed partition. For example, in Misha Glenny's opinion:

> In his culpable naivety, President Tudjman believed that this [Karadjordjevo] would prevent war in Bosnia. . . . For his part, President Milosevic was merely keeping an important option open. His commitment to the division of . . . [Bosnia] (which later he formally renounced) guaranteed Tudjman's agreement at the March meeting, which enabled Milosevic to return to Belgrade waving a . . . statement that was instrumental in quashing the last flicker of opposition movement.[54]

Likewise, Laura Silber and Allan Little describe how 'Milosevic was interested in whatever deal would maximize his grip on power. Tudjman was lulled into believing that his dream of an independent and enlarged Croatia was within reach and that war could be avoided'.[55] There seems every reason to conclude, therefore, that Milosevic held no firm conviction in upholding Karadjordjevo. Although in the short term he was prepared to come to some kind of agreement with Tudjman, the longer-term goal of the Serbian President was the forceful acquisition of territory in the republic at the expense of the Bosnian Croats.

Given the only partial resolution of the 1991 Serb–Croat War, relations between the two groups were, for the most part, still marked by an intense enmity. Again, referring to Melander's own acknowledgements: 'It is likely that the ultimate ambition of the Croat nationalists was to regain Croatian Krajina as well as annex parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Croatia'.[56] As such, as long as Tudjman and Milosevic were both planning their next moves concerning the Serb-occupied areas in Croatia, it seems difficult to talk about the goals of the parties as being compatible in any way.

Also in the context of Bosnia Hercegovina, Susan Woodward argues that the security dilemma can be used to explain not only the initial slide into conflict, but also the difficulties in reaching a stable peace settlement. She writes that military intervention by a third party will not be enough

if the negotiated agreement itself does not address the security fears of the population and the structural conditions that can create a security dilemma. If the outsiders who assist in ending the parties civil war do not understand the security dilemma, or are unwilling to see it operating in the particular case, they can even intensify the security dilemma and prolong the perceptions of vulnerability that inhibit cooperation.[57]

Assessing the 1995 Dayton accords, Woodward comments that the accords directly addressed structural conditions that can give rise to a security dilemma and to individuals' fears: military demobilisation, territorial sovereignty and authoritative government.[58] Nevertheless, her conclusion in this respect is ultimately sceptical:

> The ambiguities, uncertainties and contradictions in the peace agreement and the overriding uncertainty about the future it induced, far from helping to remove the obstacles to peace and cooperation, created the conditions for a serious security dilemma *after* the war.[59]

This is what Barbara Walter refers to as a security dilemma 'in reverse'.[60]

Woodward goes on to describe how Dayton did nothing to alter the terms of the political conflict; indeed, it served only to re-create the same, pre-existing political alignments. The accords left all three parties feeling insecure in their gains. The Bosnian Muslims secured their independent state, but one with less than a third of the territory of the former Bosnian republic. The Bosnian Serbs gained their own mini-state, but one whose legitimacy was under constant attack. And finally, the Bosnia Croats achieved recognition of their right to self-determination and joint defence of the federation, but at the expense of having to dismantle their own mini-state in Bosnia: Herceg-Bosna.[61] Moreover, Dayton maintained the central focus on territory, but did so in a way so as to create vulnerable enclaves of mixed populations: a country of corridors and buffer zones was intended to prevent Serb and Croat secession.[62] The accord's train and equip programme effectively produced three professionalised and modernised armies within one state. And with Dayton's power-sharing element again only serving to reinforce rather than break down ethnic divisions, the overall result was, in structural terms, simply to replicate the pre-Dayton situation.

Of the security dilemma itself, Woodward's conception is similar to that of Kaufman. She proffers that:

> Those who argue that there was no security dilemma in the run up to violence in Croatia and in Bosnia because this is a structural argument that ignores agency and thus denies leaders' culpability for manufacturing fears and defensiveness miss the point of the security dilemma: that it is perceptions that matter, and that it is a relational dynamic between two or more actors that leads to violence.[63]

Woodward's argument is thus interesting in a number of respects. Her acknowledgement of the possibility that group leaders were deliberately creating, 'manufacturing', fears sits somewhat awkwardly with the element of 'unintended consequences' (which, I have argued, is fundamental to the security dilemma concept): it is a distinctly 'loose' interpretation of the security dilemma, predicated on elites intentionally provoking conflict.

In addition, Woodward also recognises 'leaders' culpability': that, despite the presence of a security dilemma, this does not preclude assigning some degree of responsibility to those actors involved. Woodward's recognition of actor responsibility in this context is crucial: with Posen, Kaufman, Melander, and others furnishing former Yugoslavia with the security dilemma label, this, without qualification, might well leave the impression that leaders are caught in a situation that is not of their own making. And evidence from the wars in both Croatia and Bosnia indicates that is far from being the case.

The tight, regular and loose security dilemma categorisation proposed in Chapter 1 provides some means of making the necessary qualifications. For loose security dilemmas – as just described – actors are conflict entrepreneurs. In regular security dilemmas, although they do not deliberately intend to provoke conflict in the same way, nonetheless decision-makers must take some of the blame for choosing to execute policies that necessitate insecurity in and/or harm to their neighbours. In tight security dilemmas, the situation most resembles a Butterfieldian tragedy. Here, actors might very well be seen as blameless, as conflict is the simply the product of misperception; they have become 'victims' of the security dilemma, and not the perpetrators of aggression and hostilities.

Intra-state security dilemmas and the question of anarchy

For Posen, and other writers positing the existence of security dilemmas at the intra-state level, the role of anarchy is central. Posen describes the collapse of multi-ethnic states as a problem of 'emerging anarchy',[64] which perpetuates self-help conditions similar to those in the international system. In this way, Woodward notes how the authority and 'enforcement power' of the Yugoslav Federal government had declined so much during the 1980s 'that the context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the condition of anarchy in which a security dilemma in international relations is said to occur.[65] Similarly, Kaufman recognises the potential problem of locating international anarchy within the state:

> Strictly speaking the security dilemma should not apply to contending ethnic groups within a state, because they rarely find themselves in a situation of complete anarchy. Anarchy can be approximated, however, if ethnic groups effectively challenge the government's legitimacy and control over its territory. If anarchy reaches the point where the government cannot control its territory effectively enough to protect people

while ethnic-based organizations can, then the ethnic organizations have enough of the attributes of sovereignty to create a security dilemma.[66]

The reliance on structural anarchy posited by mostly neo-Realist scholars has come in for sharp criticism, however, from more Constructivist writers. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil accuse neo-Realists of what they call 'theoretical appropriation' and 'inclusionary control': certain processes, either left outside or completely ignored by the security dilemma concept, are subsequently admitted 'on the condition that . . . [they do] not disturb the coherence of the established theoretical core'.[67] With specific reference to Posen's treatment of structure, they write:

> Regrettably, however, the promise of . . . his move away from state-centrism towards an exploration of 'anarchic' arenas populated by non-state (ethnic) actors . . . quickly dissipates. It is followed by a regression that strongly suggests that 'all' units in anarchy (be they individuals . . . nations, or states) can be expected to behave in the very same neo-Realist logic.[68]

In this sense, Lapid and Kratochwil's concern is with the neo-Realist assumption that ethnic groups and other intra-state entities will, given an anarchic setting, behave in much the same way as states in the international system. Thus, they argue that neo-Realism's reliance on worst-case scenarios ignores, for instance, how the peoples of the former Yugoslavia lived in more or less peaceful co-existence from the Second World War up until 1991.

Structural factors are certainly significant in Posen's approach, but, and arguably so, not with 'all' units in anarchy: rather, with state-like entities or 'would-be states' (the Serb and Croatian republics, for example). Although lacking official sovereign status, such entities might be said to have analogous security concerns to those of states: political autonomy and territorial integrity. As such, with similar insecurities would-be states may indeed behave in much the same way as their sovereign equivalents, given the self-help imperative.

Moreover, Posen's approach is explicit in noting the importance of the historical record in (partially) constituting threat perceptions. Indeed, his admittance of the importance of groups' past relations is compatible with Constructivist thinking in the way in which identities inform interests. Thus, anarchy appears as a *necessary condition* more so than a *cause*. Even so, anarchy is ultimately restored for the sake of theoretical cohesion:

> These [structural] factors have a powerful influence on the prospects for conflict, regardless of the international politics of the groups emerging. . . . Analysts inclined to view that most of the trouble lies elsewhere, either in the specific nature of groups' identities or in short-term incentives for

new leaders to 'play the nationalist card' to secure power, need to understand the security dilemma and its consequences.[69]

Indeed, Michael Ignatieff also notes the importance of structure in relation to ethnic conflict. With reference to the former Yugoslavia, he writes:

> Thomas Hobbes would have understood Yugoslavia. What Hobbes would have said . . . is that when people are sufficiently afraid, they will do anything. There is one type of fear more devastating in its impact than any other, the *systemic fear* that arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of the terror which arises when legitimate authority disintegrates.[70]

To reiterate the view of Alan Collins, whether anarchy is indeed a cause or a necessary condition, what is clear is that structural imperatives are nonetheless important.

However, Ignatieff's comments still beg the question 'What causes state collapse in the first place?' In other words, if security dilemmas are informed by an emerging anarchy, what informs an emerging anarchy? Posen, Kaufman (in the case of his structural security dilemma at least), and Melander's security dilemmas are each situated *after* the outbreak of ethnic violence. On this, Kaufman is explicit: '[I]t has to be once again emphasized that this . . . [investigation] deals with the issue of why already existing ethnic conflicts escalate to extreme levels of violence'.[71] In these terms, whatever it is that *causes* ethnic conflict is *not* a security dilemma: the security dilemma is clearly an *exacerbator* rather than an *instigator*. Hence, Lapid and Kratochwil's view that

> contrary to Posen's chronology and thesis one would be justified in arguing that the dissolution of central authority was not the 'cause' of the outbreak of the conflict. Rather, its roots are to be found [in] . . . other places. . . . In short, without an explicit theoretical treatment of the bases of group differentiation, which, in turn, generate the 'anarchical environment', structural arguments do not explain conflict, they merely redescribe it.[72]

If the security dilemma is to 'explain' conflict and not 'merely redescribe it', the first challenge, then, is to (re)formulate the concept in such a way that it can be profitably situated *prior* to state collapse.

The second challenge derives from the assertion that while the site of the security dilemma may have changed (from the inter-state to the intra-state), the security concerns that drive it have, for the most part, stayed the same. The predominant issue in the inter-state context is sovereignty, or, more specifically, 'territory'. And territorial integrity is best defended by arms. Existing approaches at the intra-state level likewise tend to privilege this same

territorial element. Thus, the military (and political) sector of security is also at the very core of the ethnic security dilemma.

More recent moves in IR, however, have tended to place greater weight on questions concerning collective (ethnic and national) identity. For example, Adrian Hyde-Price notes that '[o]ne of the central themes of contemporary discourse on European security is the importance of identity'.[73] In keeping with this, Lapid and Kratochwil claim that the identity-centred 'societal security' approach of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan exemplifies the shift from theoretical appropriation to what they refer to as 'theoretical reconstruction'; where neo-Realism is reconstructed and the security agenda thus broadened. In Posen's case, they write,

> the 'national' was invoked primarily to buttress a beleaguered state-centric premise and to demonstrate the ability of neorealism to explain phenomena in traditionally untapped domains. It is then, of course, neither accidental nor insignificant that in these references the reengagement with the 'national' invariably ended as a stand-in for the same old (Waltzian) orthodoxy.[74]

By contrast, with Waever and Buzan's work

> [t]he situation is, however, different. . . . The remarkable promise of their treatment of the national phenomenon is most evident in their recent work on societal security. Introduced as 'the most effective tool for understanding the new security agenda' . . . this construct deals with threats to ethno-national identity. Such concerns, both scholars argue, are rapidly replacing purely military threats as the main reason for insecurity in the post-Cold War era.[75]

It is clear that the concept of the security dilemma has been 'lagging behind' somewhat as compared to those developments in security theory more generally. While the concept has been extensively utilised at the intra-state level in order to explain the occurrence of ethnic violence and war, there has been a concomitant failure to address other, increasingly pertinent, security concerns, such as those pertaining to ethnic and national identity. If 'theoretical appropriation' and 'inclusionary control' are to be avoided, the ethnic security dilemma must begin to engage more fully with identity-centred (societal) security concerns.

3 Societal security

The theme of identity has become one of the most important and yet contested elements in contemporary debates over the nature of security and the future of security studies.[1]

In this chapter, concern switches to the concept of 'societal security'. In Chapter 2, drawing on Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, I introduced the argument that attempts to employ the security dilemma at the intra-state level have thus far largely failed to take into account non-military concerns, namely those centred on identity. If the concept is to be utilised more effectively at this particular level of analysis, an endeavour must be made to tackle such insecurities. In this way, my intention is to try to accommodate societal security within the framework of the security dilemma. This does not assume that the end result will always be conceptually neat. Rather, the point is to explore whether identity issues can profitably be combined with the security dilemma concept in order (potentially) to produce greater explanatory value.

The chapter is broken down into two major sections. The first part involves defining the concept of societal security: initially developed by Barry Buzan in *People, States and Fear* (1991), redeveloped by Ole Waever *et al.* in *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993),[2] and further redeveloped by Buzan, Waever, and subsequent Copenhagen School member Jaap de Wilde in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). The second section concentrates on threats to societal security: those actions and measures that can bring the survival of a group's identity into question.

The concept of societal security

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, significant moves in IR took place designed to take security theory beyond the confines of the dominant Realist and neo-Realist paradigms. For Realists and neo-Realists alike, the state is the primary referent object of security. States are threatened in terms of challenges to their sovereignty, and such threats are, by and large, of a military nature. The

priority for the state, therefore, is to defend its sovereignty (political autonomy and territorial integrity) against armed aggression. While other challenges will naturally be of some concern, they are not, in the main, considered as threats to national (state) security.[3]

However, the winding-down and eventual end to the Cold War came to pose a serious challenge to Realism and neo-Realism's hegemony within the IR discipline. The decreasing threat of nuclear war opened the way for the emergence of other (non-military) conceptions of security. Writing at the end of the 1980s, Jessica Tuchman Mathews suggested that international security should be rethought to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.[4] Similarly, Ken Booth also came to identify the greatest threats as including economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, over-population, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, and disease.[5]

The term 'societal security' was first introduced by Buzan in *People, States, and Fear*. In the book, societal security was just one of the sectors in his five-dimensional approach, alongside military, political, economic, and environmental concerns. In this context, societal security referred to the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and national identities, and customs of states.[6] Importantly, though, all of Buzan's sectors of security were still formulated within the confines of an essentially neo-Realist framework: every one of the five dimensions remained as sectors of national security. 'Society' was just one sector where the state could be threatened. Furthermore, Buzan continued to treat threats in the military sector as primary. As the priorities given to each dimension depended on their relative urgency and intensity, Buzan argued that military security was still the most expensive, politically potent and visible aspect of state behaviour.[7] Consequently: 'A state and society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal, and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure'.[8]

Although recognising Buzan's considerable contribution to the so-called 'widening' of international security, some scholars nonetheless argued that it was not enough simply to introduce more sectors of state security. For sure, security studies was beginning to move away from its preoccupation with military issues, but not as yet from its state-centric focus. What was needed, therefore, were other referent objects of security. That security should also be 'deepened' manifested itself in a re-focusing on the individual through to the global level.[9] The concept of societal security marked out a distinct third, and indeed middle, position in the debate; generally reluctant to consider ideas of either human or universal security, but also in agreement that the usual neo-Realist approach to security had become overly narrow. As a result, this middle position began to talk about the security of collectivities, or 'societies'.

In *Identity, Migration*, Waever *et al.* argue that 'societal securities' had become increasingly important in relation to concerns about state sovereignty in contemporary (post-Cold War) Europe. In this respect, the critical move stems from Waever's claim that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach

to international security had become untenable as a present context for societal security. Consequently, Waever proposed a reconceptualisation: not five sectors relating to the state, but a duality of state and societal security. Societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it is also a referent object of security in its own right.[10]

In Waever's reconceptualisation, the notion of *survival* is key. Whereas state security is concerned with threats to its sovereignty; if a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, societal security is all about threats to identity; similarly, if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society. States can still be destabilised through threats to their societies. But state security can also be brought into question by a high level of societal cohesion. This refers to those instances where a state's programme of homogenisation comes into conflict with the strong identity of one of its minority groups. For example, the 'Slovakianness' of the Slovak state will be compromised the more the sizeable Hungarian minority there asserts its 'Hungarianness'. In other words, the more secure in terms of identity these societies are, the less secure the states containing them may feel. This, as Waever points out, 'creates an excessive concern with state stability and largely removes any common sense idea of the "security of societies" in their own right'.[11]

There are many societies, moreover, that either do not have a state of their own (the Palestinians), and/or do not fit with current state borders (the Kurds). Thus, as Waever argues: 'Societal security is relevant in itself . . . because communities (that do not have a state) are also significant political realities, and their reactions to threats against their identity will be politically significant'.[12] Compounding this, Waever also notes the tendency towards the erosion of sovereignty in some parts of the international system, with the emergence of transnational and supranational authority:

> In Europe, in particular, the coupling between state [and] nation is being weakened. . . . This does not mean that nations will disappear, or even be weakened. The *territorial* state, however, with its principle of sovereignty, is being weakened. Left behind we find nations with less state. . . . This development illuminates the increasing salience of 'societal (in)security'.[13]

Societal security is not only important because there are many stateless, yet politically significant, units, but also because peoples' political loyalties are increasingly being expressed in terms of units other than the territorial state.

But what kind of units?

Waever suggests that 'Society is about identity, about the self-conception of communities and individuals identifying themselves as members of a community'.[14] Societies are units constituted by a sense of collective identity. Following on, Waever defines collective identity simply as 'what enables the word *we* to be used'.[15] In this sense, though, a 'we' identity can vary a great deal as to the kind of group to which it applies, the intensity to which it is felt, and the reasons which create a sense of it.

The problem that arises here is in the very use of the term 'society'. Mathias Albert points out that '"society", or what has been associated with this term for quite some time, has a multiplicity of meanings. It is composed of many, and supporting a multitude of, different identities', leading him to note the 'by and large meaningless notion [of] . . . the identity of a society.'[16] In other words, societies are multiple identity units. How, then, might reference be made to the identity (singular) of a particular society?

Anthony Giddens notes that there are two main conceptions of society. On the one hand, something which has boundaries marking it off from other like units and, on the other hand, something that is constituted by social interaction. (In this second definition, society is seen as a fluid concept, referring to a process rather than an object.)[17] However, Waever recognises that defining society as a process arguably reduces itself to any classification of 'we'. He writes: 'This timeless and placeless view of society cannot easily be used in a security analysis at the international level. . . . We [the Copenhagen School] are interested in *societies operating as units in an international system*.'[18] As such, Waever endeavours to make a distinction between society and 'social group'. In this way, not all kinds of social group correspond to society. According to Waever's reconceptualisation, societal security is necessarily concerned with the security *of* society as a whole rather than the security of groups *in* society. He spells this out in the following terms:

> What is important in a security context is, when it is possible to mobilize a significant collectivity, which means that the reference cannot be to the individual. . . . Security action is always taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The referent object is that which you can point to and say: 'it has to survive, therefore it is necessary . . .'.[19]

In terms of the collectivity, then, there are distinctive kinds of behaviour which cannot be reduced to the level of the individual. Like state security, societal security must be approached as the security of societies having more than, and thus being different from, the sum of their constituent individuals and social groups. Waever's definition in this respect is clearly Durkheimian,[20] inasmuch as society is interpreted as an entity possessing a reality of its own.

Waever tries further to overcome his terminological difficulties by pinning the relationship between security and societal identity to a more easily definable unit. He refers to Giddens' view that as 'units' modern societies are most often nation-states or based on the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, Waever claims that the nation is a special case of society characterised by the following attributes: one, 'affiliation to a territory' (or at least some sense of a *homeland*); two, 'a combination of present time community with a continuity across time'; and three, 'a feeling of being one of the units of which the global society consists'.[21]

Max Weber defines a nation as 'a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community

which normally tends to produce a state of its own'.[22] In these terms, a nation would therefore come out as the natural precursor to a state.

Nation and state are indeed often blurred. Helena Lindholm points out that 'we have interiorized the notion of the nation in [sic] such a degree that we spontaneously mingle the concept of "state" and "nation" '.[23] The potential difficulty in separating the two is noted by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde:

> [A] problem with *societal* is that the related term *society* is often used to designate the wider, more vague state population, which may refer to a group that does not always carry an identity. In this terminology, Sudanese society, for example, is that population contained by the Sudanese state but which is composed of many societal units (e.g. Arab and black African). This is not our use of societal; we use societal for communities with which one identifies.[24]

While on the one hand nation can be defined in relation to 'citizenship', on the other hand it can also be defined in terms of 'ethnicity'. This distinction is often characterised by the terms 'civic nation' and 'ethnic nation'.

Nations perform a number of roles: most prominently, the marking of borders, thereby staking claim to control over a territory. For much of the time, though, the concept of the nation is underpinned by common cultural (more often than not, ethnic) bonds. Nations are, in this way, very much a response to the need for identity: 'It is through a shared unique culture that we are able to know "who we are" in the contemporary world. By rediscovering culture we "rediscover ourselves", the "authentic self". . . . This process of self-identification and location is in many ways the key to national identity'.[25]

Although nationality is indeed closely linked to ethnicity, nation and ethnic group can be distinguished in the following terms: '[A] nation strives for a state of its own, whereas an "ethnic group" acts within existing state structures without necessarily intending to create a state'.[26] Anthony D. Smith argues that an ethnic group constitutes a nation when it has become 'politicised'; when not only is the group bound by common blood, but when it also begins to behave as a (relatively) cohesive political unit.[27] Smith's formulation is a useful one: although politicised ethnic groups do not always strive for statehood, more often than not this is the case.

Nations, therefore, are often predicated on ethnicity. Shared ethnic origins can provide nations with some sort of legitimacy over claims for territory and autonomy. Thus, Waever duly employs the label 'ethno-national' group.

According to Waever, perhaps the only rival to ethno-national identity as a political mobiliser is religion. Religion also possesses the ability to reproduce its 'we' identity more or less unconsciously across generations. It is also able to generate a feeling of self-identification, which can be as intense as that

of nationalism.[29] Moreover, where religious and ethno-national identities reinforce each other (Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs), this can produce very defined and resilient identities. Waever thus concludes that 'the main units for analysis for societal security are . . . politically significant ethno-national and religious entities'.[30]

To sum up briefly: societal security concerns the maintenance of significant ethno-national (and religious) groups. The security of such collectivities might coincide with that of the state, where state and society are coterminous; or societal security might be in opposition to the state, where strong ethno-national identities pose a challenge to the desired unitary character of the state.

Since *Identity, Migration*, the concept of societal security has largely been viewed as a valuable addition to the security studies literature. Michael C. Williams notes that

> focusing on societal security considerably expands the agenda of security studies and its capacity to understand contemporary events. It allows, for example, a systematic incorporation of 'the national' into the traditionally state-centric vision of security studies, and an examination of the ways in which 'state' and 'societal' security concerns may develop in unifying or fragmentary directions. . . .[31]

Even so, some have voiced criticism over Waever *et al.*'s approach. Bill McSweeney, for example, accuses the Copenhagen School of adopting a 'near-positivistic conception' of societal identity.[32] McSweeney defines society as something negotiated, which embraces a 'system of interrelationships which connects together the individuals who share a common culture'.[33] Consequently: 'Identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups'.[34] In simple terms, McSweeney's objection is that Buzan and Waever take a seemingly objectivist view; that is, societies and societal identities are 'things' that somehow naturally exist.

For the *Identity, Migration* book at least, the charge of reification may indeed be warranted. As Jef Huysmans argues:

> Although the book introduces the question of how threat definitions have an impact on the identification or constitution of a society, it to a considerable extent freezes the dynamic of identification itself by positing an objectified, deeply sedimented understanding of the identity of society in Europe, namely society as the nation thereby bracketing the process of political and societal identification itself as it emerges within security practices.[35]

More recently, though, the Copenhagen School has taken an explicitly constructivist 'turn': Buzan and Waever still conceive of societal identity as a 'thing', but a thing that has been socially constructed. They write:

If one studies only the processes by which identities are formed, then identity never becomes a 'thing' at all: there is never a product as such. If one studies the politics around the established identities (as we do) why does that mean having to posit identities as . . . immutable, and intractable by sociological, 'deconstructionist' analysis. Why can one not think of identities as definitely being constructed by people and groups through numerous processes and practices, and when an identity is constructed, and becomes socially sedimented, it becomes a possible referent object for security?[36]

Societal identities are socially constructed (process), but once constructed they can also be regarded as (temporarily) fixed: 'social facts' in Durkheimian terms. Societal identities can thus be seen as objects in the sense that most members of the group adhere to, and so behave in accordance with, a particular, dominant identity construction: they become objects around which security dynamics can take place.[37]

Societal groups can be defined as collectivities that 'have the same value on some dimension, such as language [or] religion'.[38] But, as Haakan Wiberg points out: 'No such dimension can be generalized. . . . Some define themselves in religious terms, others in linguistic terms, others again by common inheritance'.[39] In much the same sense, Bjorn Hettne comments that

objective as well as subjective factors are necessary elements for the existence of an ethnic group. The objective factors can be listed: language, religion, territory, social organisation, culture, race, common origin. The subjective factor is any particular combination (of endless possibilities) of these or other markers, chosen by a group to assert its identity, and then used as a common resource to achieve a certain goal.[40]

Helena Lindholm also approaches (ethno-national) identity construction from the same perspective. She begins by noting two distinct positions: 'culturalism' versus 'constructivism'. The culturalist viewpoint sees identity as something determined by a set of givens. The constructivist version focuses on how identities are intersubjectively defined.[41] However, Lindholm comes to the conclusion that the two positions are not, in fact, incompatible: 'On the one hand, ethnicity is not about givens, on the other hand it is essential and imperative. . . . The outcome . . . is that ethnic identities and ethnicity are both chosen, voluntary and constructed/invented/imagined and perceived as . . . given and fixed'.[42] What it means to be a Slovak, for instance, may therefore change from one period of time to another. Even so, while certain values will indeed be emphasised over others at different points in history, a Slovak will nevertheless still be a Slovak: the Slovak self being distinguishable from others. 'Depending on the particular goal and the specific historical context, the set, or "packages", of factors may differ, producing different levels of ethnic identities'.[43]

I return to the Copenhagen School's own variety of constructivism towards the end of this chapter when dealing with the notion of 'securitisation'. At this point, though, it is suffice to say that Buzan and Waever's approach seems to strike some sort of balance between fluid and fixed notions of identity construction. Although ethno-national identity is invariably constituted by shifting values, identity constructions nonetheless remain stable for a sufficiently long period of time to study their security dynamics. Given this, societies and societal identity indeed seem appropriate for security analysis.

Accordingly, Waever defines societal security as

> the ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and *possible and actual threats*. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.[44]

But what 'possible and actual threats' is Waever referring to?

Threats to societal security

Objective definitions as to what constitute threats to security is as problematic for societies, indeed, may be more so, as it is for states. Given the often fluid nature of identity, not all changes to it will thus necessarily be perceived as threatening: 'Some change will be seen as the natural process by which identities . . . evolve to meet alterations in historical circumstances'.[45] Nevertheless, some processes invariably carry with them the potential to threaten societal security.

Bringing identity into question

Threats to societal security exist when a society believes that its *we* identity is being put in danger, whether this is objectively the case or not. Those means that can threaten societal identity range from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generations. According to Buzan, this may include 'forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community'.[46] Threats to the reproduction of a society can occur through the sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of the identity: 'If the institutions that reproduce language and culture are forbidden to operate, then identity cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to the next'.[47] If the balance of the population changes in a given area, this can also disrupt societal reproduction.

Buzan's characterisation of threats in the societal sector correspond well to the distinction between 'ethnic cleansing' and what has come to be called 'cultural cleansing'. In short, ethnic cleansing refers to the deliberate killing,

violence against (including sexual violence), or deportation of members of one ethno-national group by another. In terms of identity, ethnic cleansing poses an enormous threat to group cohesion. Cultural cleansing is perpetrated not against populations as such, but manifestations of group culture: religious and educational establishments to note a prominent few. Cultural cleansing also strikes against the very core of societal identity. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have come to highlight the nature of ethnic cleansing in all its horrific detail, yet, as Robert Fisk writes, cultural cleansing has also proved to be highly destructive:

> The Serbs and Croatians and, most recently, the Muslims have become businesslike as well as competent at their task of 'cultural cleansing', the planned and deliberate destruction of churches, mosques, libraries, and monuments across Croatia and Bosnia, erasing 500 years of history from the map of former Yugoslavia. . . .[48]

This is what Branka Sulc describes as 'culturecide'.[49] Its effects are summed up well by Jan Boeles:

> You have to understand that the cultural identity of a population represents its survival in the future. When Serbs blow up the mosque of a village and destroy its graveyards and the foundations of the graveyards and mosques and then level them off . . . no one can ever, ever tell this was a Muslim village. This is the murder of a people's cultural identity.[50]

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde divide threats in the societal sector into three main categories: migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition. In cases of migration, the host society is changed by the influx of those from outside; by a shift in the composition of the population. Horizontal competition refers to groups having to change their ways because of the overriding linguistic/cultural influence from another. And finally, vertical competition refers to those instances where, either due to integration or disintegration, groups are pushed towards either wider or narrower identities.[51] Still, as with the state, societies can also be threatened through Buzan's four other dimensions of security: military, political, economic, and environmental.

Most obviously, in the military sector '[i]t is almost certainly true that if a state is threatened militarily from outside its borders, then so is the society within it'.[52] Still, societies within invaded states may not always view armed aggression as a threat: minorities might be liberated either from their own regimes or by occupation from foreign powers.[53] Arguably, military threats to societal security can be seen mainly in terms of depopulation: where enough members of the society are killed (or sometimes deported) to either hinder or prevent identity from being transmitted from one generation to the next.

While external military aggression will invariably threaten states' sovereignty, it may not necessarily pose a concomitant danger to the identity of their societies. For example, when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 there was an obvious potential threat to both the French state and French society. However, whereas state sovereignty was indeed violated, for the most part French society remained relatively secure: French identity was not, to any significant extent at least, intentionally suppressed. This, however, is in sharp contrast to Hitler's prior invasion of Poland in 1939: hand in hand with the military threat to the Polish state was also a political-societal threat to Polish society: the Poles' Slavic identity coupled with the Nazis' policy of *Lebensraum*. Armed aggression can therefore threaten not only the state's borders and government, but the existence of its societies as well. Nevertheless, except when invasion is specifically designed towards jeopardising the survival of state populations, such threats are mainly directed against the maintenance of the incumbent regime. Thus, external military aggression may or may not pose a danger to societal identity.

Military threats to societies may also be from internal aggression. The primary example of this is when a regime uses its armed forces to suppress its societies: 'This is especially so when they [the regimes] represent one ethnic group against others within the state.'[54]

In the political sector, threats to societies are most likely to come from their own government, usually in the form of the suppression of the country's minorities. In this way, multi-ethnic states are particularly prone to generating societal insecurities. Political threats can often be mitigated by the state itself; for example, certain legislation can be introduced in order to protect societal identity. However, when the state machinery is overwhelmingly controlled by a dominant society, then not only might the state be unwilling to provide societal security but it may itself be posing the threat. (Here, political and military threats will be tightly connected.)

The economic sector is characterised by two main threats to societies: first, the capitalist system can undermine cultural distinctiveness by generating global products (televisions, computers and computer games), attitudes (consumerism, materialism and individualism), and style (English language), thereby replacing traditional identities with contemporary 'consumer' ones. And second, the free market can also cause economic depression and unemployment, which might hinder societies from enjoying their traditional (normal) way of life.[55]

In the environmental sector, threats to societies can occur especially when identity is tied to a particular territory. 'The ties between social identity and landscape are strongest when a culture is highly adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by landscape. . . . In such cases, certain types of threat to the landscape . . . can threaten the existence of culture and sometimes the people themselves'.[56] Territory is vulnerable through, for example, pollution, climate change, deforestation, desertification, and so forth.

Societies can react to (perceived) insecurities in two ways: one, by taking certain measures themselves; or two, by trying to move the threat onto the state's security agenda. Actions taken by states to defend their societies are quite common. However, societies can also choose, or may be forced, to defend themselves through non-state means. Indeed, societies may have numerous survival strategies short of seceding from the state. According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, societies, as minorities within states, strive for one of three basic options: to dominate the existing regime; to form their own government; or simply to be left alone.[57]

Further to this, Buzan enquires: 'What happens when societies cannot look to the state for protection . . .?'[58] Unable to turn to the regime to guarantee their survival, societies will thus have to provide for their own security; they will be in a self-help situation. Morten Kelstrup notes how 'societal insecurity might emerge when state power is not accepted by all powerful entities, or said differently, when we are not dealing with "proper" states, but only with *quasi-states*' ("domestic" social entities in which there is no commonly accepted authority)'.[59] In the next chapter, I take a closer look at the notion of quasi- or 'weak' states in terms of how they fit into the concept of the societal security dilemma. For the moment, though, it is enough to recognise that quasi-states are particularly prone to societal insecurity.

The Copenhagen School thus defines threats to ethno-national identity, not just from the societal sector itself, but from all five of Buzan's dimensions. Given this, though, McSweeney questions why the study of societal security should be solely preoccupied with identity threats in this way. He asks why 'the authors [essentially Buzan and Waever] choose identity from among countless values which people are concerned about and which can be attributed to the collectivity of society'.[60] For McSweeney, the Copenhagen School's assumption that identity constitutes society, and is therefore the core value for security analysis, is simply that, an assumption, and one made without the necessary evidence to support it. He goes on:

> If, rather than assuming that identity is the unique value vulnerable to threat, the authors had posed as a problem, 'What is the focus of the security concerns of the people who comprise a "society"?', the intuitive evidence alone would have suggested a range of values, with economic welfare prominent.[61]

Ethno-national groups will, of course, be faced with a broad range of concerns that may easily be described as threats to their security, with economic welfare being prominent among them. But there are two important points to note in this respect. The first one is that the *survival* of the group can indeed be seen to rest ultimately on the maintenance of collective identity. Maurice Pearton argues that the establishment of a collective identity has been a primary requirement for nations, the importance of which goes beyond that of just self-identification:

> [I]dentity was not just self-awareness, or group consciousness, it did not simply entail having imagined a community, though it clearly had affinities with all of these. It was a notion compounded by a sense of place, of the objectives of the group, of its norms and of its history. In these terms *identity is what makes for survival*.[62]

Similarly, Milan Kundera quotes his fellow Czech, the historian Milan Hobl: 'You begin to liquidate a people by taking away its memory. You destroy its books, its culture, its history. And then others write books for it, give another culture to it, invent another history for it. Then the people slowly begins to forget what it is and what it was'.[63] Without a sense of collective identity, societal groups will fail to exist (in their present or acceptable form). While the units comprising the group (people) may endure, the group as a self-conscious whole will not.

The second point is that 'identity' is invariably utilised in terms of how actors articulate threats to security. While there are many, potential insecurities facing societies, security dynamics are often activated by reference to identity. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde contend:

> [S]ocietal security is not a question of whether some given object is threatened. It is a mode of discourse, one characteristic variant of the generic category: security discourse. Security discourse means to argue in terms of existential threats, political primacy, etc., and societal security is when that which is installed as 'referent' for this discourse is an identity group (nation or the like). Then the argument that follows takes on some specific features because the logic of threat and survival has to be conducted in terms of 'identity' in contrast to for instance the one about state survival which takes the track of 'sovereignty'.[64]

That security is marked by a particular type of discourse has since become the central methodological feature of the Copenhagen School's work: what they have come to call 'securitisation'.

Securitisation

That the meaning of security has changed in Waever *et al.*'s work is duly noted by Huysmans. In *Identity, Migration*, Huysmans characterises the Copenhagen School as more or less following Arnold Wolfer's distinction between subjective threats and objective threats. 'To be relevant a threat has to enter the political scene. In the objective/subjective scheme this implies that a threat has to be perceived. It can be perceived wrongly but it has to be defined by actors to be of relevance to the political debate.'[65] However, since the 1993 book, Huysmans goes on, the Copenhagen School has somewhat departed from this approach; 'rather than defining security in terms of threat perception, it is now conceived of as a rhetorical structure'.[66]

In his 1995 piece 'Securitization and Desecuritization', Waever conceives of security as a 'speech act':

> With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done. . . . By uttering 'security', a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.[67]

In this way, differently to a threat perception, which refers to an interpretation of something externally given, a speech act is self-referential; the utterance itself is security. And when an actor utters security successfully, the issue is then securitised.

The securitisation approach is elucidated most clearly in Buzan *et al.*'s 1998 book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Here, security is 'the move which takes politics beyond the established rules of the game'.[68] For an issue to be securitised, it is presented as an existential threat: it requires emergency measures, justifying action outside the bounds of 'normal' politics. As such, a security issue necessitates priority over all others: 'If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or be free to deal with it in our own way)'.[69] An actor thereby claims the right to handle the issue using extraordinary means.

However, not all issues presented in this way will necessarily become securitised; they might simply be examples of 'securitising moves'. This is explained by the fact that securitisation is predicated on the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat: it is essentially a kind of call and response process. Thus:

> The way to study securitization is to study discourse. . . . When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.[70]

An actor makes a call that this is 'security', and the audience must then respond with their acceptance of it as such. The argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve that level of resonance needed to legitimise emergency measures. If there are no signs of acceptance, then securitisation has failed.

Generally speaking, and as the Copenhagen School acknowledges, successful securitisation is usually determined in hindsight, if security logic is post-facto apparent. According to Roxanne Lynne Doty, this means 'a

sequence of stimuli and responses . . . [the] logic of challenge–resistance/
defence–escalation–recognition/defeat'.[70] In this sense, although Waever's
speech act methodology theoretically opens up the possibility for the almost
indefinite widening of security agenda, in more practical terms the imposition
of this 'traditional' logic serves to maintain the fairly bounded nature of the
concept. Lynne Doty sums up the basic point well:

> The argument that Waever offers . . . is that, while security itself has
> no special meaning, but rather is socially constructed, it has been
> socially constructed through speech acts in a particular way and within
> a particular community, that is, a community that revolves around
> discussions in a classical sense consistent with the national security mode
> of securitization. . . .[71]

Huysmans points out that although the Copenhagen School indeed 'goes
social constructivist', their constructivism is 'not uniformly distributed'.[72]
And it is worth quoting him at length on this point:

> While their [Buzan, Waever and de Wilde's] understanding of security is
> radically constructivist . . . their interpretation of social relations in
> general is not. Once an ontological constructivism has been accepted
> which assumes that social relations are not a product of nature but of
> human action and therefore potentially always open to change, one can
> argue that not all social practices are equally malleable. Some practices
> are deeply sedimented and therefore not really a matter of choice. . . . This
> interpretation of social constructivism allows one to keep particular
> identities (societies, states) and structures (anarchy, international
> society) fixed while one concentrates on analysing how particular agents
> representing these identities in these structures manipulate definitions of
> security as a political tactic or strategy to reach particular goals.[73]

Huysmans goes on that the Copenhagen School's 'dualistic constructivism'
downplays the internal relationship between the processes of securitisation
and self-identification. In other words, securitisation assumes *a priori* stable,
sedimented identities.

For the more specific purposes of the book, I do not intend to further
explore Huysmans' contentions in this regard. Still, the Copenhagen School's
particular variety of social constructivism poses serious problems in terms
of incorporating securitisation into the security dilemma framework. Johan
Eriksson neatly labels the Copenhagen School's stance as 'Observe How
Others Advocate!'[74] That is to say, security is the property of actors, not of
analysts: actors and audience intersubjectively establish threats, analysts trace
the subsequent security dynamics.

The major difficulty here, though, is that for the concept of the security
dilemma, security is very much the property of the analyst. To return to

Wolfers' starting point: in the security dilemma, for the parties to the conflict threats are always (mis)perceived. It is therefore the task of, say, the historian or the political scientist to decide whether such threats were indeed real. According to Wolfers: 'With hindsight it is sometimes possible to tell exactly how far they [states] deviated from a rational reaction to the actual or objective state of danger existing at the time'.[75] In other words, without the central role of the analyst there can be no security dilemma explanations for instances of violence and war. The security dilemma (especially in its tight formulation) is thus an essentially objectivist concept. (In the following chapter, while I maintain Buzan and Waever's societal security approach, I do not employ the same speech act methodology.)

Societal security was, in many respects, formulated as a response to those events in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s: the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the problem of further integration within the West. For the Copenhagen School, the theoretical challenge was to construct a concept in which issues such as nationalism, migration and ethnic conflict could be fully addressed within a security studies framework. State-centric theory, Buzan and Waever explain, had no place for these kind of issues, not because it 'did not care', but because these issues 'could not be represented' in classical theory.[76] Thus, the goal of the Copenhagen School was to devise a conception of identity-related security issues that is compatible with traditional notions of security. Moreover:

> [S]ome other neorealists assimilated identity and nationalism into classical theory by simply treating nations as states, and identity as one more resource, thus avoiding any revision of the basic theory. We [Buzan and Waever] tried instead to revise the basic traditional conception of security so that it could still say the old things but also include the new things in their own right.[76]

The next chapter seeks to continue in this way: a reformulation of the security dilemma concept that allows for an explicit treatment of identity concerns 'in their own right'.

4   The societal security dilemma

> The identity of a people and of a civilization is reflected and concentrated in what has been created in the mind – in what is known as 'culture'. If this identity is threatened with extinction, cultural life grows correspondingly more intense, more important, until cultural life itself becomes the living value around which all people rally.[1]

Treating identity concerns 'in their own right' presents a significant challenge to the security dilemma. The concept's predominant state-centrism, its concentration on the defence of sovereignty, or sovereign-like attributes, has, in turn, necessitated a focus on the military sector of security. In this chapter, my argument is that thinking about security dilemmas between societies – rather than between states – induces a concomitant shift away from questions of purely military utility. Societal security dilemmas may also be concerned with matters of territorial integrity and political autonomy, but an emphasis on identity insecurities brings with it some degree of refocusing on 'what' is to be secured, and thus also 'how' to secure this. That is to say, defending societal identity often calls for non-military means.

What does a societal security dilemma look like? How does it operate? What effects may it produce? These are questions for which this chapter endeavours to provide some answers. In *Identity, Migration*, Barry Buzan notes that 'we might . . . talk about a societal security dilemma',[2] and that societal security dilemmas 'might explain why some processes of social conflict seem to acquire a dynamic of their own'.[3] Yet, while introducing the notion of a societal security dilemma and, importantly, also indicating the concept's utility in intra-state conflicts, Buzan does not go on to develop his initial premises. Nonetheless, the Copenhagen School itself certainly recognises that further work on the societal security dilemma is necessary: 'If we think of societies as units, do we therefore have to think in terms of societal security dilemma between them . . . ? Such an idea would require further investigation into the interplay of identities.'[4]

Societal security dilemmas might be located on three levels of analysis: between states (inter-state), through states (extra-state), and within states

(intra-state). While a pretty clear distinction can be drawn between the inter-state and intra-state levels, the difference between 'societal security dilemmas through states' and 'societal security dilemmas within states' may not be quite so clear cut; where the 'homeland' of the national minority is just across the border (Russians in the Baltic States, Hungarians in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and Yugoslavia, Romanians in Moldova, to name just a few). In this chapter, my focus is on societal security dilemmas at the intra-state level. And the reason for this is largely straightforward: building on the work of Barry Posen, Stuart Kaufman, Erik Melander and others, concentration *within* the state is maintained.[5] Societal security dilemmas may then be set against ethnic security dilemmas in assessing their comparative explanatory value.

Before going on to look at the societal security dilemma itself, though, there is the crucial distinction to be made between 'society' as a referent object and 'society' as a sector of security. When societal security refers to a referent object, societies can be threatened along all five of Buzan's sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. When conceived in sectoral terms, however, it denotes that particular dimension through which the referent object is threatened; or, in 'securitisation' terms, that dimension from which actors themselves derive and express a particular language of security. Sectors are not ontologically separate, as most units (referent objects) appear in several or all of the sectors. The units do not exist in sectors, the sectors exist in the units as different types of security concern.[6]

The risk of adopting a sector-by-sector approach is in missing security dilemmas where the threat from one (first) group to another (second) is in one sector, and the threat the first group is reacting to (from the second) is in another. Whereas the threat to one society may come, for example, from the economic sector of security, the response to that threat might well be located in, say, the political sector. It is therefore very difficult to talk of security dilemmas that operate solely within the societal sector of security.[7] While threats to state sovereignty tend to come mainly from the military sector of security, threats to societal identity will likely be spread across several of the dimensions. The societal sector of security may still be the most important in generating insecurities, but threats from the political and economic dimensions in particular may also be closely linked. The military dimension of security may also be significant inasmuch as military means might be considered when all others have failed: societal security dilemmas, although originating in the non-military sectors of security, can easily spill over into the military one. Societal security dilemmas are thus likely to operate on a cross-sectoral basis.

The emphasis here lies squarely on the referent object of security, rather than on any particular dimension. The interest is not in security dilemmas that operate solely within the societal sector of security (these would probably be very difficult to identify) but in security dilemmas that operate between societies, and thus have identity concerns as their central dynamic.

In Chapter 1 of the book, when discussing the traditional concept of the security dilemma, it was noted how ambiguity, and thus also uncertainty, essentially stems from the inherent nature of certain military preparations: that arms can be equally offensive and defensive in their purpose. How societies – as distinct from states – choose to defend themselves against perceived threats is therefore an appropriate starting point in beginning to construct a societal security dilemma.

Defending societal identity

Societal identity can be defended using military means. This is particularly the case if identity is linked to territory: the defence of the 'historic homeland'. If the threat posed by one group to another is military (armed attack from a neighbouring society), then some kind of armed response is usually required. However, the close association between societal identity and territorial integrity in all probability occasions the dynamics of the concept to follow closely those of its more traditional, inter-state equivalent: the same kind of arms-racing, action–reaction process and pre-emptive strike.

While some societies (as states or quasi-states) may have an army or some kind of militia that can be utilised for defence, the vast majority of intra-state groups possess no such exclusive means of military protection. For them, members of the group will either make up part of the state's armed forces as a whole, or have military forces composed (primarily) of the same ethnic group in a neighbouring state. Facing a threat in identity terms, such groups are therefore left with two main options: first, they can try to form their own militia/defence force as a means of protection (although this may prove to be extremely difficult);[8] or second, they can try to defend their identity using non-military means.

Non-military means of defence

At the intra-state level, vulnerabilities faced by many groups may often derive not so much from armed aggression as from demographic processes and/or political-legal means designed to deprive societies of beliefs and practices vital to the maintenance of their culture. Robert Hayden highlights how, for example, threats to societal identity – in this particular case, 'ethnic cleansing' – can be shaped very much by demographic considerations:

> As a process of homogenization 'ethnic cleansing' can take many forms. Within areas in which the sovereign group is already an overwhelming majority, homogenization can be brought about by legal and bureaucratic means, such as denying citizenship to those not of the right group, thus also inducing those members of minorities who can assimilate to do so while evicting those who cannot assimilate or refuse to do so. In more mixed areas, homogenization requires more drastic measures; the

physical expulsion, removal, or extermination of the minority popu-
lation. Although it is only the third of these processes that has come to be
known as 'ethnic cleansing' . . . it is important to recognize that legal and
bureaucratic discrimination is aimed at bringing about the same result:
the elimination of the minority.[9]

For Hayden, then, while legal and bureaucratic (non-military) means may
often be employed to disrupt group security, the more heterogeneous the
state the more likely it is that military measures (ethnic cleansing by physical
extermination) will have to be pursued in order to achieve the very same
goal. In other words, in areas where the majority ethnic group is heavily
concentrated, the state will have less need to resort to armed force in order to
induce homogeneity among the minority.

   Moreover, in cases where societies are widely scattered throughout the state,
the harder it will be for groups to pursue effective armed resistance. In these
vulnerable 'ethnic islands' it is difficult for group members to form a unified,
and therefore resilient, military unit.

   When the nature of the threat is non-military (legal and/or bureaucratic),
countervailing measures are also likely to be non-military in nature. However,
to be analogous with its inter-state counterpart, the methods that societies
resort to for protection must be seen as essentially ambiguous; they should
have the potential to be utilised for both offensive and defensive purposes. As
was noted in Chapter 1, ambiguity helps to explain why defensive measures
can sometime be misinterpreted as a sign of hostility. In the traditional
security dilemma, ambiguity stems from certain military postures. But what
about the societal security dilemma?

   In *Identity, Migration*, Waever *et al.* suggest that: 'For threatened societies,
one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This
can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and
distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself.'[10] Waever
puts this more succinctly, commenting that culture can be defended 'with
culture', adding that: 'If one's identity seems threatened . . . the answer is a
strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture
becomes security policy.'[11]

   The notion of defending culture 'with culture' is embodied in what John
Hutchinson has labelled 'cultural nationalism'. Hutchinson describes the goal
of cultural nationalists as 'the moral regeneration of the historic community,
or, in other words, the re-creation of their distinctive national civilization'.[12]
He goes on to say how

   cultural nationalists establish . . . clusters of cultural societies and
   journals, designed to inspire spontaneous love of the community in its
   different members by educating them to their common heritage of
   splendour and suffering. They engage in naming rituals, celebrate
   national cultural uniqueness and reject foreign practices, in order to

identify the community to itself, embed this into everyday life and differentiate this against other communities.[13]

Cultural nationalism is designed to generate a strong feeling of self-identification. It emphasises various commonalities such as language, religion and history, and downplays other ties that might detract from its unity.[14] In this sense, cultural nationalism seeks merely to celebrate what is special about *our* identity.

Self-identification might take place because societal identity has been weakened. Waever comments that 'hurt pride and humiliation can contribute significantly to the rise of nationalism'.[15] Indeed 'it [nationalism] offers a particularly attractive mode of identification in times of crisis and depression since the link to a glorious past . . . donates immediate relief, pride, and [a] shield against shame'.[16] Cultural nationalism often takes the form of reconstituting, indeed inventing, past traditions, values and history. In other words, self-identification is about the (re)construction of societal identity: 'Our present identity has become too weak. We therefore need to change it, make ourselves strong again.'

However, some writers note how the (re)construction of the Self invariably involves what Michael Ignatieff calls a 'defining other': another by comparison with whom to constitute one's own sense of identity.[17] This 'logic of identity . . . means that some Other often enters as part of the self-identification. . . . [As] one's identity depends on this other, the Other ends up in the dual role of being necessary for my identity, and the one who fully prevents me from being myself'.[18] As such, if I could only get rid of the Other I could finally be me again.[19] In this way, Katherine Verdery argues that nationalism is invariably a language of victimisation; that in times of crisis it is easy to explain one's own suffering in national terms. And, at these moments it is others that 'come to represent the loss of a feeling of wholeness'.[20] I might hate, and therefore try to extinguish the Other, because its otherness serves to undermine the foundations upon which my own society exists: 'Your otherness brings my identity into question'. Roberta Salecl characterises the Other as 'an alien who . . . constantly threatens us with habits, discourse, and rituals that are not "our kind". No matter what this other "does", he threatens us with his existence'.[21]

The Self/Other dichotomy is by no means new in IR: Constructivist, and in particular Postmodernist/Poststructuralist, scholars have for some time noted how conceptions of Self and Other are vital in constituting bounded political spaces (states). The boundary between 'inside' and 'outside' is 'a function of a state's discursive authority, that is, its ability . . . to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not belong . . .'.[22] Indeed, state identity is itself constructed through the language of security. David Campbell notes how the self-image of the state is created and sustained through the externalisation of dangers, through 'discourses of danger' that manifest themselves in foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus an

exclusionary practice that secures the inside by locating identifiable threats on the outside.[23]

Similarly, Michael J. Shapiro notes how the state, just like the individual, seeks the negation of the Other in order to strengthen the autonomy and coherence of the Self. In this sense, war is 'ontologically justified' as states achieve affirmation 'through the violent confrontation with the enemy'.[24] This external object is a force of resistance to the internal becoming the autonomous I, and must therefore be overcome with an act of negation. Shapiro, drawing on its Hegelian nature, explains that commitment to this kind of collective identity coherence 'translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism'.[25] War thereby becomes a cultural product of antagonism in which enemies (Others) become 'desirable targets of violence for ontological rather than merely utilitarian reasons'.[26] Thus, Shapiro concludes:

> The modern state's warfare serves not only to maintain strategic interests . . . but also to reproduce or maintain the coherence of the body politic as a whole. Enemy/Others in the case of warfare, as in the case of less-violent forms of Self/Other confrontation, are to be immobilized, dominated, or destroyed in the constitution of the national self.[27]

Self and Other demarcates the inside from the outside: what is domestic and what is foreign; what is orderly and what is anarchic; what is secure and what is insecure.

The Self/Other dichotomy is prominent in more 'critical' approaches to security.[28] Utilised in the context of the (traditional) security dilemma, though, notions of Self and Other appear somewhat problematic; that is, analogy with the role of arms cannot easily be made.

Certain military postures are ambiguous because they *can* be utilised equally for either offensive or defensive purposes. Thus, misperception stems from the misplaced belief that arms procurement is a signal that the other wishes to, indeed will, attack. For societal security dilemmas, though, violent Hegelian encounters with the Other – encounters which are necessary for the reproduction of the coherent and autonomous self – present a significant problem. Domination over and violence towards the Other means that 'required insecurity' becomes an integral part of Self-identification: 'I cannot be myself while you are there to deny me'. This being so, resultant violence and war can never be the product of a tight security dilemma formulation. Only when difference is validated, and not negated, can security requirements, in identity terms, exist in a situation of compatibility.

This particular formulation is also made problematic by the implication that (perceived) threats very much take place in the 'hearts and minds' of group members. In this regard, threats to societal identity might be characterised as being psychological and pragmatic. 'Othering' can be manifest as *tangible*, harmful policies; for instance, legislation that discriminates against

minorities. This is a pragmatic threat. But attacking a community's identity can be carried out, for example, through rhetorical means alone: hate speech and so forth, what Katherine Pratt Ewing calls 'expressive violence'.[29] And this is a more (purely) psychological threat.

As was mentioned in Chapter 1, tight security dilemmas are predicated by actors being 'ontologically secure' while at the same time being 'perceptually insecure'; that is to say, while states are not in reality insecure, in the minds of decision-makers it appears as though they very much are. But in the societal context it seems extremely difficult to determine ontological security in the sense of psychological threats. This is best further explained with brief reference to an empirical example.

Concerning relations between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland (Ulster), journalist Kim Sengupta writes:

> In Portadown the Orange Order will face the RUC and the Army to maintain their historic . . . right to march through the Catholic Garvaghy Road, a confrontation steeped in bitterness and almost certain to lead to violence. Some Catholics will take part in violence of their own because of what they claim is the provocation of it all.[30]

For the Protestant Orange Order, not to march down the Garvaghy Road 'is in reality a demand for surrender': 'We have been walking down that road for generations. Why should we stop now?'[31] The right of the Orange Order to march is inextricably bound up with the maintenance of its Protestant identity: it is the right to express who *we* are, where *we* come from (and indeed where *we* are going). It is a societal security requirement. However, celebrating the Protestant victory at the 1690 Battle of the Boyne in this, to say the least, provocative manner represents for many Catholics a serious attack on their own sense of identity. Ignatieff explains how the victory of William of Orange over the Catholic King James 'became a founding myth of ethnic superiority. . . . The Ulstermen's reward, as they saw it, was permanent ascendancy over the Catholic Irish.'[32] Thus, Orange Order marches have come to symbolise the supremacy of Protestantism over Catholicism in Northern Ireland.

Set against this, then, when marching Protestants shout slogans such as 'Croppies lie down'[33] at their Catholic counterparts, is Catholic identity ontologically insecure? Catholics may very well perceive themselves as being threatened. But is their identity really *being* harmed? Referring back to the Copenhagen School, Buzan argues that a *we* identity is put in jeopardy either when its expression is suppressed, or when its ability to reproduce itself is interfered with. In these terms, Catholic identity may not, strictly speaking, be brought into question; despite Orange Order marches, members of the Catholic community are nonetheless able to both express and reproduce their culture without significant hindrance. (I do recognise the counter-argument that a Protestant identity reproduced through the act of marching is an

integral part of Unionist violence, and thus the two cannot easily be separated.)[34]

The collective consciousness of the group is without question of importance. For its members, rhetorical threats can certainly bring into question a sense of who they are and what they represent. As Ewing recognises:

> Expressive violence such as verbal abuse or humiliation may be experienced as immediately as physical assault and may similarly result in intrusive imagery that is vivid and traumatic. Just as the experience of physical violence overwhelms our abilities to represent or contain it, there are aspects of expressive violence that cannot be encompassed in the narratives that attempt to represent it. Humiliation can be shattering.[35]

In short, Ewing goes on to note how physical and expressive violence can both 'disrupt' group identity.[36]

For my purposes here, though, rhetoric alone cannot easily be seen as jeopardising societal identity. And this has much to do with the role of the observer. The security dilemma concept is very much predicated on outsiders making judgements about insiders' behaviour: it is all about deciding who is a power-seeker and who is a security-seeker, who is status quo and who is revisionist, who is an ally and who is an adversary. This is often tricky enough, but arguably much more so if threats do not manifest themselves in any concrete sense. However, when psychological insecurities are accompanied by more tangible threats; if rhetoric comes hand in hand with harmful policies, then collective consciousness, and with it group identity, may indeed be observed as ontologically insecure. That is to say, in addition to hate speech and the like, when political-legal measures are also apparent, the observer is much better able to determine whether group identity really was/is being threatened.

What is needed, therefore, is a way of framing how nationalism can generate pragmatic threats to societal security.

Nationalism and ambiguity

Stephen van Evera recognises that in national movements others are blamed for past crimes and tragedies, and are said to harbour hostile intentions against the nation. This is used to support the claim that minorities living inside national boundaries should be denied equal rights. 'These minorities . . . will appear to pose a danger if they are left unsuppressed; moreover, their suppression is morally justified by their (imagined) misconduct, past and planned'.[37] In this way, certain existing rights will be revoked or demands for new rights will be denied – rights deemed vital for the reproduction of societal identity. National movements that are rights-suppressing are generally seen as 'ethnic nationalist'.

Most writers describe ethnic nationalism in rather negative terms: '[T]he fundamental appeal of ethnic nationalism . . . is for keeping one's enemy in their place or for overturning some legacy of cultural subordination.'[38] Ethnic nationalism tends to bring with it images of annexed territory, disintegrating states, 'Balkanisation', revolution, and coup d'état. By contrast, cultural nationalism is often viewed as a mostly positive movement: 'Many scholars would agree . . . that cultural nationalism makes a positive contribution to the task of nation building – in other words, to the identification, political organization and unification of the community within a given territory.'[39] Cultural nationalism seeks to work within the existing state structure. The goal of cultural nationalists is to amend the current order and not overturn it: it is more 'status quo' than 'revisionist'.

These two sides to nationalism – cultural (positive) and ethnic (negative) – are also noted by Helena Lindholm:

> On the one hand, ethnicity . . . is often perceived as . . . backward and dangerous. On the other hand, [some] authors tend to view ethnicity as . . . the self-expression of the threatened and the marginalised. Ethnicity can be both positive and negative. Of course, the divisive nature of contemporary ethno-nationalism, its violent boundary makings, its exclusiveness, etc., must be viewed as considerable challenges to the modern international system, as well as potentials for violence and wars. One must not forget, however, that ethnicity also has a potential for internal group solidarity and loyalty.[40]

Ethnic nationalist movements seek to strengthen societal identity not by promoting and maintaining cultural institutions and practices alone (as is the case with cultural nationalism), but by also commanding particular areas of territory. In this sense, cultural nationalist and ethnic nationalist projects can be directly equated with two types of autonomy: 'cultural autonomy' and 'ethnic (political) autonomy'. Cultural autonomy entails the granting of certain rights in relation to the means of cultural production: the control of one's own schools, museums, newspapers, religious institutions, even to have one's own television and radio broadcasts. Ethnic autonomy is more territorially based and involves self-government along a wider range of issues. This may be manifest in some kind of autonomous region within the state, or in its most extreme expression, in independence outside of the existing state structure.

Nevertheless, clear distinctions between cultural nationalism (positive) and ethnic nationalism (malign) can be erroneous to make. Rarely in practical terms will these two nationalisms exist separately. On the contrary, the tendency is for theoretically distinct types of nationalism to merge. As Anthony D. Smith points out, 'there is often *a profound dualism* at the heart of every nationalism'.[41] Indeed, Hutchinson notes that cultural nationalism may often employ ethnic-nationalist strategies in order to secure its goal:

'It is, of course, true that cultural nationalists are not hostile by definition to independent statehood and . . . are frequently driven into state policies to defend the cultural autonomy of the nation'.[42] He goes on: 'Often unable to extend beyond the [intellectual elite], it [cultural nationalism] is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies . . .'.[43] In other words, cultural nationalism may often be forced to transform itself from a solely cultural movement into a political one in order to get its concerns onto the state agenda; and/or to expand into a genuinely mass movement in order to realise its desires.

In certain circumstances, then, cultural nationalism might become conflated with ethnic nationalism: the extension of cultural societies into (ethnically defined) political parties may serve to give the impression that a cultural-nationalist movement represents a far more ambitious project than the desire for (non-territorial) cultural autonomy alone. Moreover, given the spread of cultural nationalism from the (intellectual) elite to the group's population as a whole, its nature may become more characteristic of an ethnic-nationalist movement. To be successful, ethnic nationalism requires mass mobilisation: the acquisition or consolidation of ethnic autonomy cannot be achieved without the support of large numbers. Ambiguity might thus be apparent in the sense that cultural-nationalist movements come to resemble an ethnic-nationalist project: the desire for cultural autonomy becomes confused with that for ethnic autonomy.

Nationalism and uncertainty

Nationalism is invariably manifest as a cultural-political programme that lays out the desires and grievances of the group. Such a programme can be communicated verbally and/or in written form through official pronouncements or publications. In such a context, uncertainty might be apparent in two related ways. The first is through a failure of clarity: members of the group may not be able to articulate their goals clearly to others. Second, such 'information failures' are likely if there are insufficient mechanisms within the state. As David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild point out:

> Information is costly to acquire and, as a result, there is always some uncertainty about the intentions of the other group. Groups compensate for their information limitations by acting on the basis of prior beliefs about the likely preference of others. . . . These beliefs are formed through historical experience . . . and represent each group's best guess about the other's intentions. Groups then update these beliefs as new information becomes available to them. Nonetheless, information is always incomplete and groups are forever uncertain about each other's purposes.[44]

Information may be 'costly to acquire' because of the *weakness* of the state. In democratically immature states there are often poor and ineffective channels

of communication between groups and no established procedures for resolving disputes. Indeed, it is the weak state that seems to provide propitious conditions for societal security dilemmas.

Weak states

Brian Job and John Glenn have both addressed the security dilemma in the setting of the 'weak state'. Job's work widens the utility of the security dilemma at the intra-state level by concentrating not on disintegrating states as such, but on weak ones. Although not marked by an 'emerging anarchy', Job argues that groups will behave according to the logic of self-help because of the conditions the weak state creates.

A weak state can be defined by three main features: first, an inability to meet the basic economic conditions of its citizens; second, a weak identity and lack of social cohesion; and third (and often as a result of the previous two), internal security threats. Ethnic differences combined with the state's inability to provide for its people leads the population to express its loyalty elsewhere. The 'weakness' of the state thus refers to the lack of commonality between the governing power and the various societal groups. As such, the weaker the state the more likely the regime will have to rule by coercion not consent. The governing power is seen as more a poser of threats than a provider of security.

Job's approach mainly focuses on Third World States. He notes that 'the security dilemma for typical Third World States arises in meeting internal rather than external threats, and for typical Third World Citizens may well involve seeking protection from their own state institutions'.[45] Given the presence of a hostile regime, and thus having no firm guarantees for their security, groups take measures into their own hands: they are forced to provide for their own protection. Conditions at the intra-state level, despite the presence of an overarching authority, come to replicate those between states in the international system.

Despite this, Job argues that the internal conditions of Third World States are such that analogy with the traditional security dilemma is difficult. He thus prefers to use the term 'insecurity dilemma'.[46] Even so, the situation that Job goes on to describe carries with it many security dilemma characteristics: '[G]roups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, others within the border of the state'. Moreover, 'The weakness of the state . . . hinges upon the paradox that the more the regime attempts or needs to exercise the coercive machinery of the state . . . the more obvious is its weakness'.[47] In other words, while seeking to make its situation better by suppressing those groups that challenge its legitimacy, the state comes to make things worse by taking measures that serve only to heighten opposition to the regime. And, as T. David Mason and Dale Krane write:

> This leads us to the question of why a regime, itself composed of rational individuals, would pursue [such] a policy . . . if such measures are ultimately counter-productive. We argue that . . . [it] is perpetuated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives.[48]

Measures taken by a regime to ensure its continuation are thus strongly determined by the structure of the situation; in this case, by the very nature of its own weakness. Consequently, despite being the maker of its own insecurity, the state is nonetheless compelled to pursue such policies. Joel S. Migdal makes much the same point, noting that while 'domestic and international dangers can be countered through political mobilisation, gained by constructing state agencies and viable strategies of survival, strengthening those state agencies may at the same time hold its own peril for state leaders'.[49] The implication is that although enhancing the level of cohesion between state and society, state measures erode power away from the regime itself and are thus resisted.

  Job's work is furthered by John Glenn. Like Job, Glenn's concern lies with the weak, Third-World state (although his own preference is to borrow from Robert Jackson in using the term 'quasi-state'). Similarly, he is also keen to emphasise that: 'The primary . . . threats to the security of the overwhelming number of Third World states are internal, not external; they result from the granting of international legitimacy to states which lack domestic legitimacy'.[50] Glenn goes on to explain how the lack of domestic legitimacy, and thus the persistence of the security dilemma, is often addressed through the process of nation-building: the attempt by the state to create a common, overarching identity for its population. In doing so, Glenn argues that many nation-building theories have misjudged the extent to which various cultural identities within the state are rooted. Rather than creating new, common identities, nation-building can often reinforce ethnic distinctiveness, pushing the state further away from its intended goal.

  Without question, attempts at nation building can pose serious threats to societal security. The state may require minority groups to give up all, or part, of their cultural distinctiveness if such a project is to be successful. This is particularly the case when state identities are created on the basis of *assimilation*; minority groups are forced to adhere to the identity of the majority. With some nation-building projects, though, the intention may not be so much to assimilate, but to *acculturate*. In this sense, the goal is to create a 'new' identity (Czechoslovak, Yugoslav), where people take on *additional* markers. While acculturation seeks merely to build upon the existing foundations of group identity, assimilation points to a much harsher programme where the wish is not only to alter but to extinguish altogether the basis of existing identities. Even so, acculturation may also pose a threat to societal identity, inasmuch as it still challenges – to some degree at least – the maintenance of distinct minority identities. Thus, there may be a contradiction between the

positive goals of the regime (nation-building) and the negative effects of state policies toward this end (threatening societal identity). While the desire to nation-build might well be pursued for the purposes of security (the creation of a stronger, more cohesive state), this may only be achieved at the expense of minority identities.

Considering the nation-building project in this way, the security of the regime may often necessitate the insecurity of the state's minority groups. In these terms, then, the situation is marked by required insecurity. As such, while the weak state may well be conducive to societal security dilemmas, the applicability of the tight security dilemma formulation seems nonetheless problematic. I will return to this towards the end of the chapter.

In conditions of uncertainty, when (ethnic) nationalism is employed as a means to defend societal identity, it often brings with it certain connotations that make it more likely that worst-case scenarios will prevail. This is mainly due to the assumption that for much of the time nationalism represents an aggressive (expansionist, revisionist) movement.

Nationalism and worst-case scenarios

Van Evera's work categorises nationalisms according to which type, under which particular circumstances, has a greater propensity to generate conflict. He begins by noting the 'varieties' of nationalism which are more likely to cause war: 'Nationalist movements without states raise greater risks of war because their accommodation requires greater and more disruptive change. Their struggle for national freedom can produce wars of secession.'[51] Moreover, the movement's ideology as to whether all or just a part of the national community should be incorporated in the state will also have a considerable impact on the chances for conflict. For example, the insistence by some Russian nationalists that Crimea – part of Ukraine but with an ethnic Russian majority population – be absorbed back into Russia has brought Moscow and Kiev close to hostilities on several occasions since Ukrainian independence in 1991. Whether the nationalism is 'minority-respecting' or 'minority-oppressing' will also play a significant role. Van Evera points out that minority-oppressing nationalisms can cause war in two ways: first, 'by provoking violent secessions by its captive nations'; and second, 'by spurring the homelands of these captive nations to move forcefully to free their oppressed co-nationals'.[52] These attributes, he goes on to say, can be used to create a nationalism 'danger-scale', expressing the level of danger posed by a given nationalism.

Van Evera also discusses 'structural' and 'perceptual' factors – the balance of power; the demographic arrangement of populations (intermingled or homogeneous); and past and present relations between the groups – in determining the nature of a given nationalism.[53] While structural and perceptual factors influence the propensity of states and ethno-national groups alike to assume the worst, Stuart Kaufman recognises that in this

respect, drawing an analogy with the inter-state context is not altogether straightforward:

> [T]he neorealist concept of a security dilemma cannot be mechanically applied to ethnic conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not enough to create a security dilemma between communities which may have been at peace for decades. An ethnic security dilemma requires reciprocal fears of group extinction.[54]

Kaufman suggests that a number of necessary conditions must exist in order to precipitate fear within societal groups: first, negative group stereotypes; second, threatened ethnic symbols (flags, statues); third, a threatened demographic situation; and fourth, a history of ethnic domination (the group's past victimisation).[55] Crucially, he points out that (societal) security dilemmas at the intra-state level invariably bring with them specific, identity-centred security concerns, in particular threats to ethnic symbols, that are not as salient in the inter-state context.

According to the traditional security dilemma concept, worst-case assumptions invariably trigger an action–reaction process, which is usually manifest as arms-racing. However, given the concentration here on the non-military sectors of security, societal security dilemmas are likely to be marked by different dynamics.

Nationalism and the action–reaction process

Although the military sector of security may sometimes have a role to play in the defence of societal identity – when group identity is closely linked with a specific territory – at the intra-state level protective measures will often be non-military in nature. Such measures, when employed for reasons of internal cohesion, may require comparison with others as a means by which the group's sense of *we* is created and maintained. The effect can be that in responding to (perceived) threats, the Other embarks on a course of action that corresponds with those negative images propounded by the first group. In other words, insecurity among Others can stimulate similar processes, which, in turn, subject them to increased Othering.

For the societal security dilemma, the action–reaction process can therefore be conceived in terms of escalating nationalisms. There are several possible scenarios in this respect.

Especially when nation-building, linguistic homogeneity is often seen by the majority group (regime) as vital for the maintenance – and thus also for the continued dominance – of its identity. In this regard, Kaufman notes how in Moldova, prior to independence from the Soviet Union, fears of extinction were tied largely to the maintenance of the Moldovan (Romanian) language: '[E]ither we return to the Latin script and get [Moldovan] designated the state language, or else we shall disappear as . . . a nationality'.[56] The majority group

may thus seek to suppress the minority (or minorities) by denying/revoking the right of the minority group to education in its own language. In doing so, however, the majority serves only to make the minority group even more determined to attain/preserve this right – as it constitutes a threat to its reproductive capacity in terms of identity. Kaufman points out that in Moldova the passing of the language law, which made Moldovan the official state language, triggered fears over the curtailment of Russian language rights. He describes how the Russophone media 'repeatedly alleged that the language law was only the first in a grander Chauvinist Moldovan scheme to reduce Russians to second-class citizens and deprive them of their human rights . . .'.[57] In turn, the majority is provoked to take further suppressive measures – as minority opposition poses a threat to the cultural unity of the state.

What is important to note here is that the actions of the majority group, while designed to weaken the identity of the minority, have, in fact, caused the minority group to be more resolute in defending its identity. As Buzan comments, 'threats can strengthen the identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to suppress an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres.'[58] Given its 'self-defeating' characteristic, the situation may thus seem to resemble Jervis' spiral model. However, as security for the majority (linguistic homogeneity) is dependent on the insecurity of the minority group (the absence of provisions for own-language education), the scenario is surely marked by required insecurity.

Pointing to similar dynamics, Kaufman argues that relations between Georgia and its minority Abkhaz population constituted an ethnic security dilemma. Kaufman notes that the problem of group interests is often being defined as 'requiring domination over others', and, in this way, describes how, following his presidential election victory in 1990, Zviad Gamaskhurdia 'revoked the cultural and political [ethnic] autonomy of the minority Abkhaz, exacerbating their fears of ethnic extinction and causing a security dilemma'.[59] Kaufman's conception of the security dilemma clearly draws on the work of Jack Snyder, and in this case, therefore, Georgia's security necessarily meant the suppression of Abkhazian identity.

In my own formulation, the situations described thus far more or less equate to regular (societal) security dilemmas: actors are (assumed to be) security-seekers, but their (societal) security requirements are incompatible. For tight societal security dilemmas, instances must be apparent where two societies can exist, both feeling secure in terms of their identity, without having to bring the societal security of the other into question. Where the societal security requirements of the two sides are compatible, security dilemmas occur according to an illusory incompatibility between the groups.

In these terms, we can employ a slightly different scenario. Seeking only to defend its identity within the state, the minority group may level demands for its own educational institutions, newspapers, radio station, and other such cultural provisions (cultural autonomy). However, the majority group might well misinterpret such behaviour as part of a wider secessionist project

(ethnic autonomy). In a demographically mixed state, a secessionist movement may not only represent a threat to state (national) security (territorial integrity), but may also pose a danger to societal security as well: some members of the majority might come to find themselves a minority in a new, 'foreign' state without the same rights as they previously enjoyed. As a result, the majority group takes measures in order to counter the (perceived) secession, and provisions towards cultural autonomy are denied. Provided the minority has no wish to secede from the state, and the majority group has no desire to employ assimilatory policies (as long as secession is not in fact the minority group's intention), the security requirement of the two sides may be seen as compatible. However, by misinterpreting the nature of the minority group's nationalism, the majority group has acted in such a way as to create an unnecessarily conflictual situation between them.

In this way, Kaufman's interpretation of the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh seems to provide an effective example of an illusory incompatibility between the groups. Focusing on unrest in Yerevan, in the Karabakh capital, Stepanakert, and on the violence in the Azerbaijani city, Sumgait, Kaufman points to the 'spontaneous' nature of the violence: 'Neither the rallies nor the violence [in these cities] was organized by top leaders in either republic, or even by opposition leaders. Official media opposed both violence and rallies, and republic leaders were profoundly embarrassed by both. . . .'[60] His argument in this respect is that although nationalist politicians can be blamed for the *escalation* of Armenian–Azerbaijani violence, the conflict was initially predicated on – or *instigated* by – the Armenians' erroneous assumption that the Azerbaijanis intended to harm them, as they had done in the past:

> [T]he Armenians of Karabakh remembered the 1915 genocide against them and feared extinction, so as soon as Gorbachev's policy of glasnost opened up the political space in 1987, they began agitating for annexation of their region by Armenia. The Azerbaijanis, fearful of an Armenian–Russian combination aimed at dismembering their republic, resisted. The result was an explosion of mass-led violence that propelled nationalists to power on both sides.[61]

While openly calling for secession, and thus bringing Azerbaijani state and societal requirements into question, the motivation for this, at least as Kaufman sees it, derived from misperception. That is to say, Armenian desires to sever themselves from Azerbaijan stemmed from the misinterpretation of Azerbaijani nationalism as 'minority oppressing'.

Societal and state security dilemmas

Thus far, societal security dilemma scenarios have been described predominantly in terms of relations between states, that is, majority groups, and their

minorities. The majority dominates, while minority groups struggle to maintain or improve their position, and thus their level of security, within the state. From the perspective of minorities, the maintenance of identity is often tied to control over those institutions responsible for cultural reproduction, and/or over territory to which societal identity is bound. For the majority group, societal security is usually achieved through the preservation of its privileged (political) status and the maintenance of 'national unity'.

In traditional (state) security dilemmas, the fundamental security requirements are related to the maintenance of sovereignty; in the main, the inviolability of borders (territorial integrity). In the majority of cases, what harms the sovereignty of the state can therefore be more or less easily determined *a priori*: armed attack, neighbouring states aggressing militarily.[62] However, it seems more difficult to ascertain in much the same way what harms the identity of the group. Societal security requirements are arguably more contextual. In some cases (for either majority or minority groups), societal identity may depend heavily on provisions for, say, own-language education. In others, group culture might be tied more to religion or other practices. While in some other cases, societal security may be constituted through an attachment to the historic 'homeland'. As such, some territorial aspects may be applicable, and demands for ethnic autonomy can thus be levelled. But demands for cultural autonomy may be more appropriate where the survival of group identity is not bound in any strict sense to regional control. Thus, while for some the denial of ethnic autonomy might well bring societal security into question, for others it may present no such threat.

Analogy between the societal security dilemma and its state counterpart may be difficult to make. As I have just alluded to, societal security requirements may be seen as far more contextual than measures relating to the protection of the state. But potential problems go further than this, not least because of apparent differences in the dynamic of the action–reaction process.

State security dilemmas are marked by an overwhelmingly military dynamic: the ambiguity of military preparations causes uncertainty, worst-case assumptions, and ultimately, armed countermeasures. In this context, it is the build-up of arms that generates feelings of insecurity; the (mis)perception that territorial integrity will be violated through the deployment of armed forces. However, societal security dilemmas, although potentially also military in nature, more often than not reveal non-military characteristics. Rather than the build-up of arms, action–reaction processes are triggered by the ambiguity of some nationalist projects and movements. Certainly in the scenarios I have described in this chapter, insecurities stem mainly from the granting (majority group) and perceived curtailment (minority group) of cultural rights within the state.

Because of its non-military nature, it is interesting to note, moreover, that in the societal security dilemma there seems to be no clearly identifiable

equivalent to the 'pre-emptive strike' element. As I described in Chapter 1, given the advantage of offence over defence, the spiral process can be escaped through launching pre-emptive attack: strike at your neighbour before you yourself get hit. This explains why security dilemmas can often lead to war. But when dealing with non-military actions, there are not the same kinds of offence–defence considerations to be taken into account. Certainly, the majority group can, for example, crack down on opposition groups (representing minorities) before they have the opportunity to implement their anticipated political programme. Here, though, there is no such direct link between pre-emptive action and violence and war as there is in the state context. Instead, it seems more the case that societal security dilemmas spill over into violence and war when political–legal means have been exhausted (or when such means simply do not exist).

To sum up briefly, then: societal security dilemmas occur when the actions that groups take to secure their identity cause reactions in others, which, in the end, leave all parties less secure. Societies may try to strengthen group identity through cultural- and/or ethnic-nationalist projects. However, the two nationalisms may often be difficult to distinguish: cultural nationalism may come to resemble ethnic nationalism, and will likely be conflated when accompanying rhetoric is unclear or contradictory, and when poor channels for inter-group communication exist. The assumption of a worst-case scenario provokes a series of measures and counter-measures in which attempts to deny/revoke cultural rights are both implemented and resisted. This process of action–reaction may then culminate in the outbreak of ethnic violence if ultimately grievances are not adequately addressed through existing legal and/or political means.

Tight societal dilemmas occur according to the more specific pre-condition of misperception; that is to say, there must exist an illusory incompatibility between the societal security requirements of the two groups. Both sides are security-seekers, but the nature of the situation compels them to act as if the other were revisionist. With regular societal security dilemmas, again, both sides are security-seekers, but where the maintenance of group identity is predicated on the insecurity of others: others enter as part of the self-identification in such a way that their very presence is seen as a danger to the autonomy and coherence of the self. In this way, regular societal security dilemmas describe situations of 'required insecurity'. Loose societal security dilemmas are, by contrast, marked by the presence of power-seekers, where others' identity is attacked for motives other than security. Again, this formulation is the most problematic of the three, not in the least because offence–defence variables do not equate easily with the societal (non-military) context.

In the following four chapters, attention is duly turned from theory to practice. The societal security dilemma formulations proposed in this chapter are utilised in two cases: the Krajina region of Croatia and the Transylvania region of Romania. Both cases seek to show how the

application of the societal security dilemma can highlight certain conflictual dynamics that the more regular, military-centred concept would otherwise miss. That is to say, the societal security dilemma seeks to explain how security concerns over group identity can escalate to the point of ethnic violence.

5   Serbs and Croats

Since 1918 there has been a constant tension between Serbs and non-Serbs in this polyglot country [Yugoslavia], as Serbs have repeatedly tried to Serbianize and/or dominate the non-Serbs, and the non-Serbs have doggedly fought such domination. This struggle between Serbs and non-Serbs lies at the heart of the instability for which Yugoslavia is famous. It has never been the *only* source of Yugoslav instability, but it has been a crucial component in that syndrome.[1]

In these next four chapters, attention turns from theory and concept-building to practical application. My first case concerns the applicability of the societal security dilemma to Krajina; the utility of the concept in explaining the outbreak of ethnic violence between the Croatian republic and its Serb minority. This chapter provides some basic historical context, and in doing so brings to the fore those issues which, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political elites on both the Serb and Croat sides came to utilise as justification for popular mobilisation and resistance. The historical record is fundamental for grasping how particular constructions of Serb and Croat identities came to take hold and, moreover, for how each side was able to ascribe to the other particular motives and (malign) intentions.

   The chapter is broken down into four main sections. In the first section, I look briefly at Serb and Croat histories up to the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918. The second concentrates on the relations between the two sides in so-called 'Royal Yugoslavia' up to the outbreak of civil war in 1941. Next, I examine the civil war period of 1941–45. Finally, the fourth section is concerned with Serb–Croat relations from 1945 up to the process of democratisation in 1990.

Before Yugoslavia

You cannot understand Yugoslavia without a thorough knowledge of its history even before its official birth in 1918. This is because the reasons for its birth were the same as those for its death.[2]

Yugoslavia was born on 1 December 1918,[3] proclaimed originally as the Triune Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Part of the new state was formed by the two independent Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. The remainder, Slovenia, much of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, and parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina, was carved out of the dissolved Austria–Hungary. Indeed, Royal Yugoslavia was every bit as multinational as the Habsburg Empire had been.

The new state was ethnically heterogeneous: Serbs and Croats were predominant, with lesser groups of Slovenes, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, and Germans.[4] Ethnic diversity within the state was also reinforced by religious distinctions: the Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians being Roman Catholic, the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians Eastern Orthodox, while the Albanians, along with a significant number of Slavs in Bosnia-Hercegovina identified themselves as Muslim – converting to Islam under the period of Turkish rule.[5] However, the potentially unstable heterogeneity of Royal Yugoslavia was from the very beginning most apparent between Serbs and Croats.

The main starting point in examining Serbian history – and thus appreciating the nature of Serbian national identity – is the now much talked about Battle of Kosovo Polje. At the Field of Blackbirds, under the command of Crown Prince Lazar, Serbian forces were defeated by the Ottoman army on 15 June 1389. The Turks' victory at Kosovo was a landmark for the Serbian State: their defeat in the battle effectively consigned Serbia to four centuries of rule by Constantinople. But the effects of Serbia's defeat went deeper than just a loss of sovereignty. Harold Temperley argues that the 'direct effects of the battle were felt for over 500 years', noting 'the terrible effect which Kosovo produced on the Serbs, as the overthrow of their language, civilisation, nationality, religion, of all they held dear'.[7] Indeed, the sacrifice the Serbs believe themselves to have made, not only in defence of the nation, but in saving Christianity and European civilisation, has been employed extensively as a marker for Serbian identity.

During the following four centuries of Turkish domination, the Orthodox Church played a pivotal role in maintaining Serbian national identity. Nationality, as such, was not important as a marker within the Ottoman Empire. For the Turks, religion was the primary mode of distinction between peoples, the Serbs duly distinguished themselves from their Ottoman rulers in this way: the term 'Turk' referred to a religious category, Muslim, whether Turkish or Slavic, rather than a linguistic one.[8]

In 1829 – after an earlier failed attempt in 1813 – Serbia, with support from Russia, successfully revolted against Ottoman rule. 'During the nineteenth century Serbia threw off the last shadowy traces of Turkish suzerainty. Step by step she enlarged her territory, and emerged as the only possible nucleus around which the new Yugoslav state could grow.'[10] Yet, Serb aspirations of hegemony within the Balkans were checked throughout the nineteenth century by the desires of the great powers: Austria, Hungary and Russia were

each vying for a position of influence over the south Slav nations. Indeed, during the second half of the 1900s, as Ottoman power began to falter, Austria-Hungary (having become a dual monarchy in 1867) and Russia started to compete openly for Balkan spoils.

For an exploration of Croat nationhood, the crucial starting point is 930. In this year, the Croats declared their independence and crowned their own king, so constituting the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, which lasted until 1092. Towards the end of the eleventh century, the last of Croatia's kings was crowned. (Hereafter, the name Croatia will be used to refer collectively to Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.) With no obvious successor, the *Pacta Coventa* saw a Hungarian king, Colomon, being crowned. For the next two centuries, Croatia and Hungary led an equal, independent existence under the same ruler. Importantly, Temperley asserts that:

> Croatia, though united to Hungary, was not absorbed by her. The Croats now had a foreign king, but they retained their own nobility, their own language, and the substance of self-government. Ever since that date they have preserved their political self-consciousness and [a sense of] internal home rule; its amount has varied and its theory been disputed, but self-government has never become a mere memory or tradition in Croatia.[11]

The year 1102 saw the recognition of Croatian state rights and the granting of the Croatian parliament (*Sabor*). For Croat identity, 1102 is as important a date as 1389 (the Battle of Kosovo Polje) is for the Serbs.

For the next 400 years or so, Croatia enjoyed relative stability. In the second half of the fifteenth century, however, the Turks increasingly came to threaten the Dalmatian coast. Thereafter, both Croatia and Hungary were continually vigilant to the defence of the homeland against Ottoman forces. In 1526, Hungary was defeated by the Turks at the Battle of Mohacs. Croatia, now standing alone, was forced to turn to Austria for protection. Croatia offered its throne to Ferdinand of Habsburg, but in return was poorly treated by the Austrians: for the Habsburgs, Croatia served merely as a useful barrier against further Ottoman expansion.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Austria drove the Turks out of Hungary, with the Habsburgs giving control of Croatia to Hungary as an annexed territory. Yet, the Croats remained fervently loyal to the Habsburgs, asking Emperor Ferdinand for Croatia to be released from Hungarian control and placed under the direct rule of Austria.

In September 1848, the Croats defeated the Hungarian army on its way to support revolutionaries in Vienna. Once again, though, the Croats received nothing in return from the Austrians. The emperor had offered Croatia 'unity and autonomy within the empire in return for help to crush the Hungarians. Once victory was achieved, the emperor broke his side of the bargain.'[12] Instead of autonomy, Croatia became subject to both centralisation and 'Germanisation'. Moreover, the *Ausgleich* (Compromise) of 1867 handed

control of Croatia back to Hungary. Although the Hungarians recognised the Croat nation and granted limited autonomy, for the Croats it had nonetheless been the ultimate betrayal by Vienna.[13]

While sharing a common Slavic inheritance and speaking a more or less similar language, before the creation of Royal Yugoslavia the majority of Serbs and Croats had lived apart in separate empires. However, according to some writers at least, this had not prevented the growth of feelings of unity between the two nations. In 1919, Temperley noted:

> The most astonishing fact about the whole Serbo-Croatian history is that the differences erected by nature between the Serbo-Croat races, differences increased and made permanent by Austrian and Turkish diplomacy, have never yet succeeded in destroying the feelings of unity of nationality and sympathy between these two long dispersed fragments. . . .[14]

Laffan claims that it was Hungarian treatment of Croatia that chiefly caused the upsurge in feelings of commonality. Firmly under Magyar rule and unable to draw any sympathy from Vienna as to their plight, 'the southern Slavs began once more to draw together and to demand the recognition of their united nationality'.[15] Indeed, in both Serbia and Croatia intellectual groups and cultural organisations had formed, advocating the coming together of the two nations.

In Croatia during the 1830s there had developed what came to be known as the 'Illyrian movement'. To begin with, Illyrianism was primarily a cultural project – hence, often referred to as 'cultural Illyrianism' – with Croat intellectuals as its main driving force. Its greatest proponent was Ljudevit Gaj. Gaj envisaged a 'Greater Illyria': a single linguistic unit (still within Austria-Hungary) on which a state could eventually be built.[16] Within this Greater Illyria, the south-Slav dialects would be united into one language based on the most common, the *sto-kavski*. Gaj hoped that this would overcome religious differences. But many ethnic Serbs living in Croatia were not impressed with Illyrianism, and wanted to hang on to their distinctive Serbian identity.

During the 1840s, Illyrianism evolved more into a political movement – 'political Illyrianism' – with the formation of the Illyrian Party. But quarrels in the movement soon became apparent over what form a south-Slav state should take, and, importantly, what its relationship to Serbia should be.

Following the Illyrian movement, two of Croatia's most influential advocates of south-Slav unity were Ante Starcevic and Franjo Racki. Starcevic was the leader of *Stranka Prava* ('Party of Right'), a movement founded mainly as a reaction to the growing numbers of *Krajina* ('frontier') Serbs living in Croatia. Stranka Prava's ultimate goal was the creation of a 'Greater Croatia' based on the territory of the ancient Triune Kingdom.[17] More in keeping with Illyrianism than Starcevic, Racki was the first head of the Yugoslav Academy in 1866, which had been formed in order to 'promote . . . cultural bonds among the south Slavs under the banner of "Yugoslavia"'.[18]

By the end of the nineteenth century, following Starcevic's death and encouraged by Hungary's often harsh rule, many Croats came to see a united Yugoslavia outside the Habsburg Empire as the best way forward.

In Serbia, the most prominent political-cultural figures were Ilija Garasinin and Vuk Karadzic. Karadzic was essentially Starcevic's opposite number. In 1836, he wrote *Serbs All and Everywhere* ('Srbi Srbi I Sruda'), claiming that all the *sto-kavski* speakers, that is, the majority of Croats, were really Serbs in spite of their Catholic faith. (Similarly, Starcevic had argued that all Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Krajina were really Orthodox Croats.) Garasinin's views, although more tolerant than those of Karadzic, nevertheless epitomised the fundamentally different vision held by most Serbs concerning a south Slav state. While the pro-Yugoslav Croats saw a new country comprised of equal nations, the Serbs envisioned an arrangement in which Serbia would have a predominant political and cultural influence. Garasinin's opinions were laid out in the *Nacertanje* ('Outline') programme of 1844. For him, 'Yugoslavia' equated more or less to a 'Greater Serbia', which included parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and northern Albania. Greater Serbia would form the centre of a still larger unit incorporating parts of Croatia and Bulgaria.

In short, three main visions of the future state competed for supremacy: the Greater Serbia one, the Greater Croatia one, and the Yugoslavist one. Josip Juraj Strossmayer, another important figure in Croatia, envisaged a dualistic arrangement for Yugoslavia with two poles of influence: Zagreb and Belgrade. Strossmayer tried to join forces with Garasinin, but Garasinin was interested only in power being wielded from Belgrade.

In 1876, following an uprising in Bosnia against their Ottoman rulers, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey. With Romania and Russia also intervening against the Turks, Ottoman forces were quickly defeated. Under the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, Serbia and Montenegro were to receive territory at Turkey's expense, while Bosnia was to be given autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. However, Austrian interference in the matter resulted in the Congress of Berlin. Despite having its independence officially recognised together with some territorial gains, Serbia's influence in the Balkans was severely curtailed by the Habsburgs.

> Austria was given the right to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina, and also the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. By occupying the Sanjak [the Habsburg Empire] drove a wedge between the two young Slav states [Serbia and Montenegro], and ensured that Serbia would have no access to the sea through the territory of a friendly Slav neighbour.[19]

Although the Serbian State ended up with what it saw at the time as a less than satisfactory deal, the significance of what came out of the Congress of Berlin is nevertheless noted by Heppell and Singleton:

Serbia's policy in connection with the Bosnian Rising can be regarded as the first stage in the successful realisation of the ideas of Garasinin: the acquisition of territory inhabited by fellow Slavs under alien rule. It was a modest, but nevertheless significant step in the creation of the future Yugoslavia.[20]

However, the more decisive year that marked the re-birth of the south-Slav movement was 1903, with King Peter Karadjordjevic beginning Serbia's revival and the end of its dependence on the Habsburg Empire. From this point on, political parties in both Serbia and Croatia began to see the notion of Yugoslavia as an ever-greater possibility. In 1905, the Serbo-Croat coalition was formed to further the struggle against Vienna and Budapest. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina. With the large number of Serbs living there – 1.9 million, some 43 per cent of the population at the time – Belgrade was duly outraged. In August 1911, the Serbo–Croat Progressive Party, the party at the political forefront of the south Slav movement, held its first conference in Split. It defined its objectives as 'the liberation and unification of all Southern Slavs into a single independent state'.[21]

Further progress towards the possibility of Yugoslavia was enabled by the creation of the 'Balkan League' in 1912: a series of agreements between Serbia and Bulgaria, Bulgaria and Greece, and Serbia and Montenegro. This same year, the four Balkan League countries went to war against Turkey in the first of the two Balkan Wars. In the Second Balkan War of 1913, Bulgaria turned on Greece and Serbia, but was subsequently defeated. The outcome of the two wars was that Serbia emerged as the most powerful state in the Balkans. As A. J. P. Taylor writes: 'By the Treaty of Bucharest [at the end of the Second Balkan War] Serbia had more than doubled her size, and was the obvious leader of the south-Slav peoples still under foreign occupation'.[22]

Antagonisms between Serbia and Austria-Hungary came to a head on 28 June 1914 when a young Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, thus triggering the descent into the First World War. The fall of the Habsburg Empire, brought about by their defeat in the war, effectively removed the last barrier to the creation of a new south-Slav state. Thus, as Pavlowitch points out, 'although the conception of Yugoslavia goes back to the 1830s', this 'was not predestined to lead to the territorial framework of 1918. Only when Austria-Hungary broke up as a consequence of the First World War did the unification of the Yugoslav lands present itself as a fact of practical politics.'[23]

Royal Yugoslavia: 1918–41

As a term Yugoslavia was false: the Bulgarian, Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian languages are distinct. . . . As an idea it was beautiful,

inspirational and delusive. As a political project it was beautiful, inspi-
rational, delusive, and sometimes expedient. As a state it was unique
and eventually impossible. Ripped from the grasp of dying neighbours
. . . the first Yugoslavia was a unitary, nation-state solution to a multi-
national question. Born in violence, it could only be maintained by
force.[24]

At the end of the First World War, it was not south Slav unity alone that drew
the Croats towards the idea of Yugoslavia. Italy had laid claim to parts of the
Dalmatian coastline. Alone, Croatia was too weak to challenge Italy for
control of the territory. As a part of Yugoslavia, however, Croatia was in a
much stronger position to resist others' territorial ambitions. As Mark
Almond notes: 'Italy's ambition to control the . . . Istrian and Dalmatian
coasts meant that Serbia was an ally against a new foreign domination'.[25]
Thus, according to Latinka Perovic: 'Croats . . . accepted Yugoslavia partially
out of their own historical aspirations and partially out of political realism,
given the situation conditioned by the state of the powers after World War I
. . . they accepted Yugoslavia as a political solution but not as an idea of
national unity'.[26]

However, once inside Yugoslavia, all was not well with Croatia. Many
Croats felt deceived that the new state was a centralised, Serb-dominated one.
The capital, Belgrade, was in Serbia; the royal family, the Karadjordjevic, was
Serbian; the Orthodox Church was favoured; and the Serbs dominated the
bureaucracies, the military and the police.[27] By contrast, most Serbs felt they
were the natural and deserving hegemons of the south-Slav peoples, and that
without their great sacrifices in the two Balkan wars and the First World War,
Yugoslavia would never have been possible. 'In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, the Serbs considered themselves as *Staatvolk*, entitled to play
a pre-eminent role in the polity of the new country. The Serbs identified
themselves with Yugoslavia and regarded it as their state, as a sort of widened
Serbia.'[28]

The separate historical experiences of the Serbs and Croats had besides
made an important impact on the development of their political culture.
Under Habsburg rule, in Croatia some sense of civil society had developed,
together with the experience of limited industrialisation. By contrast, in
Serbia civil society was poorly developed, and, by and large, the Serbs still
constituted an agriculturally based society. Moreover, '[w]hile Turkish rule did
not disadvantage the Balkan Slavs to the degree that many persons have
implied, it did deprive the Balkan peoples of contact with European culture
at a time when [those Slavs] in the north were acquiring habits advantageous
to the operation of modern society'.[29] Indeed, for some writers the Croats'
sense of betrayal over Serbia's domination of the new kingdom ran much
deeper than just political differences: 'For a Roman Catholic people on
the periphery of Europe, that [Serbian hegemony] signified submission to an
inferior, oriental culture'.[30]

Throughout much of the 1920s, Royal Yugoslavia's political system failed to accommodate Serb and Croat differences. Although dissatisfied with existing institutional arrangements, the Croats did not possess sufficient numbers to challenge the current order by strictly parliamentary means. As such, they began to employ different tactics, with some turning to violence. The Yugoslav parliament became increasingly disorganised and ineffective, with matters coming to a head in June 1928 when a Serb deputy shot and killed Stjepan Radic, co-leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party (CPP) and the most popular politician in Croatia. 'Radic's death was a disaster for Yugoslavia. However much he had been opposed in practice to the Yugoslav idea, his murder came to justify the complete rejection of the state in the mind of many Croats.'[31]

Political conflict culminated in the dissolution of parliament, the abolition of the 1921 constitution, and the establishment by King Alexander I of a royal dictatorship in January 1929. At the same time, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was re-named Yugoslavia and was administratively re-organised.[32] Still, Alexander's rule remained essentially Serbian, and this made him many enemies. On 9 October 1934, the king was assassinated in Marseilles.[33] His successor to the throne, Peter II, was too young to assume the full responsibilities of government. Thus, Alexander's cousin, Prince Paul, was made regent.

During the 1930s, incompatible Serb and Croat visions of the state continued to be a source of conflict. Even so, during the second half of the decade Yugoslavia enjoyed relative political stability. During this time, the CPP, under the new leadership of Vladko Macek, continued to pursue its goal of greater autonomy for Croatia within a re-worked state structure. In August 1939, the new Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dragoljub Cvetkovic, offered Croatia what effectively amounted to federal status and an enlargement of its territory. On 26 August, the *Sporazumen* ('Compromise') – also known as the Cvetkovic–Macek Agreement – was signed. Given the increasing sense of threat from both Italy and Nazi Germany, '[Prince] Paul wanted to solidify Yugoslavia's internal political order by appeasing the resentful Croats and giving them self-government . . .'.[34] The autonomous Croatian *banovina* created by the Sporazumen incorporated all of the Sava and Littoral *banovines*, plus parts of the Vrbas, Zeta and Drina provinces; encompassing approximately 30 per cent of the country's area and population. Crucially, of the banovina's 4.4 million inhabitants, 866,000 were Serbs. Not surprisingly, much of the opposition to the Sporazumen came from the Serbian minority (whose leaders had not been consulted) and from many Serbs within Serbia itself. Resistance to the Sporazumen also came from the 'Ustashe': Croatian fascists who recruited members on the basis that Serbs and Croats should not co-exist in the banovina. The Sporazumen was signed less than a week before the outbreak of the Second World War. And with the war came by far the bloodiest period of Serb–Croat relations.

The Yugoslav civil war: 1941–45

On 6 April 1941, Nazi Germany started its Blitzkrieg on Yugoslavia; with Belgrade subject to heavy bombardment, German forces crossed the border into northern Serbia.[35] Four days later, on 10 April, the *Nezavisna Drzava Hrvtaska* ('NDH'), or Independent State of Croatia, was created as an Italian protectorate. The NDH was run by the Ustashe, under the leadership of Ante Pavelic. Prior to the NDH, Pavelic's Ustashe had been anything but a proper mass movement, having no more than about 12,000 members in the whole of Croatia.[36] However, once in power most Croats seemed to welcome the Pavelic regime. Indeed, as Paul Lendvai points out, the initial enthusiasm in Croatia for the NDH says much about Croat feelings towards the Serbs:

> In a very real sense, the Ustasha regime . . . was a bizarre culmination of . . . pure Croatian nationalist trends. . . . The fact that the Croats had come to hate this centralized, Serb-dominated state more than the Germans and the Italians was a consequence of the enforced humiliation they felt living together without rights and equality.[37]

Only Croats had political status in the NDH. The new Croatian state encompassed all of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as well as what is now south-west Vojvodina. Of the NDH's inhabitants, almost two million (one-third) were Orthodox, while over one million were Muslim – although Pavelic had no particular quarrel with them. On 18 April 1941, the NDH's first anti-Jewish law was issued. Later, on 30 April, three further laws were issued concerning citizenship, racial identity and on 'the protection of Aryan blood and the honour of the Croatian people'.[38] Pavelic's goal was to create an ethnically pure 'Greater Croatia', and the Ustashe set about their task with a racial loathing for Jews and Gypsies and a religious hatred of Serbs: 'Under slogans such as "Kill a third, convert a third, expel a third",[39] Pavelic's supporters went on a killing spree.'[40]

Although the NDH was the very epitome of the Nazis' racial ideology, Ustashe methods were even more cruel and inhumane than those employed in the 'Final Solution'. Indeed, even the Nazis themselves were horrified by the often senseless brutality of the Ustashe killings. In 1942, one SS officer wrote:

> The Ustasha units have carried out their atrocities not only against Orthodox males of military age, but in particular in the most bestial fashion against unarmed old men, women and children. . . . Innumerable Orthodox have fled to rump Serbia, and their reports have roused the Serbian population to great indignation.[41]

Sometimes the Ustashe would kill Serbs in their villages. Sometimes they would load them on to trucks, drive to remote parts of the countryside,

and kill them there. And sometimes entire villages would be locked inside the local Orthodox church, which would then be set on fire. John Lampe refers to the NDH's Serb-populated areas as having been the 'Krajina killing fields'.[42]

The most feared among the killing fields of the NDH was the concentration camp at Jasenovacs. The actual number of people who died at Jasenovacs is still a point of great contention between Serbs and Croats. While Serbian propaganda has very likely exaggerated the number of deaths at the camp, there is no denying the huge scale of the killing carried out there by the Ustashe. Mark Almond claims that between 1941 and 1945, 60,000 Serbs were murdered by the Ustashe at Jasenovacs.[43] Others have put the number as high as 100,000. According to Robert Fisk, in total around 700,000 men, women and children were detained at the camp. 'Many of them, *and this is history*, were hacked to death with axes, or beheaded with saws. The women were often handed over to professional butchers who hacked them to death with their knives.'[44]

The genocidal policies of the NDH caused tens of thousands of Serbs to enlist in either of the two resistance movements: the 'Chetniks' and the 'Partisans'. Under the leadership of Draza Mihailovic, the Chetnik's fight was for the restoration of royal power. The desire to create a 'Greater Serbia' was implicit in the Chetnik's programme – although it is unclear as to whether Mihailovic himself ever advocated 'ethnic cleansing', as did some other figures within the Chetnik movement. The establishment of the Chetniks as an effective resistance movement to the Ustashe served to create a vicious cycle of atrocities and counter-atrocities against the NDH's Serb and Croat (and Muslim) populations.[45] 'Acting in the name of preserving their faiths, Serbs and Croats conducted a *holy war* trying to exterminate each other.'[46]

Although the majority of the Croats had initially welcomed the NDH, a minority soon became disenchanted, and along with many Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, chose to join the Partisans. The leader of the Partisans was a Croat, Josep Broz, better known as Tito. The Partisans wanted to create a new Yugoslavia along socialist lines, thus creating a conflict between themselves and the Chetniks as to the intended nature of the post-war state: Monarchist or Communist? Between 1941 and 1945, the country thereby became a battleground of many, often overlapping, wars. As Noel Malcolm describes:

> In addition to the initial war mainly between Germany and Italy and Yugoslavia, there was the continuing war in Yugoslavia between the Axis powers and the Allies. There was also the Axis's war against the various Yugoslav resistance movements. And, on top of all this there were at least two civil wars going on: the first one was between the Ustasha and Serb population of the NDH, and the second was a war between the Chetniks and the Communist Partisans (of which the Serbs belonged to both).[47]

When the Second World War – and with it the Yugoslav Civil War – finally came to an end in 1945, the total number of war-time fatalities – Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Gypsies, and Jews – was, according to many analysts, just over one million. Some Serbs have fiercely contended that the number of deaths among their own is nearly double this at around two million, while several Croat estimates have the total number at well below the one million mark. However, the work of Bogoljub Kocovic (a Serb) and Vladimir Zerjavic (a Croat) might be seen as a fairly accurate guide to Serb and Croat losses between 1941 and 1945: Kocovic has Serb deaths at 487,000 and Croat fatalities at 270,000. Zerjavic puts them at 530,000 (Serb) and 192,000 (Croat).[48]

Federal Yugoslavia: 1945–90

When Tito came to power at the end of the Second World War, his solution to the blood-letting of the Yugoslav Civil War was to transcend ethnic differences, uniting the people behind the banner of *Bratsvo i Jedinstvo* ('Brotherhood and Unity').

This second Yugoslavia (after the first 'Royal' state) was constructed along federal lines: six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro); and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina, and Kosovo). The new 1946 Constitution reflected Brotherhood and Unity inasmuch as all 'Yugoslavs' had equal rights regardless of ethnicity (nationality) or religion. The list of 'constituent nations' included Macedonians and Montenegrins, as well as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Bosnian Muslims, although not officially recognised as a nation (*narod*) until the 1960s, were also seen as a separate group.

As with previous arrangements, though, the new federation was an object of resentment for both Serbs and Croats alike. The Croats were unhappy because many now found themselves living outside Croatian republican borders in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbs were angry because Bosnia-Hercegovina also encompassed an even larger Serb population.[49] However, the most troublesome region for the Serbs was Krajina: still home to a sizeable Serb minority despite the wartime slaughter there, and now within the borders of the new Croatian republic. Additionally, as Harriet Critchley writes:

> The Croats . . . noted that Belgrade was both the federal capital and the capital of Serbia and that a large proportion of senior civilian and military leadership positions were held by the Serbs. The Serbs, for their part, began to see themselves as essentially losers in an anti-Serb conspiracy, especially when Vojvodina and Kosovo were carved out of Serbia to become autonomous regions.[50]

Federal Yugoslavia operated by privileging Serbs beyond their number. For example, although making up only 12–14 per cent of Croatia's population, the

percentage of Serbs in the republic's Communist Party was usually double this. Thus, '[t]he Serbs were compensated for having to live in a federation, while Croat nationalism was kept in check'.[51]

Despite Yugoslavia's new federal structure, the country's Communist government had no plans for allowing any real degree of decentralisation. Instead, Yugoslavia remained highly centralised, with the so-called 'national question' being addressed through the promotion of economic growth. Even though basic manifestations of ethnic and cultural distinctiveness were not prohibited, any expression of nationalism, particularly religiously-based, was ruthlessly suppressed: throwing national hatreds into what Misha Glenny calls 'history's deep freeze'.[52]

To begin with, the federalist system was successful in keeping any visible expressions of ethnic conflict at bay. During the 1960s, however, the Communists' approach to the national question began to change: ethnic divisions were to be overcome not only through economic means, but by also embracing a new, overarching socialist identity: 'socialist Yugoslavism'. Even so, some party members were worried that traditional Serb nationalism still resided within the core of the central bureaucracy in Belgrade. Indeed, as the writer (and later champion of the Serb nationalist cause) Dobrica Cosic suggested in 1961:

> Today the form of Serbian nationalism is often 'Yugoslavism'. . . . Serbia's 'Yugoslavs' downplay the differences among the Yugoslav nations, they are for unification, unification is for them a creation of privileges for their language and the assimilation of . . . [other south-Slav] nations, unification for them is never overcoming their 'Serbianness', and in unification they seek to obtain their 'historical rights' and 'state-building aims'. Serbian 'Yugoslavs' carry a conscience of their historical mission, they are always for a strong unified state, they are always politically 'concerned' about the fortunes and the destiny of their people.[53]

To be sure, although the idea of 'Yugoslavism' had been a significant factor in the country's creation, 'it is difficult to ascertain . . . to what extent [Yugoslavism] coexisted with or displaced the more particularist loyalties of Serbism or Croatism. . . . Yugoslavism overshadowed these particular nationalisms, but did not eliminate them.'[54]

In 1963, a revised constitution was introduced, 'giving a real measure of decentralisation, encouraging a closer association between nation and territory'.[55] The constitution reflected a different approach in the Communist leadership toward ethno-national conflicts. Different interests were now seen as something normal, and it was felt that such interests should best be dealt with through decentralisation – a more equal distribution of power among all levels of government. As a result, 'by the end of the 1960s the country's republics and provinces had begun to emerge as important centres of political authority and power'.[56]

Since 1945, nationalism in Croatia had been kept largely silent. However, during the mid 1960s signs that the Communist government was prepared to take a more relaxed view over the national question provoked a revival of Croat national consciousness. Because of the civil war, it had been politically impossible for religion to play a role in Croatian national identity. The struggle for distinctiveness therefore focused primarily on language. The fact that Croats spoke more or less the same language as Serbs was a source of great frustration, and there were attempts to make the Croatian language as distinct as was possible from the Serbian.[57]

In 1967, a body of Croatian intellectuals advanced a language declaration demanding full constitutional recognition of four (instead of three) Yugoslav languages: Croatian was to join Serbian, Slovene and Macedonian. The language declaration initiated a mass nationalist movement, known as *Maspok*, and the concomitant revival of Croat nationalism was accompanied by the reappearance of some symbols last seen during the period of the NDH. The so-called 'Croatian Spring' lasted until 1972, when it was finally suppressed by Tito.

Tito's long-term solution to the Croatian problem was to introduce yet another revised constitution. Consequently, decision-making in the Yugoslav State became subject to further decentralisation, in effect creating a near confederate system. Power passed increasingly into the hands of republican and provincial leaders, who in turn were answerable to Tito directly. Emphasis was now placed on the national question being solved by agreement between the republic's leaders. But this was often a difficult and lengthy process and, if not for Tito's personal intervention in balancing interests, would likely have failed to produce any consensus at all. Indeed, rather than working for the interests of Yugoslavia as a whole, each of the republican and pro- vincial elites utilised the further-decentralised structure to enhance their own political power. Wiberg, borrowing from Carl-Ulrik Schierup, notes how the 1974 Constitution in essence created 'ethnocracies' out of the republics.[58]

By the end of the 1970s, all of Yugoslavia's republics and provinces were economically better off. Even so, the gap between rich and poor was widening and the wealthier, more industrialised of the republics (Croatia, Slovenia) were becoming increasingly unhappy. High-level subsidies were paid to Belgrade and then distributed to the more rural parts of the country (southern Serbia, parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro). Relations between Serbia and Croatia were at their lowest point since the Second World War.

To make matters worse, on 4 May 1980 Tito died. In the main, it had been Tito himself who had held the federal structure together. Tito's death signalled the loss of Yugoslavia's solid political centre.

During the 1980s, Yugoslavia slowly began to stagnate and then fragment. The years immediately following Tito's death were characterised by sharp economic decline: Yugoslavia's already large foreign debt continued to

increase, and the jobless number was also on the rise. Throughout this period, unemployment averaged around 15 per cent, but the burden of those out of work was not distributed equally. Slovenia enjoyed almost full employment, while the jobless number in Croatia stayed in single figures. In Kosovo, however, the number of those out of work was 50 per cent, in Macedonia 27 per cent and in Bosnia-Hercegovina 23 per cent. In Serbia, the unemployment figure reached over 20 per cent. Moreover, in the country as a whole inflation was at 50 per cent – eventually leaping to an extraordinary 1200 per cent.[59] But the divisions of power created by the 1974 constitution meant that solutions to the country's economic problem were difficult to find. In fact, they only made matters worse.

Yugoslavia's economic crisis also caused political and constitutional difficulties. Slovenia and Croatia wanted to move more towards capitalism, but the other republics resisted. Moreover, keen to reduce the level of their subsidies, the two republics proposed a looser confederation. Again, the others resisted the move: Serbia and Montenegro wanting greater (re)centralisation, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia seeking a compromise solution aimed simply at keeping the state together. Either way, agreement could not be reached.

With the federal government's inability to deal fully with Yugoslavia's growing number of problems, the site of political legitimacy began to shift ever more from communism to nationalism. 'Throughout the 1980s, politicians at the unit level increasingly used ethnicity as a component of their policies and debates.'[60] Yugoslavia was coming to resemble a collection of states rather than a single country, and for many the possible break-up of the country was becoming a very serious issue. Serbia had more to lose from federal dissolution than Croatia. Apart from the economic benefits that Yugoslavia brought to Belgrade – Slovenian and Croatian subsidies – the disintegration of the state constituted serious problems for Serbia in terms of both its state and societal security: in the minds of many Serbs, it would leave them weaker and surrounded by aggressive neighbours. Moreover, the Serbian nation would be divided; millions of Serbs would find themselves separated from their ethnic homeland.[62]

Serbian fears concerning the possible break-up of Yugoslavia were articulated in a Draft Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Although not intended for publication, the Memorandum quickly found its way into the daily newspaper *Vercenje Novosti* on 24 September 1986. According to the Memorandum, in the event of the country disintegrating all Serbs should live together in a single state. To this end, it championed 'the establishment of the full national sovereignty of the Serbian people, regardless of which republic or province it inhabits as its historic and democratic right'.[62] Moreover, the Memorandum argued that the Serbs were in such an unjust position that their very existence in Yugoslavia was threatened. In particular, it emphasised the apparent plight of the Serb population in Croatia:

Except during the period of the NDH . . . Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political question. If a solution is not found, the consequences will be damaging on many levels, not only for relations within Croatia but also for all of Yugoslavia.[63]

For some Serbs, in terms of identity and security the contents of the Memorandum seemed self-evident. For others, though, it represented the unequivocal revival of Serbian nationalism. To the Belgrade government, its message was distinctly dangerous. Although some in the Communist leadership portrayed the Memorandum as in fact being anti-Serb. On 30 October 1986, the then Serbian president, Ivan Stambolic, stated:

The so-called Memorandum is not new. It is the old chauvinistic concern for the fate of the Serbian cause with the well-known formula that the Serbs win the wars but lose the peace. . . . In short, the so-called Memorandum, more precisely and with an easy conscience, could be entitled 'In Memoriam' for Yugoslavia, Serbia, Socialism . . . equality, brotherhood, and unity. . . . Essentially, it is diametrically opposed to the interests of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.[64]

Similarly, Cosic argued that it was not Serb nationalist but 'anti-Tito' and 'pro-Yugoslav'.[65] Moreover, as Silber and Little point out, 'The Draft Memorandum did not create nationalism, it simply tapped sentiments that ran deep among the Serbs, but which were suppressed and, as a result, exacerbated by communism'.[66]

In spite of the Memorandum, though, nationalist sentiment among Serbs had been on the rise since the beginning of the 1980s. More than anything else, this was due to the Kosovo uprising. Kosovo, although approximately 90 per cent ethnic Albanian in population, is considered by the Serbs to be the cradle of their civilisation, of the medieval Serbian Kingdom encompassing Kosovo Polje and Serbian cultural monuments such as medieval churches and monasteries. In autumn 1981, ethnic Albanians took to the streets demanding their independence from Serbia. Many Kosovar Serbs, dissatisfied with their seemingly precarious status in the province protested: 'This is our land. If Kosovo . . . [is] not Serbian then we don't have any land'.[67] Losing Kosovo meant losing a major part of their history, and thus also a part of their very identity.[68] The demonstrations for a Kosovar Republic were ruthlessly put down by the Serbs, besides which the media in Belgrade freely reported complaints from the Kosovar Serbs of Albanian suppression.

Following the publication of the Draft Memorandum, the situation in Kosovo remained a great worry for Belgrade. In April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, the then leader of the Serbian Communist Party, visited Kosovo Polje. It was here that 'for the first time, Milosevic felt the pull of the masses'.[69] He addressed the huge crowd that had gathered: 'You should stay

here. This is your land. . . . You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed'.[70]

Given the situation in Kosovo, Milosevic quickly became the voice of Serbian nationalism. Although, as Aleska Djilas argues, Milosevic had not altogether been a willing nationalist:

> The mass movement of the Kosovo Serbs developed spontaneously. It was not openly anti-communist, though it could have easily become so. Milosevic only gradually overcame his caution and started supporting it, but he was nonetheless the first leading communist to do so. With the help of the party controlled media and the party machinery, he soon dominated the movement. . . .[71]

Thus, in siding firmly with the masses, by the end of the 1980s Milosevic enjoyed an unrivalled popularity among Serbian political figures.

In 1988, Serbia limited (though later to completely dissolve) autonomy for both Kosovo and Vojvodina. For many Croats, this was a sure indication of Serbia's aggressive, expansionist intentions, that Serbian nationalism had always come hand in hand with a desire to dominate the Balkans, which, it was felt, would ultimately manifest itself in the creation of a Greater Serbia. On 28 June 1989, several hundred thousand Serbs gathered outside the Kosovar capital, Pristina, to celebrate the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Milosevic, now the new President of Serbia, told an already excited crowd: 'After six centuries we are involved in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, but this cannot be excluded.'[72]

Serbian nationalist sentiment was now often explicitly interposed with anti-Croat rhetoric. For the most part, Croatia had sat and watched quietly at the rise of Milosevic. Ever since Tito had put down the Croatian Spring in 1972, Croatia had become known as the 'Silent Republic'. At the end of the 1980s, though, the sense of threat from Serbia was seized upon by nationalist politicians in Croatia such as Franjo Tudjman. Ivica Racan, the then leader of the Croatian Communist Party, notes how 'Milosevic's aggressive policy was the strongest propaganda for Tudjman. Milosevic was sending his gangs to Croatia, who were dancing and singing: "This is Serbia", which provoked and liberated the national pride and the nationalist reaction of Croats which was effectively used by Tudjman.'[73]

With the collapse of the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, and the concomitant waning of threat from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was also pushed towards the process of democratisation. The process of democratisation in the former Yugoslavia marked a crucial moment in relations between Serbs and Croats, one that was to lead them to violence and eventually war in Croatia and then too in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The holding of multi-party elections in Croatia in April 1990 enabled a strong re-articulation of nationalist grievances: Croatian separatism versus Serb

unitarism. But this also brought the question of the Krajina Serbs to the political forefront. With a great percentage of Serbs having always lived outside the borders of Serbia proper, the boundaries of the Serbian state had never reflected the borders of Serbian society. In this way, Haakan Wiberg describes Serbian identity as being linked to the idea of the 'nation'.[74] As such, Serbia's desire to maintain a stable Yugoslavia has always been compatible with its goal of preserving Serbian national unity. Differently, though, Wiberg describes Croatian identity as being far more associated with the idea of the 'state', as there has always been a better fit between the borders of Croatia itself and the spread of Croatian society.[75] Consequently, the notion of Croatian separatism has always struck fear into the hearts of many Serbs, not only because this would serve to undermine the unity of the Serbian nation, but also because of what happened to ethnic Serbs in the NDH during the civil war. For the Serbs, any suggestion of Croatian autonomy, let alone secession, has conjured up the horrific image of the return of a Ustashe state.

In the next chapter I deal expressly with the question of the Krajina Serbs and the two potentially conflicting constructions of Serb and Croat national identities. In analysing the ethnic violence that first gripped the Croatian republic in August 1990, I shall turn to the utility of the societal security dilemma.

6   Krajina and the societal security dilemma

> Serbs and Croats live together, sharing a language and mentality. The territory that they inhabit cannot be separated by an amicable divorce settlement.[1]

The historical record is perhaps the primary means for ascribing meaning to others' actions: by labelling the other as 'foe', our enemy today is as they have been in the past. The recent history of relations between Serbs and Croats – as I described in the previous chapter – has provided the basic material for nationalist politicians to construct an image whereby the other is always the culpable aggressor and the self the blameless victim. In August 1990, historical narratives were in this way employed in the service of mobilising populations towards the perpetration of violence. The specific purpose of this chapter is to assess whether this violence, between Croats and Krajina Serbs,[2] can profitably be viewed as the product of a societal security dilemma, in either its 'tight', 'regular' or 'loose' interpretations.

Doing so involves determining whether the parties' (societal) security requirements display a 'real' or an 'illusory' incompatibility. I argued in Chapter 4 that security requirements are subject to a process of definition and re-definition; that is to say, according to historical and political circumstance, security requirements will change over time. It is crucial, therefore, to concentrate on a period of time when such requirements remained (relatively) constant. If security requirements are in flux, then it becomes difficult to constitute the actors as stable referent objects for security analysis. Here, the focus on events in Croatia is duly of a fairly short duration: a six-month period, from the 'official' start of the election campaign on 24 February 1990 to the so-called *revolucija balvana* ('Log Revolution') beginning on 17 August 1990.

The chapter is broken down into four main sections. The first section briefly describes events in the aforementioned time-period. The second part turns its attention to an assessment of the security requirements of the HDZ government. The third part does likewise for Croatia's Serbian population. Finally, the fourth section concludes as to the compatibility/incompatibility of Serb and Croat security requirements.

From democratisation to violence
(February 1990–August 1990)

Throughout 1990, multi-party elections were held in all of Yugoslavia's six republics. Croatia, along with Slovenia, was the first to do so. In Croatia's first democratic elections, victory went to the *Hrvatska Demokratska Zayednika* (HDZ), or 'Croatian Democratic Union', under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman. When results of the elections were announced on 25 and 26 April, Tudjman's party had won an overall majority, securing 58 per cent of the total seats in the Croatian parliament (*Sabor*).[3]

The election campaign officially began on 24 February, the very same day Franjo Tudjman was elected as HDZ President. Tudjman pursued a political programme based on the notion of Croatian sovereignty and unity. In doing so, he was keen to point out that the HDZ was not advocating an independent Croatia.

During the election campaign, Tudjman's biggest concern in this respect was the republic's Serb population, especially those living in the so-called *Krajina* ('frontier' or 'border'). The Krajina is constituted by a series of 13 administrative districts, running from northern Dalmatia through to western Slavonia. At the time of the election, Serbs formed an absolute majority in 11 and a relative majority in two of the districts. While those in the former made up just 26 per cent of all Croatia's Serb inhabitants, their regional concentration and strong ethnic consciousness made them a significant factor in Croatian politics. Five Serb politicians fought the election under the banner of the ethnically based Srbska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), or 'Serbian Democratic Party',[4] based in the town of Knin. Knin was a stronghold of Serb nationalism, and even before Tudjman's election victory serious tensions between Serbs and Croats had manifested themselves in the town.[5] For example, on 18 March, when speaking in Benkovacs, one of Krajina's largest towns, incited by anti-Croat propaganda, Tudjman was threatened by a Serb, Sava Cubrilovic, carrying what turned out to be a toy pistol.[6]

Rather than calming rising tensions, however, Tudjman's behaviour following his election success only served to agitate the nascent hostility between Croatia's Serb and Croat communities. 'Once in power', Robert Hislope writes, 'the Tudjman regime initiated a policy agenda that sought to secure the unconditional right of Croatians to exercise political priority in their own republic'.[7] This policy agenda I refer to here as 'Croatisation'.

Croatisation was both symbolic and pragmatic. Many of the symbols of Croatia's independent (often fascist) past were restored: the checkerboard flag (the *Sahovnica*) and the Croatian coat of arms. Streets and squares were renamed: the 'Square of the Victims of Fascism' in Zagreb was changed to the 'Square of the Great Croats'. Tudjman's government also proposed certain amendments to the Croatian Constitution. Section 1 of the new Draft Constitution expressed the 'thousand-year national independence and state continuity of the Croat State', and the 'historic right of the Croatian nation

to full sovereignty'.[8] Further, it established the republic of Croatia as 'the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the *members of other nations and minorities* that live within it'.[9] For many Serbs, this in effect seemed to be saying 'Croatia for the Croats'. Indeed, although the Draft Constitution referred to the Croatian nation ('*Hrvatski narod*'), it no longer mentioned the Serbs in this same respect: previously a constituent nation in the Republic of Croatia enjoying equal constitutional status alongside the Croats, the Serbs were now relegated to the category of 'other nations and minorities'. Moreover, in Article 12, paragraph 1, the official language and alphabet of Croatia was specified as 'the Croatian language and alphabet'.[10] Dual-language road signs were torn down, even in Serb-majority areas, and numbers of Serbs were removed from the bureaucracies and the police and replaced with ethnic Croats. This only further convinced many Serbs of the less than democratic nature of the new government.

The leader of the ethnic Serb SDS party was Jovan Raskovic. Throughout May 1990, Raskovic met with Tudjman on several occasions.[11] During their meetings, Raskovic is said to have articulated two primary objectives: first, he wanted Serbs to be defined on an equal footing to Croats. And second, he asked Tudjman to grant the Krajina Serbs some form of autonomy within the republic; most of all, Raskovic wanted control over the local school system in Serb majority areas. But the two leaders failed to reach an agreement. Raskovic's daughter, Sandra, describes how difficult her father had found the talks with the Croatian President: 'Tudjman kept on repeating "Croatia is an independent country. I want Croatia to be independent. We've waited nine centuries for this. . . ." My father told him that this could create a great problem, because the Serbs don't want it.'[12] However, when the new Draft Constitution appeared on 25 July, it said nothing about the Serbs as a 'constituent nation'.

With the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings having shown few signs of tangible progress, relations between Serbs and Croats further deteriorated, setting in motion an action–reaction process between the two communities. Alleged cases of discrimination against ethnic Serbs were widely reported in the Belgrade media, the most famous being the so-called 'Mlinar Affair'. Miroslav Mlinar, a Serb, was found seriously injured in Knin with a knife wound to his throat.[13] 'The Mlinar affair was intended to demonstrate to the average Serb, in both Croatia and Serbia, that a resurgence of the [fascist] Independent State of Croatia was imminent.'[14]

Unsurprisingly, the SDS rejected the new Draft Constitution outright. At a mass rally on 25 July held in the town of Srb (which is said to have been attended by 120,000 Serbs from all over Yugoslavia), Raskovic announced that a referendum was to be held on 18 August concerning the status of Croatia's Serb population. The referendum was designed to legitimate the newly formed Serbian National Council's 'Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian people'. According to leading SDS figures, if Croatia were to remain part of the Yugoslav Federation, then the declaration

mainly advocated the provision of *cultural autonomy*. However, if the Republic were to move towards secession from Yugoslavia, the document instead demanded *political autonomy*. The Croat leadership was duly alarmed, warning that the referendum threatened to create 'a state within a state'.[15]

As the date for the referendum approached, some Serbian leaders met with Yugoslav Federal President, Borisav Jovic, asking for protection.[16] At the same time, and fearing Croat interference, log barricades were set up in some of Krajina's predominantly Serb districts, thus beginning the so-called 'Log Revolution'. On 17 August, the day before the referendum, the Croatian Ministry for Internal Affairs sent several helicopters to the Knin region. They were met by jet fighters from the Yugoslav Air Force and forced to turn back. Milan Martic, chief of Knin's police force, ordered his men to take over the police station. Meanwhile, Knin Radio announced that the town's mayor, Milan Babic, had declared a 'state of war' in the region.[17] There were widely confirmed reports that the Serbs had set up roadblocks throughout the area. It was 'indicated that about 120 active and reserve policemen had mutinied, distributing weapons, and joining civil brigades. Groups of civilians, including some military reservists, also broke into civil defense storage depots and seized arms.'[18] The Split daily newspaper, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, warned that the Croatian government would be unable to stop the referendum without causing bloodshed.

The referendum went ahead as scheduled, and the 'Declaration' of the Serbian National Council was accepted almost unanimously.[19] The organisers of the referendum claimed that nearly 100 per cent of the votes cast were in favour of Serbian autonomy.[20] Stipe Mesic, the then Croatian Prime Minister, angrily voiced his concerns:

> What kind of referendum in Croatia is this when Croats are not taking part in it, only Serbs and nobody else. . . . They are not a God-given nation, they are equal to everybody else, not more equal. If there are problems we should discuss them. . . . Who gave them the right to go to [Federal President] Jovic, to speak on behalf of the Serbs of Croatia? Who authorized Jovic to have talks with them without representatives of the republic of Croatia . . . ? These people in this country think that everything should be measured with criteria that suit the Serbs.[21]

The day before the referendum, 17 August 1990, is certainly crucial, signalling the beginning of the Log Revolution, where Krajina Serbs effectively began to separate themselves from the rest of Croatia. It is also at this point where relations deteriorated sufficiently to produce the first (significant) hostile encounters between the two parties. Worst-case assumptions had been made on both sides: the HDZ government saw the referendum as giving rise to the eventual territorial dismemberment of the Republic

(state), while the failure of the Tudjman–Raskovic talks further convinced many in Krajina (and elsewhere) of Zagreb's intention to suppress Serbian national identity. Tensions duly escalated, although prior to the Log Revolution itself scuffles between Serbs and Croats had largely been devoid of any armed force. Indeed, Raskovic himself claimed that the 'Serbian community was engaged in an "unarmed" . . . uprising to gain respect'.[22]

While (societal) security dynamics are indeed apparent, which interpretation of the concept – tight, regular or loose – best explains events is still to be determined. The following sections address this, seeking to establish the security requirements of the two parties and the existence of either a real or illusory incompatibility between them.

Croat (societal) security requirements/Serb (mis)perceptions

Determining societal security requirements is by no means unproblematic. What any given society feels it needs to be secure is invariably internally contested. This is certainly the case with Croatia. For the analysis in this chapter, however, Croatian societal security requirements can arguably be taken as those articulated through the policies of Franjo Tudjman's HDZ government. While acknowledging that the HDZ was not representative of Croatian society as a whole, Tudjman certainly enjoyed the support of the majority of Croats in the Croatian republic.

The HDZ came to power characterising itself as 'the most Croatian party'. Indeed, according to Robert Hislope, the HDZ was '[m]ore a broad mass movement than a political party', which 'aspired to represent the interests of the entire Croatian nation'.[23] He goes on:

> Part of Tudjman's appeal to the Croatian electorate was that he spoke, according to the Belgrade newspaper *Borba*, in a language that was 'comprehensible to ordinary people'. He tapped into long-seething grievances of the Croatian nation that had roots not only in Tito's Yugoslavia but in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as well.[24]

In the main, government policy reflected the popular will of the Croatian people, and there was thus a marked absence of dissension among ethnic Croats towards Tudjman's programme of Croatisation.

Croat goals

In general terms, Tudjman's intention was the achievement of a 'sovereign' Croatia. Initially, this was articulated in further demands for greater decentralisation in Yugoslavia. However, it is arguably the case that although maintaining an apparently confederalist approach, Tudjman's ultimate wish was for Croatia to secede from the Yugoslav state.[25] On this matter, Dusko

Doder is particularly clear: 'Although they [the Tudjman government] professed to be advocating a confederal arrangement, the Croats in fact were determined to destroy Yugoslavia'.[26] Doder's vehemence aside, it is clear that Tudjman sought an arrangement whereby Croatia would be free of perceived Serbian domination.

More specifically, Tudjman's desire was to create a Croatian state that was also truly the home of the Croatian nation. In this sense, he is widely acknowledged as having been a 'genuine' nationalist. Indeed, in the run-up to the elections, Tudjman had made much of his role in *Maspok* and how he had served a short prison sentence following Tito's suppression of the Croatian Spring. (While without question this enhanced his nationalist credibility in the minds of many Croats, his involvement in *Maspok* made him less than trustworthy for most Serbs.) Tudjman's ideological convictions had been articulated in 1981: 'Nations', Tudjman noted, 'grow up in a natural manner . . . as the result of the development of all those . . . forces which in a given area shape the national being of individual nations on the basis of blood, linguistic, and cultural kinship'.[27] Moreover, in 1990 Tudjman wrote:

> Throughout history there have always been attempts to find a 'final solution' for foreign and undesirable racial–ethnic or religious groups through expulsion, extermination, and conversion to the 'true religion'. . . . It is a vain task to attempt to ascertain the rise of all or some forms of genocidal activity in only some historical periods. Since time immemorial, they [genocidal practices] have always existed in one form or another, with similar consequences in regard to their own time and place, regardless of their difference in proportion or origin. . . . Reasoning that would assign genocidal inclinations . . . or goals to only some nations or racial–ethnic communities, to only some cultural–civilizational spheres and social revolutionary movements, or to only some individual religions and ideologies is completely mistaken and beyond any thought of historical reality.[28]

While Tudjman is not explicitly advocating genocide by any means, Robert Hayden draws attention to the implications of his ideological convictions:

> If Tudjman's concept of nation as collective individual is representative of beliefs held more widely [throughout Croatian society] . . . then in a nation-state of the majority, minorities are foreign to the bodies political and social. Thus for the majority to obtain its primary goal of the nation-state, only two choices are possible: 'the territorial truncation of the state, or the expulsion of disloyal minorities'.[29]

Of these two choices, territorial truncation was completely out of the question.[30] Indeed, territorial integrity was particularly important with

regard to Krajina, and especially Knin. Some of Tudjman's advisors comment as to the president having been obsessed with control over the region: 'Knin is sacred, Knin is sacred',[31] he is said to have told Stipe Mesic.

In economic terms, Knin was vital: it is the central communications junction between Zagreb to the north and the Dalmatian coastline to the south (responsible for generating much of Croatia's wealth). As Glenny notes: 'With Knin outside of its control, Croatia faces insurmountable difficulties in developing its tourist industry. Without Knin, Croatia is an economic cripple.'[32] More than this, though, Knin is also of great cultural significance to Croatia: it is the site where, back in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Kings of the medieval Croatian state were crowned. In this way, Knin represents the continuity of Croatian State traditions from the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia through the Pavelic NDH to the present.

Given the economic and societal importance of Knin (and Krajina), as Haakan Wiberg explains, the inviolability of state borders 'ruled out the territorial compromises necessary to get a Croatian state that was also ethnically Croatian, leaving forced ethnic cleansing or Croatization as [the] only possibilities'.[33] The expulsion of disloyal minorities was both extreme and undesirable. This left Croatisation.

Glenny outlines the relationship between Tudjman's nationalist ideology and the programme of Croatisation:

> His [Tudjman's] obsession was with the creation of a state which would be identified with the Croatian people. . . . Croats in Yugoslavia now wanted a state which they could call their own in every respect. In Tudjman's eyes that meant hanging the red and white chequered shield, the *sahovnica*, . . . from every building; it meant demoting the Serbs from their status . . . as a majority Yugoslav nation to that of a minority within Croatia; it meant pronouncing literary Croat as the only language of administration and dismissing the Serbs' Cyrillic script as well. The move was senseless as it was provocative.[34]

Vis-à-vis the republic's ethnic Serbs, Croatisation, then, was the predominant means with which to achieve the goal of 'a state which they could call their own in every respect'.

Security-seeking?

As Glenny implies, however, the fundamental question still to be addressed is whether the Croatisation programme can be equated to security-seeking or power-seeking behaviour on the part of the Croatian President. Ascertaining the existence of either protective or predatory motives is never easy – even for the observer in hindsight. However, there is some weight of opinion to suggest the largely security-seeking behaviour of the Croatian government.

Glenny argues that Croatisation was predicated – at least in part – on Tudjman's serious misjudgement over the nature of the republic's Serb communities. The identity of the Krajina Serbs had been greatly shaped by their particular historical experiences. Krajina is where the memory of the civil war atrocities was most vivid. As such, among these (rural) Serbs any perceived manifestation of Croat nationalism was likely to be seen in terms of the fascist NDH. This made them a quite different proposition to the urban Serbs living in Zagreb and Croatia's other major cities, who had settled in the Croatian Republic from Serbia after the Second World War and, for the most part, had thus been unscathed by the experience of the Ustashe. Set against this, Glenny notes that 'Tudjman's inability to recognise the complexity of Serbian society within Croatia was probably the most costly mistake that he ever made in his life'.[35] He goes on to suggest that the president was ill-informed by his political advisers: the clique of Croat academics who fashioned Tudjman's policies in the first months after his election victory were well acquainted with the 'sophisticated' Serbs living in Zagreb and the like, but knew almost nothing as to the nature of those living in the countryside.[36]

Glenny's view is partly upheld by Mario Nobilo, one of Tudjman's then foreign policy advisors. Nobilo notes that tensions and hostilities might have been significantly reduced if 'we [the Croatian government] had taken better account of their [the Krajina Serbs'] reactions to our emotional explosion when we won the election', and, importantly, that '[t]his wasn't directed against anyone, it was just an explosion, which the Serbs took as being directed against them'.[37] Nobilo's remarks suggest that while the HDZ may well have been both reckless and provocative, Tudjman's actions were not expressly intended to suppress the Serbs either physically and/or in identity terms.

Although perhaps security-seeking, the behaviour of Tudjman's government in this respect was often erratic, at times sending contradictory signals to the Krajina Serbs:

> Persistent efforts by Tudjman and his more moderate colleagues to reassure the republic's Serbs that their rights would be protected were deeply distrusted in the Serbian community and were at odds with the nationalist anti-Serb rhetoric frequently adopted by Tudjman and certain quarters of his party's leadership.[38]

Tudjman failed to distance sufficiently the HDZ government from the wartime Pavelic regime. The president insisted that Croatia be free from blame for past events. In particular, Tudjman refused to renounce what happened at the Jasenovacs concentration camp. 'If he had done so', Michael Ignatieff suggests, 'Serbs and Croats might have begun the process of ending the past, instead of living it over and over'.[39] Other HDZ members were also reckless in their pronouncements: Sime Djodan, on the subject of the imbalance

between Serb population and representation in the Republic, spoke of the need for a 'Croatian rifle on a Croatian shoulder, and a Croatian wallet in a Croatian pocket'.[40]

Serb reactions

To the HDZ, the distinction between the positive side of its symbolism, being Croatian, and the negative side, being fascist, might well have been unambiguous; that it was self-evident that those symbols taken or copied from the 1941–45 period were only meant to represent the positive.[41] To the Krajina Serbs, however, it was anything but self-evident. As was noted briefly, it was mostly their families that had been subjected to the horrors of the Ustashe. Croatisation had thus a far greater resonance among these rural Serbs than among those in urban areas, who had been much less 'personally' exposed to the traumas of the Yugoslav Civil War.[42]

The following story told by Milan Babic is indicative:

> In 1990 my closest neighbours were the most active in forming the HDZ party branch in my village. Their father in 1941 was the head of the Ustashe government of the village. In the summer of 1941 he brought a group of Ustashe killers to slaughter my family. My father was 12 years old at the time, and only escaped because his family had fled from his home.
>
> When this man came to kill the family and found no one at home, he took a great carving knife from our house. He used it to make a gash in the bark of the mulberry tree in our garden. The tree has since grown large, but the scar remained. And we children that were born after the war were shown that tree, and that scar.[43]

And just as the scar on the mulberry tree remained, so too the memory of the suffering of the Krajina Serbs, passed down from grandparents to parents and from parents to children. Thus, '[w]hen Milan Babic began to talk publicly about genocide and fascism he was appealing not only to the realm of experience of the people but also to a folkloric belief, in which it is the fate of Serbs to be attacked at home, betrayed abroad and left alone, the sole guardians of their own destiny'.[44]

More so than other Serb communities in the Croatian republic, the Krajina Serbs seemed largely uninterested in, or mostly unaware of, the great economic potential of Croatia.[45] On 5 May, in an attempt to calm rising tensions in Krajina over the removal of Serb policemen from their jobs, the Croatian Interior Minister, Josip Boljkovac, along with his deputy, Petrica Juric, and the commander of the Sibenik police, Ante Bujas, under whose authority Knin fell, addressed 90 members of the town's (overwhelmingly Serb) police force. They stressed how in economic terms all policemen would be much better off under the Tudjman regime. By way of reply, Milan Martic

initially accepted that staying in the Croatian republic certainly meant the chance of providing for a better life for the policemen and their families. Nevertheless, he went on: 'What cannot be bought is our Serb dignity. We would rather go hungry, as long as we are together with our Serb people. We will eat [only] potatoes . . . but we will be on the side of our people.'[46] Hence, Glenny's assertion that: 'The economic horizons of the rural Serbs are limited, but the . . . concepts of land and home are central to their thinking and sense of security'.[47]

Although the Serbs were indeed over-represented in the Croatian bureaucracies and police force, to be dismissed from his or her position was not recognised by a Serb in these self-same terms. Instead, it represented aggressive behaviour by a far from democratic government, especially so as (only) ethnic Croats had replaced them. 'For many Serbs who fell victim to this policy, this was distressing to say the least. When the HDZ government attempted to start addressing the imbalance in the police force where rural Serbs dominated . . . [this] was able to invoke their worst nightmare: the return of the Ustasha, the Croat fascists.'[48] Tudjman failed to take into account that these Serbs, suddenly and inexplicably deprived of their livelihood, might be unaware that they had only been appointed to these positions in the first place because of their nationality.

To sum up briefly, then: Croat (societal) security requirements can be said to derive largely from Franjo Tudjman's strong ideological convictions concerning the achievement of a sovereign Croatia. However, the variety of nationalism this brought with it seemed potentially at odds with the well-being of the Republic's Serb community. The achievement of Croatia as the homeland for all Croats was pursued through the programme of Croatisation. Croatisation represented the primacy of a separate (from the Serbian) Croatian identity based on (re-)expressions of Croatia's historical past, together with other pragmatic measures such as ensuring the predominance within the Republic of a distinct Croatian language in the Latin script. The often provocative symbolism of the programme, together with the dismissals from the bureaucracies and the police, did much to convince many Serbs that at best they would be second-class citizens in the new Croatia, and at worst physically threatened as they had been under the Second World War, Pavelic regime.

The regime in Zagreb was arguably revisionist (power-seeking) in its stance towards the maintenance of the Yugoslav Federation. Still, in the context of relations with the Republic's ethnic Serbs, there is at least some weight of opinion to suggest that Tudjman as much as anything else simply misjudged the reaction of the Krajina Serbs to Croatisation, rather than deliberately attempted to suppress Serbian identity. At the same time, though, contra-dictory statements emanating from the HDZ – fluctuating between civic and ethnic conceptions of nation – served only to create uncertainty in the Serb community as to the degree of inclusion they might be afforded in a future Croatian state.

Serb (societal) security requirements/Croat (mis)perceptions

As with the Croats, security requirements for the Serbs were also subject to internal contestation. However, as the dominant political voice among the Krajina Serbs, societal security requirements were for the most part defined (and articulated) by SDS leader Jovan Raskovic. Although following the Serbian National Council's 'Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian People' on 19 August Raskovic's status in the party was to become increasingly marginalised, up until this point the SDS leader in the main reflected the desires of the majority of ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region.

Serb goals

Raskovic was essentially a moderate, wishing, if possible, to avoid any kind of hostilities between the Republic's Serb and Croat populations. During his meetings with Tudjman in May, Raskovic expressed two primary concerns. First, there was the more general goal of preserving the Yugoslav state. Raskovic explains why Croatia's potential secession from the federation was a frightening prospect for many Serbs:

> For the Serb, Yugoslavism is something identical with Serbianism. For other peoples, this . . . does not exist and therefore this is one of the greatest divisions in the political and psychological life of Yugoslavia. One people identify with Yugoslavia, but other people accept it conditionally. . . . Federalism is something that is tied to the ideas of the Serbian people. . . . As regards a confederation, nobody in the world knows what a confederation is.[49]

The perpetuation of Yugoslavia was therefore synonymous with the maintenance of Serbian national identity: Yugoslavia was the only entity in which all Serbs resided. Any moves towards greater decentralisation, towards a confederation, or, even worse, the actual break up of the state, was tantamount to a loosening or severing altogether of those structures that bound Serbs together.

Second, there was the more specific task of protecting the status of Croatia's Serbian population. With regard to the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings, Lenard Cohen writes that disagreement arose over Raskovic's demand for 'some kind of "ethnic sovereignty" [ethnic autonomy]'.[50] In Cohen's version of events, Tudjman's main problem area in the talks seems to have been allowing the Serbs some degree of regional (territorial) control within Croatia. This is likely given Tudjman's apparent obsession with Croatian unity. Indeed, Thompson remarks as to the Croatian government's vow 'never to cede 'as much as a millimetre' of the republic to any rebel Serbs'.[51]

To be sure, Knin and the surrounding Krajina region was culturally speaking every bit as important for its Serb inhabitants as it was for the Croatian Republic. The Serbian presence in Krajina stems mainly from the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. During this period, many Serb families driven out of the Serbian Kingdom by the Turks came to settle in the region. In return for pledging their allegiance to Vienna, these Serbs were granted religious freedom and a measure of self-government: '[T]he Croats were forced to observe as large parts of what they considered the historic Triune Kingdom of Slavonija, Croatia and Dalmatia were administered by Vienna and peopled by Serbs'.[52] The deep sense of historical attachment in this way is expressed by Father Starrofor Mrdjen, an Orthodox priest from Knin:

> The Serbs were in this area 30 years before the Croats. Our church of St Luke was built here in AD 872. The Serbs were first mentioned in history in AD 1200. There were a lot of monuments that were Serbs' in this present time here in Knin. . . . The parochial churches were built here 600 years ago. The Serbian people were here before the battle of Kosovo in 1389. [But] [t]he most significant immigration of Serbs to this area was between 1424 and 1426.[53]

And the strong religious marker of Serbian identity, Father Mrdjen goes on, has long served as a source of conflict between Serbs and Croats in Krajina:

> [T]he Serbs were oppressed, forced to convert to Catholicism by a Croat community that wished to enlarge its numbers. . . . They resisted the invasion of Catholicism as long as they could, but under pressure they had to convert. They forced 20,000 Serbs to convert to Catholicism between Karlobag and Markaranska in the years after 1793. In receiving the Catholic faith the Serbs lost their own identity.[54]

Croatian Serbs who did convert to Catholicism under Habsburg rule were more likely to have done so in order to gain land rights: a case of Austrian legislation more than Croatian persecution. Nonetheless, Father Mrdjen's words are powerfully indicative of the religiously centred identity battleground that Krajina became.

Glenny's reading of the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings is, however, different to that of Cohen. He claims that more than anything Raskovic wanted local control over the school system in Serb majority areas.[55] This is apparently confirmed by a June 1990 address made by Raskovic in the ethnically mixed town of Petrinja, to the south of Zagreb. Belgrade Radio reports the SDS leader as having said the following:

> [T]he Serbs admit the Croatian people the right to their sovereign state, but they demand in that state an equal position for the Serbian and

other people. The Serbs do not want a second state in Croatia, but they demand autonomy. . . . The Serbian people in Croatia should be enabled to speak their language, to write their script, to have their schools, . . . to have their education programmes, their publishing houses, their newspapers.[56]

Importantly, according to Glenny: 'At no point did Raskovic express an interest in taking Serb areas out of Croatia. The autonomy he demanded would be realised in a Croatian state, whether part of Yugoslavia or not.'[57]

   This version of events is also maintained by Milan Andrejevich. Among other things, he notes how the Belgrade daily newspaper, *Borba*, and the Zagreb daily, *Vjesnik*, 'occasionally commented that the Serbs in Croatia . . . were not thinking along the lines of the more radical leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party . . .'.[58] That is to say, Raskovic and his supporters did not harbour the self-same secessionist goals increasingly being expressed by Milan Babic and other SDS extremists.

   Laura Silber and Alan Little are also of the same view:

> He [Raskovic] wanted autonomy for the Serbs, but this had no explicit territorial dimension. There was to be no specific autonomous region; the Serbs were to enjoy national rights, as individuals and collectively as a nation, wherever they lived in Croatia.[59]

Thus, and partly in keeping with the declaration of the Serbian National Council, Serb societal security requirements were very much defined in terms of the provision of *cultural autonomy*.

Security-seeking?

Security seeking on the part of the SDS leadership certainly seems easier to establish than for the HDZ government. Raskovic, unlike some of his more radical colleagues in the party, was an essentially moderate voice in the Republic's Serb community. Raskovic was not opposed to Croatia's secession *per se*, but nonetheless required some kind of Serbian autonomy – whether this be in the context of a more confederal Yugoslavia or in an independent Croatia.

   Given that Raskovic's intentions were devoid of any clear territorial (ethnic autonomy) element, vis-à-vis the Croatian republic the SDS leader might very well be described as a status-quo actor. Raskovic's demands – control over local education and other mechanisms for identity reproduction in Serb majority areas – neither compromised Croatia's territorial integrity, nor effectively created 'state within a state'. Nevertheless, for many Croats Serbian autonomy within Croatia raised the prospect of territorial revision, where Belgrade wrested Krajina from Zagreb's control as part of its Greater Serbia project.

Croat reactions

Raskovic's demands were seen by Tudjman and other leading HDZ figures as much as anything in terms of the danger of future territorial compromises. In the mind of the Croatian government, the granting of cultural autonomy made the achievement of ethnic autonomy just a matter of time: If I give you this now, you will surely want something more later. In turn, ethnic autonomy, it was feared, opened up the way for Krajina's eventual unification with Serbia itself, and with some justification: at the time Belgrade was continuing to churn out anti-Croat propaganda and Milosevic's support for the more extreme elements in the SDS was becoming more apparent. Indeed, on 25 July, in an address to the Sabor, Tudjman warned of a possible 'scenario of Kosovization and destabilization' in Croatia: the Serbian minority provoking outside military intervention on their behalf by falsely claiming persecution at the hands of the Croat majority.[60]

In much the same way as many Serbs saw any expression of Croatian nationalism as a revival of Second World War fascism, many Croats viewed nascent Serbian nationalism also in terms of the civil war experience. Serbian nationalism, given its often-aggressive manifestations – the suppression of the Kosovo uprising being the most prominent example – was portrayed throughout Croatia as the return of the Chetniks. Thus, Serbian nationalist sentiment *per se* was invariably conflated with the 'Greater Serbia' project; Belgrade's (apparent) desire to carve out an ethnically pure nation-state from those territories inhabited by Serbs. Raskovic's demands for cultural-ethnic autonomy were therefore tied to the dual threat of a Chetnik revival and the territorial dismemberment of the Croatian Republic.

Again, to sum up briefly: Serb (societal) security requirements, as articulated by Raskovic in his meetings with President Tudjman, in the main seem to equate to the provision of cultural autonomy: control over mechanisms for identity reproduction in Serb majority areas. However, in much the same way that nationalists on the Serbian side were able to convince themselves that HDZ policies and pronouncements alike marked the presence of a neo-Ustashe regime bent on the suppression/elimination of Serbian identity in the Croatian republic, on the Croatian side SDS demands were made easily to fit with Milosevic's Chetnik-like nationalism. This was made possible given demands levelled by the more extreme elements in the party: Milan Babic, for example advocated outright secession from the new Croatia and received significant support for this at least within Knin itself.

From what I have outlined in these previous sections, escalating tensions between Serbs and Croats in the Croatian Republic, culminating in the Log Revolution beginning on 17 August, can profitably be described in terms of either a tight or regular security dilemma situation (rejecting at least for the moment the notion of the HDZ government as a power-seeker). With a tight societal security dilemma, requirements for both sides to feel secure in terms of their identity are indeed compatible; the situation is marked by an illusory

incompatibility. In a regular security dilemma, although the parties involved can still be considered security-seekers, societal security requirements are incompatible; there, by contrast, exists a real incompatibility.

This next section seeks to place the Krajina case in terms of the tight/ regular security dilemma distinction. In doing so, it addresses the following question: were Croat and Serb societal security requirements indeed compatible or not?

Real or illusory incompatibility?

Croat societal security requirements, as defined by the HDZ government of Franjo Tudjman, appear to have rested largely on the general goal of a 'sovereign' Croatia. In practice, this meant creating a homeland for the *Croat* nation which, at minimum, coincided with its existing Republican borders. This had two major implications: first, the inviolability of borders ruled out any territorial compromises. And second, the very 'Croatness' of the Republic challenged the strong 'Serbness' of the Krajina Serbs. On the other side, Serb societal security requirements, embodied in the political programme pursued by Jovan Raskovic, had two specific goals: to secure equal constitutional (national) status in the Republic alongside ethnic Croats, and to gain some measure of cultural autonomy for the Krajina Serbs. The achievement of these goals likewise posed a challenge to Croat national consciousness, as they involved seeking to bolster Serbian identity within Croatia. (Whether the provision of cultural autonomy brought Croatian territorial integrity potentially into question is less than clear, and I will return to this later.)

It is evident that Raskovic was prepared to accept either a more autonomous Croatian republic within a looser confederal Yugoslavia, or, indeed, an independent Croatia outside of any Yugoslav structures. However, the crux of the matter is whether Tudjman was ready to allow two things: one, cultural autonomy for Serbs in Krajina and two, equal constitutional status for Croatia's ethnic Serbs. It is to these two things that this section now turns.

Article 15 of the Croatian Constitution allows 'all nations and minorities . . . cultural autonomy'.[61] In addition to the basic 142 articles of the Constitution, there are a further 65 articles contained in a supplementary document, 'The Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia'. In Section 3 of the document, the grounds on which cultural autonomy is granted is clearly laid out (referring back to Article 15 of the Constitution). However, the Sabor did not ratify the supplementary document until 4 December 1991, nearly half a year after the start of the full-blown Serb– Croat War. At the time of the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings, the criteria for cultural autonomy, therefore, may still have been very much ambiguous. This tends towards the conclusion that Tudjman *may* have been prepared to grant cultural autonomy for the Krajina Serbs, but nevertheless disagreed with Raskovic as to what exactly this might entail.

Cohen writes:

> Although Croatian leaders appeared willing to guarantee the rights
> of the Serbian community (e.g. the use of Cyrillic in predominantly
> Serbian localities, provisions for Serbian cultural association and
> media), they were opposed to any arrangements for 'autonomy' that
> would compromise the republic's authority over Serbian majority
> [areas]. . . .[62]

In other words, cultural autonomy for the Krajina Serbs was indeed accept-
able to Tudjman, but only to some rather woolly degree.

This version of events is more or less backed up by Andrejevich:

> The lengthy text [of the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings reported by Danas]
> revealed the tension between the leaders. But far more significantly, it
> showed both leaders' tolerance and willingness to come to . . . [an]
> agreement. During the meeting Tudjman guaranteed that Croatia's Serbs
> would have cultural autonomy.[63]

In fact, according to Andrejevich, in interviews both Tudjman and Prime
Minister Stipe Mesic had said that 'they did not see any reason not to grant
Croatia's Serbs cultural autonomy, but both officials stopped short of
granting the Serbs political [ethnic] autonomy'.[64] Silber and Little disagree,
though. They argue that cultural autonomy alone was unacceptable to the
HDZ government, which saw in it 'the negation of their overriding objective:
the founding of the Croatian nation-state'.[65]

Given the range of interpretations concerning the provision of cultural
autonomy within the framework of the Tudjman–Raskovic meetings, it is
therefore difficult to conclude with any great certainty as to what indeed
Tudjman was prepared to grant. If, in identity terms, the major preoccupation
for the Krajina Serbs was *local* control over schools in Serb majority areas,
then there is certainly some reason to suggest that the HDZ government was
indeed willing to allow this. This being the case, incompatibility between
the groups will have been illusory; the societal security requirements of the
Krajina Serbs will not, after all, have been in conflict with those of the Croats.
Still, there is some weight of evidence to suggest that this was not the
fundamental source of conflict.

Thompson highlights the key insecurity for the Krajina Serbs as their
constitutional status. Thompson quotes Lazar Macura, Press Officer for
what became Serbian Krajina: 'We want to be people in Croatia . . . as we
always were until now. The new constitution has eliminated us as people'.[66]
Disagreement in this respect centred specifically on Section 1 of the
Croatian Constitution, which labelled Serbs among 'other nations and
minorities'.[67] Set against this, questions pertaining to the use of the Cyrillic
alphabet and other related cultural provisions were largely of secondary

importance. Indeed, as it was, the vast majority of Serbs in Krajina wrote with the Latin script and spoke the Croatian (western) version of Serbo-Croat.

In this sense, societal security requirements for the Krajina Serbs were defined in terms of *majority rights*: the same constitutional status in the Republic as ethnic Croats. And, as Thompson points out, anything less than majority rights were not worth having in Croatia:

> Others might have put up with minority rights; but not Serbs, not here [in Krajina]. . . . Zagreb could have promised its Serbs heaven and earth as individuals, and they would still have reacted hostilely to any hint that their collective status would be downgraded.[68]

And, quoting Lazar Macura once more: 'They [the HDZ government] are so stupid. . . . They just aren't clever enough. If they only said that the Serbs exist as people.'[69]

But is it, as Macura suggests, that Tudjman and others in the HDZ were simply not 'clever enough'? Or is there another possible explanation?

Tudjman's vision of a 'sovereign' Croatia equated, among other things, to a 'Croatia for the Croats': a country in which ethnic Croats dominated societally to the exclusion of all others, especially Serbs. That is to say, Croatia could not be the Croat homeland while ethnic Serbs enjoyed anything more than minority status. In this way, Thompson notes how the Croats' 'emotional explosion' after Tudjman's April election victory 'was directed against someone; nor could it have been otherwise. Croat self-assertion was against Yugoslavia, and, in concrete terms, this meant against Serbia; above all the Serbs within Croatian borders.'[70] Or, to put Thompson's remarks in slightly different terms, Croatia's Serbs entered Croat self-identification as Others; Others who stood for everything that the Croats had become opposed to: Yugoslavism, Federalism, Centralism.

Some writers note how Serbs came to be regarded as Other, not only in ethnic and/or religious terms, but in a wider cultural, civilisational sense too. Many Croats saw themselves as 'civilised' and 'European', while the Serbs were characterised as 'backward' and 'Balkan'. As Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden point out:

> [A] great deal of rhetoric since the late 1980s has revolved around constructions that claim a privileged 'European' status for some groups in the country [Yugoslavia] while condemning others as 'Balkan' and 'Byzantine', hence non-European and Other. . . . This orientalist dichotomy is embodied in distinctions such as that between the 'northern' republics and the 'southerners'. . . . These are not culturally or politically neutral distinctions. They privilege the predominantly Catholic . . . territories of Slovenia and Croatia over the predominantly Orthodox or Muslim . . . territories in the rest of the country.[71]

Drawing on this 'orientalist dichotomy', an official HDZ publication saw its election victory as the biggest step towards

> The inclusion [of Croatia] in the states of Central Europe, the region to which it has always belonged, except for the recent past when Balkanisms and the forcibly self-proclaimed national representatives have constantly subordinated the Croatian state territory to an Ottoman form of government. . . .[72]

If Serbs did enter as Other in the Croats' self-identification, then this can be seen as an instance of 'required insecurity', where Croatian societal security requirements (cultural, and indeed political, predominance in the new Croatia) could only be achieved at the expense of Serbs' status within the Republic. This meant the HDZ implementing political-legal measures (in the Croatian Constitution) designed to categorise ethnic Serbs as what was effectively second-class citizens. Indeed, that the language of the Croatian Constitution provides a propitious source with which to determine security requirements is given weight by Hayden:

> Constitutions are among the most effective subjects for the study of the implementation of nationalist ideologies . . . providing not only the conceptual framework for the state, but also to make the state confirm to that model. When the states envisioned by the constitution exclude many residents from the bodies political and social . . . the seemingly bloodless media of constitutions and laws are socially violent and often induce bloodshed.[73]

In other words, the threat is both psychological and pragmatic.

The security dilemma that existed between the two groups was in this respect arguably 'regular'. The SDS' rejection of the Draft Constitution on 25 July and the subsequent announcement of the 18 August referendum concerning the status of the Republic's Serb population were predicated on a real incompatibility in the means (requirements) by which both sides sought to achieve their goals. The outbreak of violence in many parts of Krajina on 17 August was largely the consequence of Serb resistance to a Croatian government that was not willing to afford ethnic Serbs equal constitutional status in the Republic. The Tudjman government indeed seems to have been aware of the potential reaction of the Serb community to the Draft Constitution. But that the HDZ government clearly sought to suppress Serb identity in this way is more contentious. Glenny describes the relationship between Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs as a confused account of 'real and perceived discrimination'.[74] Thompson arrives at much the same conclusion, labelling the HDZ's actions as more 'reckless' than anything else.[75] Thus, while elements of power-seeking behaviour may have been apparent, the intentions of the Tudjman government are sufficiently

ambiguous to justify the down-playing of a looser security dilemma interpretation.

In the next two chapters, I go on to consider a further case against which to set the concept of the societal security dilemma: Romanian–Hungarian relations in the Romanian region of Transylvania and the violence that erupted there between the groups in the town of Tirgu Mures on 19 March 1990.

7 Romanians and Hungarians

Their [the Romanians'] history is more than a series of struggles for independence or honour: it is a permanent war, for centuries on end, for their own survival. In each battle they risk everything: their right to life, to religion, to their language and culture. God is by their side each moment, because each moment they run the risk of disappearing.[1]

A nation placed as the Magyars have been, ever since they entered Europe, has indeed no alternative between extinction and an almost ferocious attachment to its ways and manners. . . . [F]or the Magyars no compromises have ever been possible.[2]

In these next two chapters (7 and 8), I further explore the applicability of the societal security dilemma, this time in terms of relations between Romania and its Magyar population: the Transylvanian Hungarians. As with Chapter 5, the intention here is to provide some basic historical context, and, in doing so, to illuminate – in Chapter 8 – how particular threat perceptions were able to take hold.

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section looks at Romanian–Hungarian relations from their early beginnings to the time of Ottoman invasion. The second section deals with the period of Turkish rule until the 1876 *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary, and to the formation of the Independent Kingdom of Romania in 1881. The third section is concerned with the subsequent period through to the end of the First World War. The fourth part deals with those dramatic changes during the inter-war and Second World War periods. Finally, the fifth section looks at the nature of relations between the two sides in the Communist period; in particular, focusing on the Ceausescu regime in Romania.

Early beginnings

According to the so-called 'Daco-Roman Continuity Theory', the origins of the Romanian people can be traced all the way back to the ancient Dacians.

Following the defeat of the last Dacian king, Decabalus, by the Romans in AD 106, Dacia was subject to a process of 'Romanisation', whereby most of the Dacian population was assimilated into the Roman language and culture. From the end of the third century through to the seventh century, Dacia suffered a succession of attacks from Germans and Slavs. The Roman army withdrew, but the majority of the Daco-Roman population remained. While the Daco-Romans were consequently subject to both German and Slav assimilation, according to Andrei Otetea 'they were able to preserve to the end what was most valuable . . . the Roman strains rooted in a Dacian back-ground'.[3] By the eleventh century, 'the people living in the territory of Dacia was the Romanian people, who had preserved all the characteristic features of their forefathers, the Dacians, and were speaking a Latin language: the Romanian'.[4]

The Daco-Roman Continuity Theory is, however, contested by the so-called 'No Man's Land Theory'. In 896, the Magyars arrived in the eastern Carpathians. At the beginning of the tenth century, Hungarian forces, under King – later Saint – Stephen I, invaded present-day Transylvania. But the Magyars encountered no significant numbers of what were, in effect, proto-Romanians. The region was, for all intents and purposes, deserted. Thus, Stephen claimed Transylvania for himself, and the province was incorporated into the new Kingdom of Hungary. The Magyars called it *Transilvana* ('the land beyond the forest'). It was not until the twelfth century, so the No Man's Land Theory has it, that Romanians came to Transylvania.[5]

At the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century, to consolidate its control over Transylvania, Hungary colonised the region heavily. First of all, Szeklers were settled in front of the Magyar inhabitants in the west of the region.[6] After this, Germans were also invited. Unlike Transylvania's Romanian population, the Szeklers and the Germans were given extensive self-government: the Germans under the king himself, and the Szeklers under their own local ruler – in turn, responsible to the king. Moreover, Transylvania as a whole was placed under the rule of a Hungarian *voivode*, or prince.

The No Man's Land Theory is keenly disputed by most Romanian scholars. They contend that at the time of the original invasion the majority of Magyars stayed only briefly, with just a handful thereby remaining among the population. Moreover, much of the region was already politically organised into three *voivodates* (principalities) each under the rule of a Romanian *voivode*,[7] with Stephen only fully defeating the three Transylvanian *voivodes* at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century.

The second half of the thirteenth century witnessed the development of the Transylvanian *voivodate* system: the autonomy of the region within the Hungarian Kingdom under the rule of *voivodes*. According to Stefan Pascu, the enduring nature of the *voivodate* system demonstrates how the Hungarian kings were forced to recognise Transylvania's separate culture and political organisation within the Magyar lands. Crucially, though, this is

premised on there being an uninterrupted line of *Romanian* – not Hungarian – *voivodes* until the middle of the sixteenth century:[8]

> Transylvania experienced a separate development from the rest of the Magyar . . . kingdom during the whole time it was a part of it. This explains the fact that Transylvania never entirely lost its identity: Transylvania and the Kingdom of Hungary remained two separate countries. . . . Hungary was oriented more politically towards the west, while Transylvania naturally began to look east to the other two Romanian countries [Moldavia and Wallachia].[9]

Transylvania's growing orientation towards Moldavia and Wallachia was, in this sense, mainly in terms of the ethnic homogeneity of the three regions: most people in Moldavia and Wallachia were Romanian, as was the majority of the population in Transylvania. Of Transylvania's 550,000 inhabitants at the time, approximately 65 per cent were Romanian, with the remaining 35 per cent consisting mainly of Magyars, Szeklers and Germans.[10]

These early beginnings in Transylvania remain very much contested. Nevertheless, R. W. Seton-Watson's 1934 work, *A History of the Roumanians*, sums up well the two opposing viewpoints:

> The Romanians claim they are the true descendants of [the Roman] colonists, that Transylvania is the cradle of their race, and that historic continuity has never been lost . . . The Magyars in their turn argue that continuity is a myth; that the abandonment of Dacia by the Roman element was complete. . . .[11]

According to Seton-Watson, the Dacians did fuse with their Roman occupiers, but the majority of the Daco-Roman population was forced to flee to the mountains upon the German and Slav invasions. He goes on: 'We are already in the domain of keen controversy, but whatever deductions may be drawn, nothing can obscure the essential fact of the racial and linguistic survival of something approaching a common [people] in the bend of the Carpathians . . .'.[12]

From Ottoman rule to the *Ausgleich* and the Romanian Kingdom

From the middle of the fourteenth century, the armies of the Ottoman Empire began to make advances into the southern Balkans.[13] Perhaps of most significance, on 29 August 1526 the Hungarian army, under King Louis II, was beaten by Ottoman forces at the Battle of Mohacs. Louis' defeat at Mohacs condemned the majority of the Hungarian Kingdom to over 150 years of Turkish rule. Mohacs was to Hungary what Kosovo Polje was to Serbia. The Turks took most of Hungary proper (southern and central parts),

while Transylvania became an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire – the Habsburgs even got a slice in both the north and west of the country.

With the Turkish conquest of the Hungarian Kingdom, many Magyars fled to neighbouring Ottoman territories.[14] Most of them settled in Transylvania. While Hungary itself was subject to an often harsh policy of Ottomanisation, Transylvania enjoyed much greater autonomy and was much less subject to Turkish influence. Life in the principality was far better for Hungarians than anywhere else in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, while Magyarism in Hungary proper withered, in Transylvania it was allowed to flourish. As Ivan Volgyes puts it: '[D]uring these years of Ottoman rule, marked elsewhere by [the] extermination of things Magyar, Transylvania became the site of Hungarian culture'.[15] Transylvania kept Magyar identity and the tradition of Hungarian national independence alive.

During the fifteenth century, Transylvania had established close ties with the other two Romanian principalities: Moldavia and Wallachia. The two countries had formed what amounted to a united coalition against the Ottomans. (Indeed, from the middle of the thirteenth century the role of Moldavia and Wallachia has been characterised as 'frontier states'; defending western Christian civilisation from the Turk.[16]) The existing, culturally based relationship between the three principalities was furthered in 1600 when Michael the Brave, *Voivoide* of Wallachia, became sole ruler of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania after defeating the Ottoman forces. Michael saw the joining of the principalities not only in terms of Romanian unity, but also in providing a strong barrier against Turkish expansion. However, in 1601 Michael was killed and the union fell apart.

In 1686, Budapest[17] was liberated from Ottoman rule and the Hungarian State was subsequently administered from Vienna. In October of the following year, the Treaty of Blaj brought Transylvania under Habsburg rule.[18] Under the terms of the Treaty, Transylvania was granted status as an autonomous principality within the Habsburg Empire. The general principles of Austria's rule over the region were set out in the *Diploma Leopoldina*: the Romanians, who formed the majority of the population, were effectively excluded from political life. In Transylvania, only three nationalities were recognised as such: the Magyars, the Szeklers and the Germans.

The subordinate status of Romanians in Transylvania was compounded by religion. Roman Catholicism was employed as a powerful weapon by the Habsburg emperor. Those adhering to the Catholic faith – Hungarians and Germans – were entitled to privileges. Most Romanians were Eastern Orthodox. By way of defence, however, the Romanians secured the help of the Greek Catholic, or Uniate, Church bishop, Inocentiu Micu Klein, who fought for the Romanians to be granted equal cultural and political rights. In doing so, Klein was keen to stress the Romanians' origins and their continuous presence in the region: 'The Romanian nation is inferior to no other nation,

neither in its character, nor in its culture. . . . Not only are the Romanians much the oldest inhabitants of the hills and valleys of Transylvania, but they are also the most numerous'.[19]

The eighteenth century witnessed the development of the so-called 'Transylvanian School'. The School was a Romanian cultural organisation that sought to promote the origins, continuity and unity of the Romanian people. The political manifestation of the Transylvanian School was the Romanian National Party, founded in 1790. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, and due in part to the work of the School, more and more Romanians had begun to develop a sense of national consciousness. In 1784, this culminated in an uprising which protested against ethnic discrimination in Transylvania. The 'Revolt of Horea' marked a significant event in Romanian–Hungarian relations. Writing in 1926, John Cabot notes how the revolt was the first time 'that the hatred between Magyars and the Rumanians had flamed into open rebellion. . . . Ever since then, the bitterest feeling has existed between the two races; and even today, Horia is regarded by the Romanians as a martyr to the national cause'.[20]

In 1791, the *Supplex Libellus* document was presented to Emperor Leopold II by the Transylvanian Romanians. In short, the *Supplex* demanded the following: first, equal status for the Romanian nation alongside the Hungarians, Szeklers, and Germans; second, Romanian representation in the Transylvanian *diet* in proportion to their numbers; third, Romanian names for those districts containing a majority Romanian population; and fourth, the right for Romanians to elect representatives to their own national assembly.[21] Even though the *Supplex* was rejected, it was nonetheless important inasmuch as it was the first political programme representative of the Romanian population of Transylvania as a whole. Moreover, the *Supplex* demonstrated the peoples' heightened cultural and political awareness. Indeed, according to Pascu, by the beginning of the nineteenth century a culturally based ethnic nationalism had taken root in Wallachia and Moldavia, as well as Transylvania: 'Unifying the national language and culture was a general preoccupation of educated Romanians, especially in the early nineteenth century. The struggle for a single literary language and a national culture . . . [was] thus an integral part of the creation of the Romanian nation.'[22]

Despite their liberation from the Turks, in some respects the Magyars had not fared much better than the Romanians. From being subject to a fairly lengthy period of Ottomanisation, Hungary was now exposed to an even more intense process of Germanisation. The Germanisation of Hungary created bitter resentment among many Magyars and, importantly, toward the end of the eighteenth century in particular, helped to generate a cultural revival that came to focus mainly on the Hungarian language. From this, the early part of the nineteenth century gave rise to political aspirations for a nation-state and a Hungarian nationalism that advocated this linguistic predominance.

Set against this, Romanian dissatisfaction with their own national and political status contrived to produce an explosive combination. According to C. A. MacCartney: 'Between the Orthodox Roumanians and the [Catholic] Hungarians . . . the religious difference helped to accentuate the contempt in which the . . . [Magyars] held the former as an unstable and altogether inferior race. . . . The Roumanians in their turn endured with sullen hatred their position of inferiority.'[23]

In 1821 there was a Romanian uprising in Wallachia. The revolutionaries demanded independence from their Ottoman rulers. The uprising was put down by the Sultan, but not before its sentiment had spread both to Moldavia and Transylvania. As a result, the Hungarians became faced with increasing Romanian demands for greater political representation in Transylvania.

In the main, the 'Romanian problem' was tackled by employing a programme of Magyarisation. In 1833, Miklos Wesselenyi, one of Magyar-isation's greatest advocates, suggested that

> it is not only correct but also necessary that the lower classes [mainly the Romanians] should not enjoy national rights and the right to represen-tation unless they become a Magyar population, indeed, unless they merge with those whose rights they want to employ, and unless they adopt its language and customs. . . . In this way those who do not speak Hungarian or are not Hungarian would gradually be granted national rights according as they become Magyars.[24]

In particular, enmities between Hungarians and Romanians rose dramatically following the subsequent introduction of two sets of legislation by the Hungarian Diet. In 1842, the Diet passed the School Law, which stated that the Hungarian language should replace the Romanian language in Romanian schools and churches throughout Transylvania within ten years. Later, in 1844, the Diet formulated the Language Decree, which made Magyar the official language of Transylvania. Thus, as Seton-Watson describes: 'More and more . . . the struggle centred around *the language question*, and the Slovaks, Roumanians, Germans, Serbs, [and] Croats . . . alike saw themselves *threatened in their very existence*'.[25]

On 15 March 1848, an uprising broke out in Budapest, with Hungary demanding independence from Vienna. To begin with Austria gave way, and Hungarian autonomy was granted in the so-called 'April Laws'. In May 1848, the National Assembly of Transylvanian Romanians in turn demanded national independence. However, fearful of losing their privileged status, the Principality's Magyar rulers subsequently proclaimed the union of Transylvania with Hungary, thus wiping out Transylvania's self-governance. This, together with Hungary's refusal to grant cultural autonomy for other national minorities, turned the non-Magyar peoples against the revolution. Seizing on the moment, Austria also turned against Hungary. In an attempt to win back the support of its minority groups, the Budapest Diet hastily

passed the 'Nationalities Law'. This Law granted the country's non-Magyar peoples limited autonomy and the right to use their own language. But it was too late. On 13 August 1849, a combined Austrian–Russian force decisively defeated the Hungarian army at Villagos. There followed a bloody backlash against the Hungarian people; the brutal reprisals against the revolutionaries opening up a deep divide between the Habsburgs and the Magyar nation. Hungarian resentment was made all the worse by Austria's increased Germanisation of the country, German being made the official language of both government and education.

In 1849, the Habsburgs extinguished Transylvanian autonomy. Much of the region was run as a military district providing a strong barrier against the Ottomans (as with the Krajina in Croatia). Although temporarily restored in 1860, by 1866 Transylvania was firmly under Hungarian control. In January of that year, Franz Josef I instructed the Transylvanian Diet to attend that of Budapest, thus effectively recognising its reunion with Hungary.[26] Moreover, given Austria's defeat in the brief war against Prussia – also in 1866 – the Habsburg Emperor was unable to avoid 'the political necessity of a compromise with Hungary'.[27] The Austro–Hungarian 'Compromise' (*Ausgleich*) was established in the following year. On 29 May 1867, the Hungarian Diet accepted the creation of a Dual Monarchy, with Budapest becoming a twin capital of the Empire.

In 1848, the revolutionary mood had also spread to Wallachia and Moldavia. Andrei Otetea describes the goals of the Romanian movements there:

> [T]he Romanian revolution of 1848–9 made its aim to unite Moldavia and Wallachia into an independent state, to have the Romanians of Transylvania recognized as a nation and thereafter to unite all the Romanian districts in the Habsburg Empire into an autonomous principality. A far more reaching aim was the creation of one Romanian state.[28]

Although the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia seemed an attainable goal, the creation of a single state uniting all Romanians appeared virtually impossible; the Romanian lands had come to be divided between three empires: Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman.[29]

On 5 January 1859, Alexandru Ioan Cuza was elected Prince of Moldavia. On 24 January, he was also elected Prince of Wallachia, thus bringing into being the new state of the United Principalities. In 1861, Cuza's rule was recognised by Turkey, but only three years later in 1864 Cuza was ousted. In 1866, the vacant throne was offered to Prince Carol of Hohenzollen-Sigmaringen. The following year, 1867, Carol declared Romania's autonomy from the Ottomans.

On 31 July 1877, the Romanian army intervened on the side of the Russians, helping them defeat the Turkish forces at Plevna. The consequent

Treaty of Berlin, signed on 3 March 1878, recognised Romania's full independence. Four years later, on 10 May 1881, Romania was officially proclaimed a Kingdom under Carol's rule.

Change and war: Romania and Hungary until 1918

For the Magyars, the Compromise with Austria had restored the territories of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. Some 15.5 million people now inhabited Hungary (40 per cent Hungarian, 14 per cent Romanian, 14 per cent south Slav, 10 per cent German, 10 per cent Slovak, and 8 per cent others). In this respect, the *Ausgleich* had two most significant effects: first, the union with Transylvania, and second, the so-called 'Nationalities Question'. In tackling the problem of their newly inherited national groups, in 1868 the Budapest Diet introduced the Nationalities Law. The Law stated that 'in accordance with the fundamental principles of the constitution, all Hungarian citizens [constitute] a nation in the political sense, the one and indivisible Hungarian nation, in which every citizen of the fatherland is a member who enjoys equal rights, regardless of the national group to which he belongs'.[30] However, while containing many fine sentiments, practically speaking the Nationalities Law never came into force. As Seton-Watson comments:

> For two generations to come this law, guaranteeing the Equal Rights of Nationalities, was to be quoted before the world as proof of Hungary's unexampled racial tolerance: but while no one who studies its text can deny it was generously planned and adequate in its pledges, it suffered from one fatal defect; that from the very outset it remained a dead-letter.[31]

In fact, the text of the Nationalities Law failed to satisfy both sides. On the one hand, Hungarian nationalists clung on to the vision of a Magyar state which effectively denied political rights to all its non-Magyar inhabitants. On the other hand, the Law denied the right of self-government to those nationalities that formed the local majority.

The effects of the *Ausgleich* were harshly felt by Hungary's Romanian population, in particular those living in Transylvania. Transylvania's incorporation into the Hungarian State effectively reduced the Romanians there to a weak minority, largely devoid of any rights. Moreover, along with Hungary's other national minorities, the Romanians became subject to the most brutal period of Magyarisation thus far. When, for example, I. E. Macelariu, a Romanian representative in the reconstituted Hungarian parliament, attempted to speak in Romanian he was shouted down by the president of the Diet, who let it be known that 'without use of the [Magyar] mother tongue, fatherland and nationality are a mere illusion'.[32] This, Seton-Watson, suggests, 'may stand out as a classic illustration of the Magyar mentality, which identified the fatherland with

one particular race, and then denounced the other races as unpatriotic in protesting'.[33]

For many Hungarians, assimilation was the foremost goal: in the main, the eradication of all non-Magyar languages within the state. Hungarian politician Kolomon Tisza, a prominent advocate of Magyarisation, declared that 'the nationalities must follow the Magyar proverb "Be silent and pay". Their interest, he said, was not to learn their own language in school, but to become assimilated as quickly as possible.'[34] The belief in Budapest was that linguistic assimilation created the necessary conditions for genuine political integration. And, to this end, further laws were passed. The Language Laws of 1879, 1883 and 1891 made the teaching of Hungarian compulsory in state primary and secondary schools.[35] Moreover, following the Education Law of 1868 the number of state schools in which Hungarian was the language of instruction increased from 7,300 to 14,200. In all of the country's 92 teacher-training colleges Hungarian was established as the official language. As a result, the overall standard of education rose. Even so, '[t]he national minorities had to pay dearly for this dramatic improvement in the education system with the loss of their own languages as the language of instruction'.[36]

Of the 16,618 state schools in inner Hungary in 1906, Hungarian was the language of instruction in 12,223 of them. In 1907, an additional Education Law was introduced further restricting the use of non-Magyar languages for instruction within state schools. This law proved to be of particular significance inasmuch as it provoked widespread criticism of the Hungarian government outside as well as inside Hungary and Romania.

The effects of Hungary's assimilation policies were far-reaching: town, village and street names were changed to their Hungarian form (the Magyarisation of place names being made law by the Budapest Diet in 1897), and constant pressure was put on the national minorities to Magyarise their family names. The Romanian national colours were prohibited, spurring incidents both cruel and ridiculous. For example, a six-year-old girl was arrested for wearing Romanian colours in her hair. Her mother and father were fined and sent to prison for four days, with the father also being suspended from his job.[37]

Another, and significant, effect of Magyarisation was a huge demographic shift. In 1848, 75 per cent of Budapest's population had been German. By 1900, nearly 80 per cent was Hungarian. In Transylvania, however, some Romanian scholars argue that the number of Romanians in the region remained fairly constant; between 51 per cent and 60 per cent in the period 1870–1910, and that the Romanians had simply been subject to 'denational-isation'.[38] Strikingly, in Transylvania in 1874 only 3.2 per cent of the population were entitled to vote. And although this was eventually revised in 1912, many voting irregularities still occurred. For example, non-Magyar voters were excluded both for mispronouncing the candidate's name, and for putting the candidate's Christian name first – the Hungarian practice being to put it last.[39]

Transylvania's Romanian population tried to resist Magyarisation. Romanian demands were presented in terms of the recognition of equal status alongside the region's Magyar, Szekler and German inhabitants. In 1881, the Romanian National Party[40] demanded that Transylvania's autonomous status be restored, thus abolishing the union with Hungary. Hungarian politicians accused the Romanians of irredentism. Later, in 1892 the Party presented a memorandum to the Habsburg Emperor calling into question the legality of the union of Transylvania with Hungary. As a result, in 1894 the Party's entire executive committee was put on trial – the so-called Memorandum Trial – with 15 of its members being sentenced to jail.[41]

From the very beginning of Carol I's reign, the plight of Hungary's Romanian population had provoked great resentment in Bucharest. In 1891, the Romanian Cultural League was formed. The League did much to raise the importance of the 'Romanian Question in Transylvania and Hungary'. It strongly advocated the union of Transylvania with Romania, and was firm in the opinion that this goal was shared by their Transylvanian counterparts. As the Habsburgs became increasingly indifferent to the status of Transylvania, nationalist propaganda emanating from Bucharest proved to be more and more influential. Still, options other than that of union were also being proposed. For example, Aural Popevici, a Transylvanian Romanian representative in the Budapest Diet, advocated the creation of a Greater Austrian federation containing Transylvania as a separate state. This fits more with Stephen Fischer-Galati's assertion that the vast majority of Romanians in Transylvania were simply not interested in the idea of a 'Greater Romania':

> Their primary concern was the establishment of a modus vivendi with the Hungarians within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy rather than the attainment of foolhardy and unreasonable ventures, and their attitude reflected the difference separating the nationalist movement in the Hungarian-dominated regions from the Moldavian and Wallachian.[42]

By the turn of the century, however, the authoritarian methods employed by the Budapest government in dealing with the status of its Romanian population had caused a radicalisation of the Romanian nationalist movements. This left the Transylvanian Romanians more susceptible to the desires of those in Bucharest. The idea of a Greater Romania had mainly originated in the Romanian Kingdom among members of the National Liberal Party (PNL). By the beginning of the 1900s, the PNL's overriding aim was 'unification at all costs'.[43]

During the First (1912–13) and Second (1913) Balkan Wars, Romania remained neutral. Following the peace talks held in Bucharest, Romania's foreign policy began to move away from the Central Powers towards that of the Allies. This was seen as more favourable concerning initiatives for Romanian unification.

When the First World War broke out in 1914, Hungary, as the partner to Austria in the Habsburg Empire, automatically entered on the side of the Central Powers. Romania, under a new king, Ferdinand I, chose to be neutral. During the first few years of the war, both the Allies and the Central Powers were keen to bring Romania on board. In August 1916, following unsuccessful negotiations with the Germans, Romania entered the war on the Allied side. 'In return for an allied guarantee of the integrity of her current borders and recognition of her right to unite with the Romanian territories in Austria-Hungary, Romania agreed to declare war on Austria-Hungary and to break all relations with enemies of the allies'.[44] Thus, Romania's decision to enter the First World War was above all else motivated by the desire for national unification. As Pascu writes: 'The Romanian people did not join the war prompted by the desire to invade and annex foreign territories but by the urge of achieving its age-old aspirations of unity'.[45]

On entering the war, the Romanian army crossed into Transylvania. However, '[t]he ill-starred invasion of Transylvania had deplorable results in both directions. Large sections of the Magyar population fled before the Roumanian army, suffered many privations, and quite naturally returned full of anger and suspicion toward their fellow Roumanian citizens.'[46] Soon after, Romanian forces were forced to retreat, and in December 1916 Bucharest was occupied by Austro-Hungarian forces.

In the aftermath of Romania's failed invasion, a so-called 'cultural zone' was established in the south of Transylvania. All Romanian schools within 30 kilometres of the Romanian border were closed – apparently in accordance with a wider plan to establish such a zone around the entire frontier of Hungary in which Magyar schools alone would be permitted. This was coupled with reports of Romanians being deported and, worst still, being thrown into concentration camps.

In May 1918, Romania concluded an armistice with the Central Powers. In the Peace of Bucharest, the country ceded a large portion of territory to Austria-Hungary. Subsequently, though, the war turned in favour of the Allies. Taking advantage of the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Bessarabia declared its independence from Russia in January 1918, and in March of that year proclaimed its union with Romania. In a similar move, on 29 September 1918 at a meeting of the Romanian National Party in the Transylvanian town of Oradea, a document was formulated by the party's leadership that was to be read out in the Budapest Diet. Part of the text stated that

> the Romanian nation want to make use of this right [to self-determination] and consequently demands the right to make its own future . . . the right to decide alone its place among the free nations, free from any foreign influence. The national body of the Romanian nation of Hungary and Transylvania does not recognize the right of this parliament and government to consider themselves as representatives of the Romanian nation. . . .[47]

With the Austro-Hungarian Empire falling apart, Romania took its chance. On 30 October 1918, Romania re-entered the war on the side of the Allies in a bid to annul the Treaty of Bucharest. Concurrently, Hungary, under Prime Minister Mihaly Karolyi, tried desperately to desert from the crumbling Habsburg Empire. Karolyi offered national equality to Hungary's minorities. But it was not enough: the country's Romanian population wanted independence from Hungary, not rights within it. On 28 November, Bucovina proclaimed its union with Romania. In Transylvania, this was shortly followed by a similar declaration at Alba Iulia on 1 December.

The Trianon legacy and 'cultural offensives'

In January 1919, Karolyi was elected president of the new Hungarian Republic. However, disillusioned with the Allies for allowing the country's dismemberment, Karolyi soon after resigned on 21 March. Power in the country was taken on by a Communist coalition led by Bela Kun. Kun's rule was often akin to an unruly dictatorship. For a while though, Kun succeeded thanks largely to a rising tide of Hungarian, anti-Allies nationalism. But in August of that year the coalition fell apart, and with it Hungary suffered the humiliation of Romanian troops occupying Budapest. On 1 March 1920, after a series of ineffectual provisional governments, Kun was succeeded by Miklos Horthy, an admiral in the former Austro-Hungarian navy.

As head of state, Horthy was forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, which was concluded between Hungary and the Allies on 4 June 1920. The Treaty effectively sanctioned the territorial dismemberment of the Hungarian state. The independent 'Kingdom of Hungary' that emerged after Trianon was reduced to a land less than a third of the size of its pre-war boundaries. In the 1920 census, the population was recorded as 7.62 million: prior to the war, it had been 20.9 million. The biggest winner in the carve-up – in terms of both territory and population – was Romania. Hungary ceded over 30 per cent of its entire area and over five million inhabitants to the Romanian Kingdom: the whole of Transylvania, the eastern part of the Banat, most of the neighbouring districts of Koros and Tisza, and the southern part of the Maramaros region. On top of this, Hungary was ordered to sign a war-guilt clause and to pay reparations. The country was devastated by the settlement: 'Every section of the Hungarian population felt disappointed at the scale of the losses demanded by the peace treaty, which came to be regarded as a dictated settlement'.[48] Trianon was for Hungary what Versailles was for Germany. The Hungarian government failed to reconcile itself to the settlement. After the Treaty, the Horthy regime promulgated a historically based Magyar national identity based on the lands of Stephen I. Hoensch writes that the Hungarian government 'kept alive the sense of humiliation at Hungary's defeat . . . and despair at the injustices of the peace settlement. . . . The slogan: "*Nem, nem, soha*" ("No, no, never") summed up the attitude of every Magyar to the peace treaty.'[49]

Of all the losses that Hungary felt, Transylvania was by far the most painful. Writing in 1926, Cabot noted that

> the history of Transylvania makes it impossible that Hungary will ever willingly allow it to remain under Romanian rule. . . . [T]he freedom of Transylvania, when the rest of Hungary was subjugated, makes all Magyars look to the province as the fountain head of their liberty and independence, and its subjugation to any foreign power is to them unthinkable.[50]

Following Trianon, Bucharest's goal was to undo the Magyarisation, Germanisation and Russification of the previous period of imperial rule. In order to assimilate the new provinces, the Romanian government introduced a number of cultural policies. Before 1918, the urban elites in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania had been largely devoid of Romanians. While many towns and cities in the three provinces contained around one-third of Romanians, they had not exhibited a proportionate Romanian cultural influence.[51] Thus, after 1918 it was of the utmost importance to devise an identity-producing mechanism in order to create new Romanian cultural elites. The predominant weapon chosen for the task was education. Irina Livezeanu writes that:

> In the case of Greater Romania [the Romanian Kingdom plus the three provinces], national unification came too late. It brought together disparate populations that were the historical product of diverse linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, and political experiences. . . . The Romanian elites felt their country to be 'backward'. . . . Therefore, the use of educational institutions as a powerful instrument of homogenization . . . was extremely appealing and fully exploited by state makers and nationalists.[52]

Constantin Angelescu, Minister of Education on several occasions during the interwar period, noted that different cultural influences had left 'profound marks which . . . weakened our national consciousness'.[53] Romanian education policies during the interwar period were referred to as being part of the 'cultural offensive'.

For Bucharest, the task in hand was to unify the four previously existing school systems: Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania plus the Romanian Kingdom. Consequently, education in Greater Romania expanded enormously. From 1918 to 1937, the number of primary schools rose from 7,915 to 17,385. This was accompanied, under the Education Reforms of 1924, 1925 and 1928, by the unification of the four separate school systems. The main concern of the education laws, however, was the imposition of Romanian language instruction into what had previously been non-Romanian schools. In its most extreme manifestation, as L. P. Mair describes:

'If one Romanian child attended a school, all the teaching had to be given in Romanian, even, apparently, if the child did not speak Romanian at home'.[54]

The Romanisation of Transylvania proved to be particularly problematic. Two main areas of difficulty existed: eastern Transylvania where the Szekler communities were prominent, and in the north-west on the border with Hungary where the majority of Magyars resided. Among many Romanians, the prevalent assumption was that the Szeklers, while largely indistinguishable from their Magyar relatives, were more open to Romanisation as many were really 'hidden Romanians'.[55] Thus, a policy of 'peaceful assimilation' was advocated, designed to lull the Szeklers toward Romanian culture.[56] New Orthodox and Uniate churches were established. In Mures, Ciuc, Odorhei, and Teirscaune counties, 75 Romanian schools were opened between 1919 and 1928, 34 more between 1929 and 1933, and a further 15 from 1934–5. Moreover, in existing primary and secondary schools where Hungarian had been the language of instruction, pupils were now taught in Romanian.[57]

The programme of peaceful assimilation in the east was in sharp contrast to the policies in the north-west. For most Romanians, the Magyars there were fervently irredentist. Accordingly, Sabin Manuila, Director of the Demographic Institute in Bucharest, urged that the border area between Romania and Hungary be ethnically cleansed along 100 kilometres 'through the eradication (*extirparea*) of the Hungarian element'.[58] Manuila put matters in the following terms:

> [M]any posters are hanging on the doors and walls of public institutions saying 'Speak only Romanian'. [This] is, however, not respected. Everywhere, but everywhere . . . you only ever hear Hungarian, with some honorable exceptions. Let this tolerance be done with. If in all the public institutions everyone would speak Hungarian, they would only get used to our language, imperceptibly, and we would really seem as if we were in a Romanian country. The decree on the use of the Romanian language should be reissued.[59]

In conjunction with the various peace agreements concluded after the First World War, treaties were drawn up by the League of Nations to protect minorities in the newly created states in Central and Eastern Europe. With respect to Transylvania and Bucovina, on 9 December 1919 Romania signed the so-called Minorities Treaty. On 28 October 1920, this was extended to include Bessarabia. In essence, the treaties were designed both to establish the right to nationality in the new states and to specify those particular rights that derived from this. To oversee the Minorities Treaty, a special League of Nations Council was set up. During the first half of the 1920s, the Transylvanian Hungarians petitioned the Council on several occasions, but without much success. Their grievances were essentially threefold: the expropriation of land and church property; the suppression of Magyar schools; and the Romanisation of Hungarian cultural institutions. For

example, on 6 October 1921, a petition by the 'Society for the Defence of Minorities in Transylvania' was presented to the Council through its Hungarian representative. It complained of Hungarians being arrested, of Hungarian officials being dismissed, religious persecution, and the closure of Hungarian schools.[60]

On the one hand, the Romanian cultural offensive represented a genuine attempt to tackle the vast cultural diversity of Greater Romania as effectively as it could. On the other hand, though, and especially in terms of its Hungarian minority, Romanian policies were largely driven by the desire for revenge. Nevertheless Cabot is sympathetic in this regard: 'They [the Magyars] do not stop to consider that Romania is not wholly to blame. . . . They do not realize that they themselves are largely to blame for Romania's hatred of them . . .'.[61]

During the interwar period, top among Horthy's foreign policy objectives was the restoration of Hungary's pre-Trianon frontiers. Nevertheless, without the prospect of border revisions during the 1920s the Budapest government levelled few demands at their counterparts in Bucharest. This all changed in the 1930s with the rise of Nazi Germany. By supporting the Nazis, Hungary hoped to regain Transylvania along with the other lost lands. In March and June 1933, Hungarian government representatives met with Hitler. Hungary's revisionist aims were outlined and a loose alliance was proposed by Budapest between Italy, Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

For much of the 1930s, the government in Bucharest tried to perform the precarious balancing act of maintaining loyalty to the Allies, while at the same time recognising its increasing dependence on Nazi Germany. Following the 1937 elections, a monarchist-fascist dictatorship was established under King Carol II. Under pressure from the country's growing pseudo-Nazi 'Iron Guard', Carol's foreign policy swung closer to that of Hitler.

For Hungary, the opportunity to acquire Transylvania arose after Romania was forced to cede Bessarabia to the Soviet Union on 26 June 1940. Seizing on Bucharest's moment of weakness, Hungarian troops massed on the Romanian border ready for a war. Hitler warned Budapest against the use of armed force in settling the 'Transylvanian Question', and advised the Hungarian government that a negotiated settlement should be sought with Romania. The negotiations, which took place in August 1940, were unsuccessful: the Romanians refused to give in to Hungary's demand for the return of the northern Transylvanian counties.

Given the failure of the negotiations, Hungary's hope was that Germany, fearing a war between Hungary and Romania, would impose a settlement on the two countries. Again, Budapest massed its troops on the border. This time it worked, and by the terms of the Second Vienna Award,[62] on 30 August 1940 Romania was forced to cede the northern part of Transylvania to Hungary. This amounted to 43,104 square kilometres and 2.53 million inhabitants. Prior to this Hitler had remarked: 'No matter how the dispute would be

settled one side will always wail, in the case of Transylvania probably both'.[63]

Following the Second Vienna Award, King Carol II – who had succeeded Ferdinand in 1939 – fled Romania. Carol was succeeded by his son, Michael, who in turn handed over power to the Iron Guard. The Guard's ruthless dictatorship lasted only until January 1941 when, with German support, General Ion Antonescu took charge. Not much changed, though: Antonescu ran the state as a military-fascist dictatorship.

With the northern part of Transylvania back under Hungarian rule, the region was yet again subject to an often brutal process of re-Magyarisation. In their 1986 book *Horthyist–Fascist Terror in Northwestern Romania* – the title alone demonstrating the publication's extreme nationalist tone – Mihai Fatu and Mircea Musat catalogue a whole series of atrocities committed in the region during the Second World War. Much of the persecution, the authors point out, was carried out by Hungarian paramilitary organisations largely under the guidance of the fascist Arrow Cross Party. The goal of the paramilitaries is summed up by Aczel Ede, head of one such organisation operating in the Cluj district:

> [W]e must kill them as our enemies. . . . God helps only brutal force, and this brutal force we must all use in order to kill and exterminate those Wallachians [Romanians]. In its Ten Commandments religion says: do not kill, do not steal . . . for these are sins. But is this a sin? It is not. It would really be a sin if we did not exterminate this gang . . . of Wallachians. . . . [W]e shall even kill the babies in their mothers' wombs.[64]

Much of what Fatu and Musat go on to describe is reminiscent of the Ustashe's extermination of Croatia's Serbs during the same Second World War period. For example, on 7 September 1940 Hungarian soldiers arrested 20 Romanian villagers in the Mihai Bravu district:

> They took them to a deserted cemetery where they beat them with rifle butts, tied their hands behind their backs with wire and asked them whether they wanted to be shot or hanged. At the question '*Whom do you want us to kill first*?' a man answered: '*Me*'. Asked why, he said: '*So that I should not see my children die*'. He had two children with him.[65]

On 9 September in the village of Traznea:

> Nicolae Brumar was taken from his home together with his wife and two daughters, and they were all shot near a haystack, then hacked with bayonets. Visile Margarus was seized from home, stabbed with bayonets several times, then shot in the head. . . . [A]n Orthodox priest . . . was burnt alive in his house. . . . [A] teacher and his wife . . . were crucified on the church door and shot.[66]

After Traznea was occupied by Hungarian troops, the villagers were shot and the houses were set on fire. 'After the shooting ended, the Hungarians caught the Romanian children and threw them into the fire; they were burnt alive . . . and their cries were heard all over the village.'[67] A total of 263 Romanian men, women, and children are said to have died on that day. On 13 and 14 September in Salaj:

> [T]eams of Hungarian soldiers . . . dragged all the Romanians who had not run away out of their homes, beat them savagely and tortured them, breaking their bones, pulling out their nails and then shot them, regardless of sex or age, by rifle and machine-gun fire. Moreover, the women were raped. . . . After the slaughter . . . [t]he bodies were loaded into carts, some still breathing, and were buried in a common grave.[68]

Such accounts of the period have been highly prone to exaggeration, both in the scale and the nature of the killings. The accuracy of Fatu and Musat's evidence aside, their account is nonetheless indicative of intense enmity that many Romanians came to feel towards the Magyars over this particular period of their history.

In addition to expulsions, killings and forced conversions to Roman Catholicism, Magyarisation also entailed reversing family and place names back to the Hungarian, the banning of Romanian language in public and of traditional Romanian dress, the removal of Romanian teachers from schools, and the forced attendance of Romanian schoolchildren in Hungarian classes.[69]

On 20 November 1940, prompted by competition with Romania to win German favour, Hungary signed the Tripartite Agreement. On 15 October 1944, with the Axis powers clearly losing the war, Horthy tried to remove Hungary from its alliance commitments with Germany and Italy. He failed, and was dislodged as Hungary's leader by Ferenc Szalasi. The reign of Szalasi and his Arrow Cross Party was incredibly cruel, but luckily shortlived: the signing of the peace between Hungary and the Allies on 20 January 1945 in Moscow was overseen by Bela Miklos, head of the country's new provisional government.

On 23 August 1944 General – later Marshal – Antonescu was ousted from power in Romania. Successive governments headed by the military saw Romania through until 6 March 1945, when a Communist-dominated coalition government led by Petru Groza was installed. In the same month, Groza announced Stalin's decision to return northern Transylvania to Romania.

Communist rule and the Ceausescu era

After the Second World War, the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi, exercised a dominant role in government.

With the backing of the Soviet Union, Rakosi gradually eroded the influence of other parties. By 1949, the HCP was in total control of the state. However, following the death of Stalin in 1952 discontent grew. Rakosi took what amounted to only half-hearted measures to quell the imminent revolution. Insurrection broke out on 23 October 1956. But by 7 November, with its tanks and troops on the streets of Budapest, the revolution was put down by Moscow. The Soviets installed a new leader, Janos Kadar. Kadar spent the next 33 years as head of the Hungarian state until the eventual fall of communism in 1989.

In Romania, to legitimise their power after 1945, the country's communists sought to ally themselves with Romanian nationalism. This gave rise to the expression 'national communism',[70] which was strongly advocated by the First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. According to Trond Gilberg, given the pressing economic, social and political problems facing the country after the Second World War, it was necessary for the regime to take 'a strongly nationalist stance. . . . Thus in the period 1944–1947, even the communists loudly proclaimed the need for re-establishing "Romania mare" [Greater Romania]'.[71]

By the terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Transylvania was reintegrated into Romania. This made the Hungarian population in Romania the largest single group of Magyars outside the Hungarian state: 1.481 million, according to the 1948 Romanian census, and the largest minority group in Europe.[72]

With the relaxation of national communism, in 1952 the Romanian regime created a Hungarian Autonomous Region (*Regiunea Autonoma Magharia*). There was no question as to the region's strong Magyar character. According to the February 1956 census, it had a population of 731,361, comprising 567,509 Hungarians and 145,718 Romanians.[73] In practice, though, the region did not enjoy a great deal of self-government. Its separate Magyar character was marked only by most officials being Hungarian, Hungarian being the official language of self-government, and bilingual signs being erected on public buildings.[74]

Following the Hungarian insurrection in 1956, and fearing the spread of anti-communist revolution to the Hungarian community in Transylvania, Gheorghiu-Dej instigated a series of assimilatory policies. The first was to reduce the provision for Hungarian-language teaching: teaching in Hungarian was moved from separate Magyar educational institutions into shared Romanian and Hungarian ones. For example, in June 1959 the Hungarian Bolyai University was merged with its Romanian Babes equivalent, and re-named the Babes–Bolyai University of Cluj. Importantly, as Dennis Deletant points out: '[T]he closure of the separate [Bolyai] university removed the distinct institutional identity which had ensured the provision of Hungarian language teaching and exposed it to erosion from within the new structure'.[75] The following year (1960), and justified in terms of national homogenisation, Hungarians were re-settled from the autonomous region, thus diluting its Magyar character.[76]

In March 1965, following the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, Nicolae Ceausescu came to power. Under Ceausecsu, national communism in Romania was revived and executed in its most extreme form: 'The goal of a unified homogeneous state, with a clearly defined homeland and a concrete historical tradition, was paramount in importance and it was clear that Ceausescu considered viable almost any method by which to achieve this ultimate aim.'[77]

Ceausescu extended Gheorghiu-Dej's assimilatory policies. The position of the country's national minorities deteriorated rapidly under the assertiveness of Romanian nationalism and what Ceausescu called national 'equalisation'. In 1968, the Hungarian Autonomous Region was disbanded altogether. In education, instruction in Magyar required qualified Hungarian teachers. But the deteriorating provision of higher education in the Hungarian language meant an ever-increasing shortfall in their number. Indeed, Ceausescu made it quite clear that in education the primary objective was for every student, including those from the national minorities, to speak Romanian at school: 'Romanian is not a foreign language. . . . It is the language of our socialist society and it must be learned by all Romanian citizens'.[78] Moreover, following the completion of their studies, ethnic Hungarians were assigned to jobs in predominantly Romanian areas, what effectively amounted to a policy of ethnic dispersal. For Ceausescu, the suppression of Romania's Magyars brought closer his conception of national communism. As Ceausescu himself put it: 'In the foreseeable future there will be no more national minorities in Romania: only one Socialist [meaning Romanian] nation'.[79]

The treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians troubled Budapest greatly. For the most part, Kadar showed great restraint in dealing with the issue of ethnic Hungarians abroad, although in a number of speeches 'general' rhetoric from the Hungarian government was very much interpreted as being specific to Ceausescu's intolerances. On 15 and 16 June 1977, the first bilateral meeting between the two leaders for many years took place in Budapest. Throughout the discussions, Ceausescu described the issue of Transylvania's Magyars as a purely 'internal matter', and Hungary's views were thus expressly rejected as 'foreign meddling'.

During the 1980s, the policy of national communism in Romania continued. In the early part of the decade, Romania was hit by severe economic depression. To stifle growing dissatisfaction among the people, Ceausescu assumed an increasingly nationalist posture. The terrible hardships endured through the depression were justified in the name of 'the nation's defending its honour and integrity against foreign interference'.[80] Along with Jews and Gypsies, singled-out in this respect was Hungary and the Magyar minority in Transylvania. As Pal Bodor writes:

> The mechanism for this functions in a relatively simple manner. The measures taken against the minority are bound to lead to complaints and protests by a Hungarian in Rumania, let alone anything said in Hungary, will then be described as an attack on Rumania. Whoever demands rights

for the Hungarians in Rumania is presented as someone who really wants to take away Transylvania.[81]

Ceausescu also set about the destruction of those edifices he regarded as incompatible with national communism: churches, museums and monasteries, with sometimes whole districts of Bucharest being knocked down and replaced with his own brand of neo-Stalinist architecture. Moreover, in the countryside the 'systemisation' programme entailed the eradication of whole villages. Outlined by Ceausescu in March 1998, their number was to be reduced from 13,000 to 6,000 by the year 2000, with huge agricultural–industrial units to be established in their place.[82] While systemisation was not specifically aimed at the Magyar population 'the anti-Hungarian aspects of the razing of the villages were not lost of the Hungarian population of Romania, [or] on the Budapest regime . . . [who] condemned Ceausescu's policies as violations of human rights and inexcusable expressions of Romanian nationalism'.[83] Demonstrations in Budapest against systemisation were described by the regime in Bucharest as ' nationalist', 'irredentist' and 'anti-Romanian'.[84]

During the second half of the 1980s, the Hungarian government became more vocal in its condemnation of Romania's minority policies. However, Budapest's rhetoric served only to exacerbate Ceausescu's programmes: between 1984 and 1989, the number of Hungarian children being taught in their native language declined by 40 per cent in primary schools and by 50 per cent in secondary schools. During the same period, the number of Hungarian teachers decreased by 40 per cent in primary schools and 75 per cent in secondary schools. Moreover, by 1989 Magyar instruction at the Babes–Bolyai University was limited to the Hungarian Language and Literature departments only.[85] In this respect, Bogdan Szajkowski suggests that Ceausescu's policies were clearly conceived 'with the intention of removing any possibility of Hungarian irredentist claims on Transylvania'.[86] The eradication of the Hungarian presence in Transylvania served to legitimise the Romanian claim that the region represents the cradle of their nation.

Ceausescu was overthrown by a popular uprising on 23 December 1989. Right up to the last, Ceausescu laid the blame for the revolution squarely on Budapest. While cutting short the full extent of national communism, by the time of the dictator's demise the policy had produced some devastating results, demographically and linguistically but also very much psychologically. As Bodor describes:

> The national minorities are thus forced to develop a sense of inferiority . . . to become conscious of being second class citizens in view of their ethnic origin and language. . . . Schoolchildren, who are forbidden to use their native language in the playground, develop a consciousness of a hierarchy of languages to the effect that there is a dominant language, Rumanian . . . and that there is a subordinate language, their own. . . .

They acquire their knowledge and culture in Romanian . . . They are wise in Romanian. People more willingly speak in the language they are wise. . . . [Yet they] can never forget for a minute they are members of a minority, they are non-Rumanians but are intellectuals only in Rumanian.[87]

More than anything else, relations between Romania and Hungary have been shaped by their struggle over Transylvania. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, this struggle has most easily manifested itself through assimilation; the deliberate use of cultural and educational policies designed to weaken, if not eradicate, the national identity of the other. More recently, the harsh policies of the Ceausescu regime in Romania served merely to exacerbate previous trends, and thus to preserve Transylvania as a central symbolic feature of the historical enmity between the two countries. As Deletant notes:

> The experience of [the Hungarian] minority under Ceausescu has left a legacy of mistrust among both peoples. . . . [Transylvania] is regarded by both Romanians and Hungarians as an integral part of their ancestral homeland and in the minds of both people, their own *survival as a nation* is linked to the fate of [the region].[88]

In the next chapter, I locate this historical interplay between nation, culture and education at the core of the societal security dilemma. The concept is presented as a significant cause of violent clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in the Transylvanian city of Tirgu Mures in March 1990. Differently to Krajina, though, I argue that for the Transylvania case the societal security dilemma corresponds much more closely to a 'tight' interpretation of the concept.

8 Transylvania and the societal security dilemma

> The central problem with the history of Transylvania is that there are separate Romanian and Hungarian histories, both firmly articulated and neither acceptable in its national version to the other. . . .

> [N]either Romanian nor Hungarian nationalists can accept that Transylvania should be a part of the other state's territory and both accept a nationalist imperative that it should belong to them. In this kind of emotionally charged atmosphere, the rights of minorities are easily ignored, and, indeed, their articulation may be treated as evidence of irredentism.[1]

In the last chapter, I described the Hungarian–Romanian struggle for sovereignty over Transylvania, and, in particular, the maintenance of national identity in the region as the main source of enmity between the two parties. Following the overthrow of Romania's dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, in December 1989, historical narratives concerning the struggle for Transylvania – employed on both the Hungarian[2] and Romanian sides – came to frame questions over the reorganisation of educational establishments in the region. More than anything, the issue of educational reform set in motion an escalatory dynamic, culminating in what became the first significant outburst of ethnic violence in post-communist Eastern Europe. As with Chapter 6, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether this dynamic can profitably be described in terms of a tight, regular, or loose societal security dilemma.

As with the application of the concept in Krajina, the time-scale in this particular case is also crucial. Here, events take place within just a four-month period, from the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime on 23 December 1989 to the outbreak of hostilities between the two parties in the Transylvanian city of Tirgu Mures on 20 March 1990.

The overall structure of the chapter follows that of Chapter 6. The first section is largely descriptive, providing an overview of events in the given time period. The second section lays out Hungarian societal security requirements, as set out mainly by the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania

(HDUR).[3] The third section does the same but this time in terms of the Romanian side, defined – although not exclusively so – by the provisional government of the National Salvation Front (NSF). And finally, the fourth section addresses the question as to the compatibility/incompatibility of these security requirements.

From revolution to Tirgu Mures

On 22 December 1989, the brutal reign of Nicolae Ceausescu came to an end. After fleeing Bucharest, Ceausescu and his wife Elena were arrested by police in the town of Tirgoviste. The following day, news of the dictator's capture was announced on Romanian TV and radio. Two days later, on 25 December, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were secretly tried and executed.

In the aftermath of the Ceausescus' arrest, leadership of the country was taken over by the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF was 'presented as an umbrella organization in which practically all those which took a public stand against the dictatorship were included'.[4] Hurriedly an NSF Council was formed consisting of 39 members, including army officers, students, intellectuals, and academics who had actively taken part in the insurrection. By the end of December, the Council had expanded to 145 members. Nevertheless, power in the NSF resided firmly within an elite group of Communist Party officials who had seized the opportunity to place themselves at the forefront of the revolutionary movement. Most of all, authority was wielded by two individuals, Ion Iliescu, Chairman of the Council, and Petre Roman, his political number two.

On 22 December, the NSF had already issued a ten-point plan for the country. Among other things, the plan called for the introduction of a democratic, pluralist form of government and the abolition of the leading role of a single party; the holding of free and fair elections; the reorganisation of education; and the observance of rights and freedoms for Romania's ethnic minorities.[5] The NSF Council was to see through the implementation of the plan until proper elections could take place. For the time being, the executive members of the Council effectively constituted a provisional government: Iliescu[6] assumed the position of president, while Roman[7] became his prime minister. To begin with, the NSF was keen to stress its transitory existence. On 12 January 1990, Iliescu pointed out that the NSF had no desire 'to assume power in this state. We are a temporary force which wants to hold free elections'.[8] Similarly, Roman expressed his desire to remain in politics for no more than a few months.

While the democratic credentials of Romania's new political elite were certainly questionable, all the initial signs were that the NSF was pointing the country in the desired direction. As Martin Rady writes: 'Even though it was dominated by former Party members, the National Salvation Front swiftly realized the hopes of the Romanian population. Starting on 26 December 1989, the NSF began abrogating the most oppressive and unpopular decrees

of the Ceausescu period'.[9] As such, initial enthusiasm for the NSF even extended to the country's Hungarian population.

During the insurrection itself, Hungarians and Romanians had taken to the streets together, united in the overthrow of a despot under whose extremism both communities had suffered. Directly after the revolution there developed an apparently new sense of trust and cooperation between Hungarians and Romanians: the fear and suspicion that previously epitomised relations between the two sides now seemed to all but disappear. Indeed, shortly after Ceausescu's execution, Karoly Kiraly, an ethnic Hungarian and member of the NSF Executive, triumphantly declared: '[W]e are going to be free Hungarians in a free Romania'.[10] The sense that anything was possible seemed to take hold. Writing for *The Times* of London, Woodrow Wyatt asserted that: 'A new empathy has arisen between all Hungarians, wherever they live, and Romanians'. And sharing in the optimism of the time, he concluded: 'There is now the chance that out of fearful bloodshed two adjacent countries, with intermingled, once quarrelling populations, can make their lands fit . . . to live in with reciprocal amity'.[11]

That a new opportunity had arisen to tackle the legacy of Hungarian–Romanian relations had not been lost on Budapest either. On 23 December, the Hungarian government was the first to recognise the new leadership in Bucharest. Moreover, on 29 December Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn went to see Iliescu. On his return, Horn – who was the first Hungarian Foreign Minister to go to Romania – reported that two main issues had been on the agenda:

> One is that we respect Romanian territorial integrity. On the other hand, we firmly stated, and this was fully accepted by the Romanian leadership, that a basic condition for improving the Hungarian–Romanian relationship was the assurance that the rights of Hungarians living in Romania were ensured.[12]

Crucially, Horn also reported that the NSF had agreed to the reinstatement of Hungarian educational and cultural institutions abolished under Ceausescu.

Immediately after the revolution, Hungarians in Transylvania had set about reviving their cultural institutions. For example, some Hungarian-language newspapers that had survived the communist period were reorganised: names were changed and the existing editors were asked to leave.[13] Others, which continued to appear under their old name, were printed with explanations as to their change of editorial policy.[14] Tellingly, in these newspapers the names of former Hungarian towns and villages now appeared in their Magyar form. Moreover, Hungarian radio broadcasts were again transmitted.[15] And in those areas where the Hungarian population predominated, road signs were erected in Magyar.

In this respect, the rhetoric emanating from the NSF was certainly encouraging; their initial statements served to reinforce the sense of improving

inter-ethnic relations within the country. Of greatest significance, on 5 January 1990 the NSF issued a declaration saying that it would seek to implement 'constitutional guarantees' for the rights of ethnic minorities. To this end, a Ministry for National Minorities was to be created 'to provide the appropriate institutional framework for the exercise of minorities' major rights, the use of their mother tongues, the promotion of the national culture, and the safeguarding of ethnic identity'.[16] Indeed, the inclusion of leading Hungarians such as Laszlo Toekes[17] and Geza Domokos within the Romanian parliament appeared to confirm the NSF's willingness to allow the Hungarian minority to play a full cultural and political role in the country.

The NSF was particularly keen to secure the participation of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR) within the governing Council. The HDUR had come into being on 23 December 1989. Set up by Domokos, it was designed to represent the interests of the Transylvanian Hungarians as a whole. Domokos' support for Iliescu and Roman therefore provided the NSF with the legitimacy it needed to initiate policies on behalf of the country's Magyar population. And, for its part, the HDUR was perfectly willing – at least initially – to work within the framework of the NSF. In January and February 1990, the HDUR 'acted primarily as a vehicle for NSF policy in Transylvania'.[18] As Domokos himself explained, 'the NSF was the guarantor . . . of the rights of minorities'.[19]

Fundamental for Hungarians was the reorganisation of education. In specific terms, the NSF's 5 January pledge seemed to include the following: first, the re-introduction of Hungarian-language teaching into some of what had been previously 'Romanian' schools, thus creating mixed educational institutions; and second, for the separation of others, thereby also providing for a number of solely Hungarian establishments. Responsible for their implementation was the new Deputy Minister for Education, Attila Palfalvi. But Palfalvi encountered problems straightaway. In Cluj, for example, Romanian pupils, together with their parents and teachers, took to the streets in protest after being moved from their own premises to the old Communist Party training school. Moreover, following Palfalvi's declaration that the mixed Babes–Bolyai University in the city was to be divided, a League of Romanian Students was formed in order to prevent the reorganisation of higher education along ethnic lines. In Tirgu Mures the situation was much the same: the city's Medical University was also to be split, and there were similar protests as Romanian students were again pushed out of their schools – some being moved temporarily into the technical high school.

As a result, on 27 January Palfalvi was dismissed for 'creating tensions between the Romanian and Magyar populations in Transylvania'.[20] In supporting the separation of certain institutions, Palfalvi was reported to have exceeded his authority in the Ministry of Education. Under Palfalvi's replacement, Lajos Demeney, educational reorganisation was to be delayed until the beginning of the next academic year and pupils were returned to

their regular schools. In addition, the proposed Ministry for National Minorities was temporarily suspended.

The suspension of educational reform in particular significantly strained the relationship between the HDUR and the NSF: Domokos warned Iliescu that if decisions detrimental to the rights of the Hungarian minority continued to be taken, the HDUR would leave the NSF. At the same time, the party's executive expressed its regret over an address by Iliescu two days earlier (25 January), which had left them with the distinct impression that the Hungarian community had been 'exclusively responsible' for ethnic tensions in some Transylvanian towns.[21] Indeed, that a discernible gap had opened up between the HDUR and NSF became most apparent when, on 6 February, after reneging on its previous pledge and registering itself as a political party, the NSF published its manifesto for the forthcoming elections: in the programme, nothing specific was mentioned about minority rights.

Even prior to this, though, there had been warning signs of a potential serious deterioration in relations between the two communities. For example, shortly after the revolution, in Harghita County, one of the Hungarian majority areas in Transylvania, the local population had taken its revenge on those associated with the old regime. In total, six militiamen and Securitate officers – Ceausescu's feared secret police – were killed. Reports of the incident implied that Hungarians had attacked Romanians on ethnic grounds, suggesting that the murders had been the work of 'Magyar thugs'. However, three of the victims were ethnic Hungarians, and those responsible for the killing had been from both sides. Domokos sought to reassure ethnic Romanians of the benevolent intentions of the Hungarian community towards them. On 4 January, at a meeting of the NSF Council, Domokos told its members that the country's Magyars separated themselves from these 'stupid actions'.[22] In the light of the incident and contrary to the then still prevailing optimism, the well-known Hungarian author Andras Suto warned: 'Decades will be needed before the wounds are healed and the nationalism stirred up by the dictatorship is absorbed by the common land'.[23]

Despite Palfalvi's sacking and the concomitant curtailment of educational reform, dissatisfaction at what had already taken place was still being voiced by elements within the Romanian community. For example, on 8 February some 5,000 Romanians attended an anti-Hungarian rally in the local sports centre in Tirgu Mures. Reportedly, the rally had been organised to protest against the prior reinstatement of Hungarian as a language of instruction in the city's Bolyai High School. Behind the demonstration was the newly formed *Vatra Romaneasca* ('Romanian Homeland'), an extreme right-wing nationalist organisation with the self-charged mission of protecting the Romanian language. On the same day, 10,000 Hungarians took part in a rally in Gheorghini calling for separate Hungarian schools. Two days later (10 February), ethnic Hungarians again took to the streets in Tirgu Mures, Sfintu Gheorghe and several other Transylvanian towns, demanding minority rights. Reports of the numbers involved varied widely between 40,000 and

120,000. On 6 March, a protest was organised by Hungarian students at the Medical University in Tirgu Mures calling for the provision of classes in the Hungarian language and the reinstatement of a more equitable admissions policy that would allow Magyars to be admitted in greater numbers.

An action–reaction process between the two communities was thus clearly under way, with demonstration being met by counter-demonstration: the more elements in the Hungarian community demanded the re-continuation of educational reform, the more ethnic Romanians were driven to protest against its potential implementation. And, although in part marked by nationalist sentiment, demonstrators on both sides had been engaged in largely peaceful protest.

On 15 March, however, tensions were noticeably heightened when celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the 1848 Hungarian War of Independence were held in several towns and cities throughout Transylvania. In Cluj, festivities passed off without too much trouble. But in Satu Mare, Oradea and Tirgu Mures scuffles were reported between the two communities.[24] The following day (16 March), *Vatra* supporters, said to have been angered by two bilingual signs hoisted in Tirgu Mures declaring 'Justice for Minorities' and 'Schools in Hungarian', set upon Hungarians in the streets of the city. The Hungarian owner of a pharmacy was attacked and his shop ransacked after having written the Magyar *gyogyszertar* next to the Romanian equivalent *farmacie* on the sign above the door.[25] On 17 March, demonstrations in the city were organised by the Romanian Student League. Anti-Hungarian slogans were chanted, and skirmishes took place between Hungarian and Romanian students. A group of Romanians entered a Hungarian Protestant church, beating up some of those inside and vandalising church property. Hungarian students in Tirgu Mures responded by organising a demonstration reiterating their previous demands for the continuation of educational reform.[26]

On the morning of 19 March, several hundred *Vatra* supporters gathered in Tirgu Mures' Square of Roses to protest against Hungarian demands for separate schools and bilingual signs. Throughout the afternoon, busloads of Romanians were sighted on their way to Tirgu Mures from a number of villages in the surrounding Gurghiu Valley: Hodac, Ibanesti, Toaca, Rusii, Munti, and Zau de Cimpie. Upon reaching the city, the villagers joined their fellow Romanians in the Square of Roses, where they were armed with axes, knives, pitchforks, and clubs.[27] The Headquarters of the HDUR was attacked, and, upon being escorted out of the building by the Chairman of the Mures County Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC) committee,[28] its occupants – including author Andras Suto – were beaten up. According to Hungarian accounts, as Romanians ran riot in the city they screamed slogans such as 'Out with the Huns', 'We are prepared to die defending Transylvania', and 'Bozgor (Hungarians), don't forget, this is not your homeland'.[29]

The next morning, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Hungarians had gathered in the Square of Roses to protest against the previous day's events. The

crowd waved Romanian flags in a gesture of political loyalty. However, by early afternoon thousands of Romanians had gathered in opposition on the other side of the square. Moreover, the Hungarians received reports that Romanians from the same surrounding villages were once again on their way to Tirgu Mures. When the villagers arrived to reinforce the existing Romanian contingent, some reports estimate that, separated only by a thin line of police, 5,000 Hungarians were faced by 2,000 armed Romanians. When the Romanian crowd surged forward the police line was easily broken, and running street battles ensued. Later in the day, the Hungarians rallied reinforcements and several hundred armed villagers from the Szekler communities along the Niraj river began to arrive.[30] Only at this stage did local PNUC members summon the army's support to restore order. While sporadic outbreaks of violence continued for the next few days, the worst of the fighting was now over. Newspaper reports put the total cost at six dead and between 250 and 300 injured[31] – although official reports claim that only three people had died.

The events in the city, what many Hungarians came to dub the 'Pogrom of Tirgu Mures', were subsequently described as 'Romania's worst outbreak of nationalist violence since the Second World War'.[32] They marked the first significant occurrence of ethnic violence in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, what Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn described at the time as 'ominous and approaching civil war'.[33] On both sides, worst-case assumptions had taken hold: many Romanians viewed educational reform as a precursor to demands for ever greater autonomy, and ultimately secession, while many Hungarians saw the NSF's refusal of changes to the existing educational structure as a clear indicator of the further suppression of minority rights by the Romanian government.

These following sections seek to determine whether the escalatory dynamics that culminated in the Tirgu Mures violence were the product of either a real or an illusory incompatibility between the two parties. The approach is the same as that taken in Chapter 6: each side's goals are established, whether these goals equate to either security-seeking or power-seeking behaviour, and the reaction of the other is described.

Hungarian (societal) security requirements and Romanian (mis)perceptions

In determining Hungarian societal security requirements, the HDUR can generally be said to have acted in the interests of the majority of Magyars in Romania, although, within the party itself there were a number of disparate voices. Indeed, Laszlo Kurti identifies three distinct political factions within the HDUR. The first was headed by Geza Szocs and represented 'perhaps the most visible radical program with the RMDSz'.[34] Szocs strongly advocated the creation of a federal system for Romania, and from the very beginning of 1990 was highly critical of the Iliescu government. The second was the

so-called 'Christian' element led by Toekes. Although also critical of the NSF, Toekes argued for 'territorial integrity . . . [a] regionalist policy within the state and a common voice for Hungarians, Romanians, and other minorities . . .'.[35] The third, the 'most conservative, yet most influential', was that led by Domokos. Domokos maintained 'that only by remaining in unison with Romanians at large can Hungarians find political and legal frameworks for existence as a recognised minority'.[36]

Within the party, Domokos and his supporters carried the greatest weight of popular support. This particular faction may therefore be considered as expressing most fully Hungarian societal security requirements.

Hungarian goals

The HDUR's first official statements on 24 and 25 December 1989 give some indication as to the goals of Romania's Hungarian community, the party proposing 'the enactment of a law that would guarantee . . . equal educational opportunities in the native language of the minorities'.[37]

In terms of the maintenance of Hungarian national identity, the issue of own-language education was crucial. Under communism, although the 1965 Romanian Constitution had guaranteed 'education for the nationalities on all levels in their own language',[38] Hungarian-language education had been a specific target in Ceausescu's drive to assimilate the country's ethnic minorities. As a result, by the mid-1980s Hungarian secondary- and university-level education had been virtually wiped out. The loss of Magyar educational institutions had been both symbolic and pragmatic. As Martin Rady explains:

> Firstly, they [Romania's Magyars] were deprived of many historic institutions which had served their national community over generations. Secondly, Hungarians anticipated that the loss of teaching in the native language would lead to the erosion of a special Hungarian identity in Romania. Hungarians have always been mindful of their precarious nationhood and have always regarded their language as the mark of their unique national character.[39]

The question of educational reform, in particular, the restoration of Hungarian-language education to somewhere near resembling its pre-1959 status, was thus of the utmost importance for the Hungarian community.

In this way, the Hungarian struggle for separate education can be seen on two levels, the first level being particular to Tirgu Mures. Up until the 1960s, Tirgu Mures had been an overwhelmingly Hungarian city. According to Romanian census figures, 74.27 per cent of the population in 1948 was Magyar, and 73.74 per cent in 1956.[40] However, as a consequence of indus-trialisation and through the more deliberate programme of re-settlement, the arrival of Romanians from counties all over the country had, by the time of Ceausescu's demise, reduced the proportion of Magyars in Tirgu Mures to

just over 50 per cent. Moreover, prior to its abolition in 1968, the city had been the capital of the Magyar Autonomous Region and correspondingly had maintained a strong tradition of separate Hungarian education (its technical and medical universities) and culture. During the 1980s, however, this was severely curtailed. For example, the SzentGyorgyi Theatre School, originally Hungarian, was the leading institution of its kind in Transylvania. By the time of the December 1989 revolution, though, two-thirds of its pupils were ethnic Romanian and it had become impossible for the school to stage Hungarian-language productions.[41] As Tom Gallagher sums up: 'By the end of the 1980s, many of the city's Hungarian population keenly felt their relegation and believed that they were at the cutting edge of Ceausescu's assimilationist drive'.[42] Set against this, the loss of Magyar educational autonomy in Tirgu Mures was symbolic of the more general loss of Hungarian cultural independence within the former Autonomous Region. This, coupled with the demographic changes that had occurred during the previous 25 years, contrived to produce a profound fear of the extinction of Hungarian identity. As such, the re-establishment of separate educational institutions came to represent a crucial check on the process.

The second level is wider and refers more to the issue of Hungarian identity in Transylvania as a whole. This centred for the most part on the proposed separation of the Babes–Bolyai University in Cluj. The feeling among many in the Hungarian community was that under communism Magyar history and culture in the region had been effectively suspended. The re-establishment of an autonomous Hungarian Bolyai University therefore came to symbolise the re-activation of Hungarian history in Romania. As arguably the most important Hungarian institution of higher education in the country, the Bolyai University was enormously important as an indicator of the general cultural status and well-being of the Magyar community. The whole question of the maintenance of societal identity was in these terms played out through the creation of distinctly Hungarian institutions.

Security-seeking?

The goals of the HDUR can, in the main, be viewed as indicative of security-seeking behaviour. The intention on the part of Romania's Magyar community to implement educational reform was arguably 'revisionist' in the sense that it sought to alter the existing status of the country's ethnic Hungarians. Yet, Domokos and his supporters were also surely 'status quo', inasmuch as any demands for Hungarian autonomy – whether this be more cultural or more ethnic – were very much levelled in terms of simply *reversing* the country's Ceausescu-era policies towards its minorities. That is to say, the HDUR did not seek any provisions that were over and above what they had previously been afforded by the Romanian State.

In this regard, and crucially so, the HDUR 'pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Romania, but it stressed the right of minorities to self-

determination within Romania . . .'.[43] Indeed, in an 11 January statement Domokos sought to reassure Romanians that the HDUR 'sets out to achieve the rights of Hungarians with due respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of free and democratic Romania'.[44] Thus, right from the start the HDUR endeavoured to make it as clear as possible that the secession of Hungarian majority areas from Romania would not be sought.

Given the HDUR's declared intention to seek only the *restoration* of Hungarians' cultural status in Romania and, in doing so, to work unambiguously within the existing state structure, what is puzzling, therefore, is the reaction on the Romanian side; in parents, teachers and students alike taking to the streets in protest, and in the provisional government suspending the programme of educational reform.

Romanian reactions

Many on the Romanian side, including the leaders of the NSF, feared that the separation of educational institutions – from primary schools right through to the university level – would inevitably create a separate Hungarian cultural and political elite. The argument in this respect was, that in practical terms at least, it would be difficult to separate completely the achievement of cultural autonomy from that of ethnic autonomy in those counties where Magyars constitute a majority. For example, in Covasna County, where over 75 per cent of the population is ethnic Hungarian, or in Harghita County, where the figure is closer to 85 per cent, in proportion to local numbers the creation of and control over separate educational establishments meant Hungarians *de facto* exercising a considerable amount of territorial control. As Gallagher notes in relation to Romanian misgivings in Tirgu Mures, the replacement of Romanian officials by ethnic Hungarians in these counties 'may only have heightened fears among the city's recently constituted political elite about the fate that awaited them unless they mobilised to protect their interests'.[45]

In this sense, the question of the re-establishment of Hungarian cultural institutions was inextricably bound up with the issue of the competition for local political power. Within newly created institutions, battles for positions would take place between both sides' bureaucratic elites: in mixed establishments the top jobs would go to Romanians, but creating purely Magyar educational institutions would guarantee a certain number of jobs for ethnic Hungarians.

During the Ceausescu period, many Romanians had benefited from the dispersal of ethnic Hungarians. This was not only in the educational sector:

> There were members of the security apparatus who would have felt suddenly vulnerable in the face of resentment from a former Hungarian minority. . . . [Also] there were recently arrived workers who boosted the size of Vatra meetings and who could be persuaded that if Hungarians

were allowed to gain control of the local economy, positive discrimination would be exercised in favour of their community.[46]

As such, some of the greatest fears stemmed not so much from those Romanians whose families had always lived in the region, but from those resettled from outside Transylvania during the communist period. As Jonathan Eyal writes:

> It [Vatra Romaneasca] is a union which articulates the fears of many of the recently arrived settlers in Transylvania. The settlers, many of them introduced during the Ceausescu dictatorship in order to dilute the Hungarian presence, were attracted by calls to racist hatred out of fears of a Hungarian backlash that might lose them their jobs in Transylvania's closely knit communities.[47]

Lost jobs were not the only fear for Romanians, though: decentralisation (federalism) and, far more worryingly, Hungarian secession/irredentism loomed large. Historically, Romanian national building had often been a highly precarious enterprise. For certain periods, Romanian territories were scattered among three empires: the Habsburg, the Ottoman and the Romanov. Thus, the legacy of national fragmentation manifested itself in a highly centralised state, administered solely from Bucharest, and very much resistant to any notions of federalism – let alone territorial fragmentation. As Gallagher notes:

> There may have been others motivated less by material self-interest or physical security who, witnessing the disappearance of a state which, for all its shortcomings, had been the first to impose its authority right across the nation down to the village level, may have feared that dismemberment of the county was now a serious possibility.[48]

Many Romanians indeed feared that the ultimate goal of Transylvania's Hungarian community was secession. Under Ceausescu especially, Romanians had been subject to constant propaganda according to which there always lurked surreptitious Magyar plots aimed at depriving them of Transylvania.[49] To be sure, the very mention or suggestion of Transylvania and Hungary together has, in itself, often been enough to arouse Romanian anger. For example, on a visit to Budapest in January 1990, French President François Mitterand, was attacked by the Bucharest daily *Romania Libera* for merely commenting as to the fact that Hungary had lost much of its territory.[50] The relationship between school separation and Hungarian irredentism is by no means unproblematic (I will return to this in the final section of the chapter). Nevertheless, the very fact that the Hungarian community was actively pushing for educational reform heightened Romanian suspicions, and indeed manifested itself in outright resentment. The main problem in this

respect was that in their rush to act on Iliescu's (supposed) initial promises, leaders on the Hungarian side had not taken enough time in explaining their motivations to those in the Romanian community. Consequently, many Romanians in Transylvania began to question why mixed schools, indeed why mixed communities even, were suddenly unacceptable to their Magyar neighbours: 'Do the Hungarians not like us? Have we done something wrong? Are they blaming us for something?'

Nationalist organisations, such as Vatra, were able to provide at the same time both simple and persuasive answers to their uncertainties: that their Hungarian neighbours were inherently secessionist made perfect sense, after all had they not always wanted Transylvania for themselves? Vatra presented the country's Hungarians as demanding not only rights but privileges, accusing them of displaying a superiority characteristic of their past behaviour. As Radu Ceontea, the then Chairman of Vatra, put it:

> After almost a thousand years of foreign domination in Transylvania, it is fairly difficult for the [Hungarians] to forget their behaviour as rulers. . . . They demand rights specific to communities with a federative status. . . . Romania is not a multi-national state but a national unitary state in which different percentages of minorities live. And no minority is permitted favours just because its ancestors were oppressed for centuries.[51]

At a rally in Alba Iulia on 4 March 1990, the Vatra leadership was even more direct:

> Under the pretext of collective human rights, the Magyar[s] . . . are coming up with demands for territorial [ethnic] autonomy. Up to now, [they] . . . have not said so clearly, but properly speaking what they are trying to do as an ethnic group is to create a federated state within Romania.[52]

But it was not only Ceontea and his colleagues who were voicing their concerns over apparent Hungarian ambitions. In a 25 January address, Iliescu noted how 'many disquieting phenomena have been brought to our attention recently from certain Transylvanian counties in connection with separatist trends which cause tension between citizens of Romania and Hungarian nationality'.[53] What exactly such 'separatist trends' were, Iliescu did not say. Nevertheless, simply by virtue of framing Hungarian behaviour in these terms the NSF was clearly contributing to the widely held perception that at the very least the country's Hungarians were seeking some kind of ethnic autonomy within a decentralised Romania.

Many of those susceptible to talk of Hungarian irredentism were rural Romanians whose families had been in Transylvania since before the Second World War.[54] Like the fear of the return of the Ustashe felt by many Krajina

Serbs, for these villagers suspicions of Magyar secession revived particularly painful memories. Some would have themselves experienced the often-brutal period of Hungarian occupation between 1940 and 1944, while others would have heard stories of past atrocities passed down from grandparents to parents. Thus, the mere mention of Hungarian autonomy served easily to provoke fiery responses.

Additionally, that Hungarians had organised themselves politically into a single, more or less cohesive party, the HDUR, and indeed had done so with great speed, again caused resentment within the Romanian community. And this has to be considered in terms of the specific political (and for that matter economic)[55] situation at the time. At the beginning of 1990, Romania was marked by almost total political chaos. Following the overthrow of Ceausescu, a multitude of new political parties – more than 50 in all, most of them highly disorganised – sprang up in an attempt to fill the gaping political void. Set against this, the very coherence and orderliness of the country's Hungarians served only to highlight Romanian (political) inadequacies. As Gallagher writes:

> It is doubtful . . . whether the Hungarians realized that by creating their movement so rapidly, by avoiding the disunity which turned much of the rest of the Romanian political landscape into the myriad of squabbling factions . . . they would be conveying a disquieting message to a large number of Romanians.[56]

By way of summary: the overall goal of the HDUR was to 'reverse' the assimilatory policies of the previous Ceausescu regime, which had hit the country's Hungarian community the hardest. In more specific terms, this meant undoing much of the harm that had been done to Hungarian-language education at both the secondary and university levels. In this way, Hungarian societal security requirements were equated with a revival of national identity through, in the main, the re-introduction of Hungarian-language teaching into 'Romanian' schools (creating mixed institutions), plus the separation of others (allowing for a number of solely Hungarian educational establishments). However, Hungarian moves towards educational reform were perceived by many Romanians as constituting a separate Hungarian cultural and political elite, and a process that would de facto provide Transylvanian Hungarian with some measure of ethnic autonomy. Moreover, and assuming the worst, some Romanians also believed that this would inevitably open up the way for the federalisation of the country and, most alarmingly, for Transylvania's re-unification with Hungary proper.

Even though the achievement of HDUR goals required some significant amendments to existing minority-rights provisions, the dominant, Domokos-led faction within the party was arguably very much security-seeking; that is to say, it sought no more in securing Hungarian identity than had previously been afforded by the Romanian State. Nevertheless, the very speed with which

Hungarians went about the task of educational reform made it less than clear as to the real extent of their intentions. Many in the Romanian community became unsure as to just what the HDUR was really asking for.

Romanian societal security requirements and Hungarian (mis)perceptions

Romanian societal security requirements can primarily be attributed to the NSF. However, two qualifications need to be made in this respect. The first is that as an actor the NSF encompassed numerous political factions; indeed, the NSF Council comprised representatives along a broad range of Romanian public opinion. However, 'the NSF Council was a façade institution. . . . Real power was vested in the Executive Office . . . and in the narrow group of individuals clustered around the person of the president'.[57] That is to say, the overwhelmingly dominant voices within the NSF were those of Iliescu, Roman and their supporters.

The second qualification is that even within the three-month period in question (from the end of December 1989 to the end of March 1990), in order to maintain its tacit legitimacy in governing the country, the NSF altered its voice to come more into line with what it believed to be the prevailing public opinion. From around the end of January 1990 – and more or less coinciding with the dismissal of Deputy Education Minister Attila Palfalvi – the stance taken by the NSF coincided to a much greater degree with that of Vatra. In effect, during February and March these two actors spoke with a more or less common voice with regard to the provision of minority rights. As Gallagher points out: 'It [Vatra] is a nationalist offensive whose rhetoric and symbols have at times been borrowed by a National Salvation Front government lacking the grass-roots presence which Vatra has in selective areas'.[58] As was the case with the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Croatia, the actions of the NSF were in part influenced by 'ethnic flanking', whereby the more extreme nationalist – and, indeed, in certain counties more popular – Vatra put pressure on the NSF to 'shun moderation and inter-ethnic negotiations'.[59]

The changing voice of the NSF is certainly a tricky aspect of the Transylvania case, and I will return to this in the final section. For the moment, though, it is sufficient to mention some fundamental (stable) security requirements.

Essential to Romanian national identity is the unitary character of the state. According to Article 1 of the Romanian Constitution, 'Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible National State'. Moreover, the predominantly ethnic equation between nation and state is alluded to in Article 4: 'The State foundation is laid on the unity of the *Romanian people*'.[60] In this regard, Robert Hayden talks about what he calls 'constitutional nationalism'. This, Hayden explains, refers to 'a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state'.[61] The Romanian Constitution affirms

the dominant status of ethnic Romanians over other national minorities, and thereby also places certain constraints on the provisions affordable by the state to those minorities. In this way, Rady suggests that:

> The particular fear of the Romanian majority and, indeed, of ministers in the NSF was that separate educational facilities extending through from primary school to university would create a separate Hungarian elite and intellectual class. This was interpreted as quite out of keeping with the traditional unitary character of the Romanian national state and as the prelude to federalization.[62]

Similar to the case with the Croatian government, Romanian societal security requirements can in some sense be seen not so much in terms of what the NSF *sought*, but what they wished to *prevent or allow*; that is to say, whether the Romanian government was prepared to compromise in terms of the pre-existing relationship between state and (the ethnic) nation. Thus, the central question is this: what measure of autonomy, if any, was the Romanian government prepared to consent to, given the importance of the state's unitary character?

Romanian goals

The NSF's initial pronouncements were clear enough in the sense that they were willing to grant at least some degree of minority rights. For example, in their 5 January (1990) declaration, the NSF condemned Ceausescu's policy towards ethnic minorities and noted that because of the 'sad inheritance of the dictatorship' it was necessary 'to elaborate constitutional guarantees for the individual and collective rights of ethnic minorities'.[63] In seeking to undo the injustices of the communist period, Iliescu and Roman therefore seemed (initially) in favour of school separation. Indeed, Jonathan Eyal is sure about what the NSF decided: the provisional government 'promised to revive the Hungarian Bolyai University in Transylvania' and also offered the Hungarians 'separate schools and facilities to develop their own culture'.[64] Moreover, in the middle of January the Hungarian Ministers of Education and Culture visited their Romanian opposites in Bucharest. Among other things, agreement was reached over Budapest supplying books and other provisions for the Magyar minority.[65]

However, with adverse reactions to the proposed educational reform in Cluj, Tirgu Mures and other Transylvanian towns, the provisional government's initial commitment to school separation was 'suspended'. According to the NSF, the main reasons for doing so were *time* and *money*. The NSF contended that the break-up of educational establishments halfway through the academic year would be detrimental to pupils' education. Further reform should therefore wait until the following school year. On top of this, the provisional government also noted that the country's economic situation was

such that they would not yet be able to provide the new buildings and other educational facilities warranted by school separation; the corollary to this being that the money was sorely needed in other areas that would benefit the population as a whole (the majority), and not just the Hungarian minority.[66] In simple terms, the apparent position of the NSF was more or less: 'Yes, you can have your own schools, but not right now!'

Security-seeking?

Determining security-seeking behaviour on the part of the NSF is far from easy. Distinguishing protective from predatory moves in this regard is tied largely to the question of whether the provisional government *deliberately* sought to hinder/suppress the reproduction of Hungarian identity within Romania. This is discussed at greater length in the following section. For the moment, though, suffice it to say that the ambiguity of the NSF's goals *vis-à-vis* school separation makes it somewhat difficult to be too categorical over Iliescu and Roman as either security-seekers or power-seekers. On the one hand, the NSF leadership may well have suspended educational reform in order to maintain, indeed strengthen, their nascent power base. On the other hand, it is arguably the case that the NSF reacted to what were, for sure, genuine fears among many Romanians in Cluj, Tirgu Mures and elsewhere.

What is apparent, however, is that any form of territorially based independence (ethnic autonomy) was unequivocally ruled out by the NSF leadership. Politicians on the Romanian side repeatedly stressed the highly centralised nature of the country, and that any moves towards decentralisation were totally unacceptable. For example, shortly after the Tirgu Mures violence Ilisecu addressed the country: while supposedly appealing to ethnic tolerance, he spoke of the 'unitary character' of Romania, which, he said, should not be questioned. Indeed, he went on to stress that 'Transylvania belongs to the Romanian fatherland and cannot be subject to negotiation with anyone'.[67]

Hungarian reactions

Even though the NSF was keen to stress the *temporary* nature of the suspension of educational reform, many within the Hungarian community nonetheless remained distrustful: in their minds, the provisional government was simply stalling, playing for time. They believed the NSF had no intention of proceeding with school separation even at a later date, and that if the desired educational reform did not happen now, then it would never happen at all. Moreover, that at the same time Iliescu had reneged on his pledge and registered the NSF as a political party for the forthcoming elections was a clear sign to the Hungarian community that he, and his inner policy-making clique, could not be taken at their word.[68]

Moreover, Hungarian suspicions that the provisional government was not committed to educational reform and minority rights were aggravated by the fact that many of the officials responsible for the implementation were the very same as under the Ceausescu administration. For example, the Education Minister, Mihail Sora, had for many years been employed under the former dictator.[69] In addition, several leading NSF officials had reputedly strong links with organisations such as Vatra; for example, Ion Manzatu, Vice Chairman of the national PCNU, was closely associated with Radu Ceontea. Manzatu was also the leader of the Republican Party, an organisation with clear nationalist tendencies.[70] Moreover, the HDUR, together with 11 other bodies representing national minorities, fiercely objected to the appointment of Adrian Motiu as Minister of Transylvanian Affairs. Motiu was to emerge as a senior figure in Vatra and was most vociferous in his charges of Hungarian irredentism.[71]

To sum up, then. Iliescu and Roman, as the leading figures in the NSF, pledged themselves to a 'reversal' of Ceausescu's assimilatory policies. Indeed, to begin with at least, the two leaders seemed willing to allow the implementation of education reform, only, however, then to suspend the programme at the end of January. Although the NSF proffered mainly economic reasons for the suspension of school separation and noted that educational reform continue at the beginning of the next academic year, Romanian societal security requirements – the maintenance of a highly centralised state – instead suggested that any provisions culminating in Hungarian autonomy, be that cultural or ethnic, were potentially contrary to this end. Indeed, the perception among many Hungarians was that commitment on the Romanian side to the country's unitary character effectively precluded school separation indefinitely: a case of it is now or never.

That the NSF came to change its mind over educational reform not only makes it less than clear (in hindsight) to the observer as to whether the provisional government was indeed a security-seeker, but (at the time) also served to create uncertainty in the Hungarian community over Iliescu and Roman's genuine commitment to reversing Ceausecu-era policies.

As with the case of Krajina, this next section turns finally to the compatibility/incompatibility of Hungarian and Romanian societal security requirements

Real or illusory incompatibility?

Hungarian societal security requirements manifested themselves most clearly in the required implementation of educational reform: many of Romania's Magyars saw separate Hungarian-language classes and institutions as the primary means of protecting their societal identity. Two effects of this were most apparent: first, in some establishments pupils' education was disrupted, with school separation taking place part way through the academic year. And

second, fears emerged among many Romanians that Hungarian demands were simply a prelude to Magyar autonomy within Transylvania, or perhaps even to outright secession from the country itself. Romanian societal security requirements were for the most part unclear, over and above the question of the maintenance of the unitary nature of the state. Still, the NSF's opposition to territorially based (ethnic) autonomy and federalisation within Romania was more than enough to convince many in the country's Hungarian community that no provision of minority rights was to be forthcoming.

Expressing its concerns over educational reform, the provisional government stressed the pace of implementation: that the Hungarians wanted too much too soon. This might indicate that school separation was indeed acceptable, although only at the end of the academic year, as some of the NSF's pronouncements had alluded to. However, matters were complicated somewhat by the question of jobs. Because of Ceausescu's policy of resettlement, very few Hungarians had been able to secure teaching positions in Magyar-populated areas. Thus, Hungarian students were taught mainly by (ethnic) Romanians, in the Romanian language. By separating Hungarian- and Romanian-language education, those Romanians who had previously benefited under Ceausescu would have to be replaced. As Gallagher pertinently recognises: 'The Hungarians concerned had *miscalculated* by taking the initiative in a sensitive area like secondary education where any rapid restoration of the pre-Ceausescu status quo could only be achieved by placing Romanians at a disadvantage'.[72] Gallagher's comments thus suggest the *inadvertency* of Hungarian actions, where the outcome, Romanian job losses, had not been deliberately sought by the HDUR.

Added to this was the problem of local former Romanian Communist Party (RCP) officials. In spreading its power throughout the country, the NSF came to depend heavily on taking over the local RCP organisation. In many parts of Romania, the NSF took on board those officials who had first been appointed as a direct result of Ceausescu's discriminatory policies against Magyars and others – the self-same policies that the provisional government initially condemned. Again, to quote Gallagher: 'The NSF clearly found itself in a *contradictory position*. If it was prepared to honour its promises to Hungarians, this would be at the expense of state and party officials whose cooperation with the NSF was needed in order to extend its authority across the whole country.'[73] While strengthening the cohesion between state and (Hungarian) society, the granting of minority rights nonetheless threatened to erode power from the provisional government. In other words, the very *weakness* of the state precluded the NSF from pursuing other policies.

Having said this, some reservation exists as to the NSF's desire to allow school separation right from the very start. Clearly, in the aftermath of the revolution Iliescu made certain promises to the Hungarian community concerning the splitting of schools and universities. Yet some are of the opinion that Iliescu's decision in this respect was driven out of purely

short-term political necessity rather than a genuine desire to improve the status of the country's Magyars. Gallagher's observations are significant:

> What has become known about Iliescu's and Roman's stance towards minority questions suggests that they were not motivated by a sense of guilt or remorse about the ill-treatment of Hungarians or a desire to make reparations to them. It is more likely that minority concerns figured more prominently on the NSF policy agenda earlier rather than later because Hungarians had organised themselves into a political body which soon showed that it was able to speak on behalf of a large section of the Hungarian population.[74]

Iliescu had certainly been swift in suspending educational reform following Romanian protests in Cluj and Tirgu Mures, and the NSF's subsequent shift more towards the extreme nationalism of Vatra certainly appears to demonstrate Iliescu's and Roman's opposition to the provision of cultural autonomy for the Hungarian community.

Political elites are nonetheless both enabled and constrained by political and social structures; that is to say, although the decision by the NSF leadership to suspend educational reform may well have been motivated more than anything else by the desire to stay in power, its tacit legitimacy to stop the separation of schools nevertheless derived from the (mis)perceptions of Romanian society. Or, to put it another way: the behaviour of the provisional government alone explains neither the initial popular reaction to school separation nor the subsequent escalation to violence manifest in Tirgu Mures.

The question of jobs has already been mentioned with regard to Romanian protests in Cluj and Tirgu Mures. But more psychological factors were also apparent. In beginning to explain this, Gallagher notes how a 'tradition of self-expression and self-organization was lacking among Romanians who had grown up during the Ceausescu era . . .'[75], this in distinction to the (political and social) order of the HDUR and, by extension, of the Hungarian community itself. In this context, Katherine Verdery seeks to explain Romanian national sentiment using the Self/Other framework. She begins by pointing out that under communism the distinction between *Us* and *Them* was apparent in accounting for peoples' repudiation of single-party rule: ' "They" [the regime] were always doing something nasty to "Us", "We" always suffered hardship while "They" wallowed in privileges'.[76] But the end of a single-party system produced a crisis in this particular mode of self-identification: the Other against which the Self had been identified suddenly disappeared. The communist enemy was no longer there. In the political and economic pandemonium of post-revolutionary Romania, a new enemy was needed, one that could be blamed for all of the pain and suffering. In this way, the shift from a communist Other to an ethnically-defined Other was a relatively easy one to make. As Verdery goes on:

> Given many people's frustrated and discouraging lives over the past forty
> years, how easy it is to explain their victimization in national terms. . . .
> The contrast between the anarchy of Romania's political scene and the
> apparent discipline . . . of the political party of Hungarians [HDUR]
> makes it easy for Romanians to believe in a Hungarian plot to recover
> Transylvania with another mutilation of Romania, as happened in
> 1940.[77]

Verdery's approach suggests that Hungarians entered as Other in the
Romanian self-identification: 'Oh wretched Romanians, your troubles have
always come from scheming aliens. Expel them and all will be well',[78] and
in this way certainly seems to equate well to required insecurity, where
Romanian societal security requirements necessitate the suppression of
Hungarian national identity in Romania – psychological insecurities manifest
themselves in the denial of minority rights legislation. And, if this is indeed
the case, then it effectively precludes the application of a societal security
dilemma in its tight formulation.

However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, psychological insecurities are
often too difficult to disentangle from other more pragmatic threats in any
meaningful sense. To be sure, the position the NSF came to adopt (following
the dismissal of Attila Palfalvi) was representative of the wishes of the
majority of Romanians. But can this be seen as purely an expression of the
desire to blame others for one's own woes? Arguably it cannot. It has surely to
be considered together with the question of jobs, and, as Verdery herself
alludes to, the additional issue of the re-establishment of Magyar regional
autonomy within Transylvania, or, more threateningly, the severing of
Hungarian majority areas from Romania and their eventual reunification
with Hungary proper.

For many Romanians, educational reform and the provision of cultural
autonomy was the thin end of the wedge. The separation of schools was seen
as a first step towards greater ethnic autonomy, and, ultimately, to secession
itself. Rady puts this most succinctly: 'In the minds of many, cultural
pluralism was confused with territorial fragmentation and educational
autonomy with political separatism'.[79] He goes on:

> The misgivings of the majority population were deepened by fears
> of Hungarian irredentism. Despite continued assurances by both
> Budapest and the minority leaders in Transylvania that Hungary had
> no interest in revising its borders, Romanians believed that territorial
> secession was the ultimate goal of the Hungarian minority. The
> experience of the twentieth century combined with Ceausescu's
> frequent denunciation of Hungarian imperialist ambitions, even
> convinced educated Romanians of the existence of an international
> Magyar conspiracy aimed at depriving them of their Transylvanian
> home.[80]

Taking this into account, there are two distinct, yet tightly interrelated, questions to consider here. The first is the specific matter of the separation of schools, the second the more general issue of Magyar autonomy (cultural, ethnic) and secession. As to the first question: despite his initial promises, it seems as though Iliescu had no genuine desire to see through the implementation of educational reform. Agreeing to the splitting of schools meant that many Romanian teachers were straight away faced with the prospect of looking for new jobs. Moreover, the subsequent creation of a local Hungarian cultural elite also meant jeopardising the positions of those officials the NSF had come to rely on in extending its power base throughout the country. In this way, a real incompatibility between the two sides existed, and thus the presence of a tight (societal) security dilemma at least has to be ruled out.

As to the second question: the tendency of the provisional government was toward preserving the country's highly centralised structure. Their major worry, therefore, was about those moves that might enable the development of a more federal Romania. Thus, for many on the Romanian side the provision of cultural autonomy was seen squarely as a precursor to political decentral-isation. Consequently, the tendency was to exaggerate Magyar demands, inviting a Romanian backlash against what was depicted as a Hungarian plot to wrest Transylvania away. And while Hungarian demands contained no clear territorial element, the provision of cultural autonomy in counties such as Harghita and Covasna would nevertheless manifest itself in de facto ethnic autonomy. It seems evident, though, that both the Budapest government and the HDUR leadership in Romania had no intentions in terms of territorial revision. As such, Romanian fears of irredentism – heightened by Second World War memories and Ceausescu's propaganda – were almost certainly misplaced. In this sense, Hungarian demands for cultural autonomy appear not have to threatened Romanian (societal) security and, differently to school separation, this more general scenario might thus reflect a more tight societal security formulation.

Conceptually, though, this makes things rather messy. On the one hand, it was the specific issue of education reform that triggered the action–reaction process, which ultimately manifested itself in the Tirgu Mures violence. On the other hand, arguably the situation would not have escalated to violence had it not been for the issue of Hungarian irredentism. Those Romanian villagers who arrived by the busload in Tirgu Mures were incited to violence by the *misplaced fear* of secession: in Hodac, for example, the village's inhabitants were advised by the local Orthodox priest to make their way to the city 'to stop the Hungarians taking Transylvania away'.[81] The proposed separation of schools certainly provoked a great deal of antagonism between the two communities, but cannot be said to have generated the height of fear necessary for mass mobilisation and the perpetration of hostilities on the scale of Tirgu Mures.

Conclusion

It is over 50 years since John Herz and Herbert Butterfield first drew scholarly attention to the 'absolute predicament', the 'irreducible dilemma': the security dilemma. For Butterfield, the security dilemma constituted 'the basic pattern for all narratives of human conflict, whatever other patterns may be super-imposed on it later'.[1] While many other writers, including Herz himself, came to contest Butterfield's claim that the security underlies *all* human conflict, what is certainly not contested is the centrality of the concept in purporting to explain both international and domestic (ethnic) wars.

The utility of the security dilemma is in elucidating how actors, seeking more security, can nonetheless end up with less and provoke conflict in the process, be this competition and/or outright war. The 'tragedy' of this situation stems from the misperception that the other harbours malign intentions. For Butterfield, and other 'Classical' Realists, misperception is essentially the product of human fallibility, which prevents the individual from being able to enter into the other's 'counter fear'. For neo-Realists, the individual level of analysis is not necessarily inconsequential, but what is most crucial is structure: worst-case assumptions necessitated by the anarchical nature of the international system and its self-help corollary.

The emphasis on structure – rather than agency – seeks to provide further explanation as to why the tragedy of the security dilemma occurs. In doing so, however, the question of anarchy and self-help, together with other, additional elements introduced into the security dilemma, such as offence–defence considerations, has inevitably resulted in ever-wider interpretations of the concept. To be sure, I am not against what Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis acknowledge as 'concept stretching'.[2] Indeed, like Charles Glaser, I also recognise the utility of expanding some of the security dilemma's core assumptions.

Expanding, refining and refocusing the security dilemma

The starting point for expanding the security dilemma is Jervis' distinction between the spiral model and the deterrence model. The difference between the two models essentially reflects actors' divergent *intentions*; that is, either

for security or for power. Glaser notes the limitations of this basic model and builds upon the spiral model/deterrence model dichotomy by shifting the concentration from actors' intentions to actors' *motives*. That is to say, Glaser's concern is not only whether states are status quo or revisionist, but whether at the same time they are also secure or insecure. This, Glaser argues, not only has significance in terms of policy prescriptions, 'but [also] provides important insights into historical cases':

> World War I is offered as the classic case of spiral model phenomena leading to war. The alignment of France, Russia and Britain was primarily an effort to protect the status quo, but it contributed to German insecurity by generating fears of encirclement, which increased German incentives for war.[3]

Glaser notes that some critics of this formulation contend that Germany was very much revisionist, and thus that spiral model prescriptions, cooperative rather than competitive policies, are simply inapt. However, he goes on:

> Framing this as a choice between policies designed to deal with insecure states and those designed to deal with greedy [that is, revisionist, power-seeking] states may miss the key point, however: Germany may be more accurately described as an insecure greedy state that could not be adequately dealt with by either purely cooperative or purely competitive policies.[4]

Glaser is right in seeking to extend the utility of the spiral model/deterrence model dichotomy, but, nonetheless, is wrong, I feel, in his focus when doing so. Accepting Glaser's definition of motives, it seems logical to assume that motives are located *prior* to intentions; that is to say, the desire for power is, for example, a product of feelings of insecurity. However, in trying to operationalise the security dilemma, it is difficult enough to determine actors' intentions, let alone their motives. Determining motives seems doubly difficult, as its corollary is to shift inquiry more towards the level of agency. The focus on motives arguably warrants concentration on individual decision-making, and thus also on more psychological dynamics.

In the book, I have also proposed extending the utility of the spiral model/deterrence model. However, rather than focusing on motives, I have chosen to concentrate on *means*. The main reason for having done so is that unlike motives, means are *subsequent* to intentions. Once intentions are clear – or at least as clear as they can be – strategies for achieving these intentions are much easier to observe. Unlike motives, which are located inside the units, means are a property of the relationship between them; in other words, means are located more in structure than in agency.

As I have used them, means are predicated on a prior definition of actors' security requirements – assuming that the actors involved are indeed security-

seekers. In other words, means are dependent on an actor's definition of what it needs to be secure. In this regard, expansionist policies are a corollary of security being defined as, for instance, requiring domination over a potentially adversarial neighbour, or the acquisition of certain resources (water, oil and so forth) deemed vital for the preservation of the national well-being. In this way, the relationship between the two, means and security requirements, is inextricable. Between two actors, therefore, a compatibility of security requirements automatically brings with it a situation where means do not threaten the security of the other, while, on the contrary, incompatible security requirements warrant policies and actions that necessarily harm the well-being of the other.

Expanding the utility of the spiral model/deterrence model dichotomy indeed brings with it a wider conceptualisation of the security dilemma (singular). And, as I have made clear, I am not necessarily against this. But expansion – concept stretching – has its dangers: crucially, the security dilemma turns more and more into a 'catch-all' concept. What I mean by this is that in purporting to explain violence and war at both the inter-state and intra-state levels, far too many disparate cases of conflict are likely to be dumped in the same conceptual bag, all of them carrying with them the security dilemma tag. This is crucial for both scholars and practitioners alike, and I will return to this more fully at the end. For the moment, though, it suffices to say that what I am for is an unambiguous distinction between security dilemmas (plural). That is to say, the security dilemma must not only be expanded, but at the same time also refined, or (re)categorised.

In Chapter 1, I proposed the categorisation of the security dilemma into 'tight', 'regular' and 'loose' conceptions. A tight security dilemma most reflects a Butterfieldian formulation of the concept, inasmuch as compatible security requirements are *misperceived* as threatening by each party. In this case, hostilities result as a consequence of an illusory incompatibility between the actors.

In a regular security dilemma, which, for example, corresponds to Jack Snyder's interpretation of the concept, although the actors are viewed as security-seekers, their security requirements necessitate harmful policies. In this situation of 'required insecurity', hostilities emerge because of a real, and not illusory, incompatibility.

For some writers, a loose security dilemma is not much of a security dilemma at all. As Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth point out: 'If the threat posed by one state to another . . . is accurately perceived by the potential or actual target state, then the situation cannot be classified as a security "dilemma". It is simply a security "problem", albeit perhaps a difficult one.'[5] In other words, there can be no security dilemma where power-seekers are involved. However, some writers make the argument that even power-seekers can be subject to security dilemma-type dynamics; most of all, with offence–defence considerations often influencing the propensity for military actions.

As such, there is arguably still some value in incorporating such actors into an, albeit much expanded, security dilemma categorisation.

The line between regular and loose security dilemmas may well be a fuzzy one as, in certain cases, it is often very difficult to distinguish between security-seekers and power-seekers – while Jeffrey Taliaferro sees Imperial Japan's expansion as security-driven, many others, including myself, may well not.[6] Still, as Randall Schweller argues:

> In a hypothetical world in which states are known to be status quo and cannot be otherwise in the future, it would make no sense to say that offensive advantage dictates 'that the only route to security lies through expansion'. States that are dissatisfied with the territory they possess, even if for defensive reasons, are, by definition, revisionist, not status quo, powers.[7]

In other words, whether harbouring security or non-security intentions, any expansionist state is revisionist.

Schweller's is a pertinent point and certainly seems to bring into question the regular security dilemma formulation. As he goes on: 'to introduce actual aggressors into the model . . . destroys the security dilemma'.[8] Even so, differentiating between (aggressive) security-seekers and power-seekers is vital, as it has implications for both defining the nature of the conflict and for prospective third parties when formulating intervention strategies. Again, I will return to this in more detail at the end.

The final contribution I have sought to make is that of refocusing. In its traditional sense, the security dilemma is overwhelmingly military-centric: it is the indistinguishability between offensive and defensive military postures that produces the uncertainty from which worst-case assumptions derive. To be sure, the utility of the security dilemma is in this way considerable – it explains the occurrence of arms racing and pre-emptive military action (in an anarchic international system). And, although the Cold War is over, the likelihood is that security dilemmas between states will continue as a foremost concern for International Relations scholars.

Since the end of the Cold War, many such scholars have sought to harness this utility also in the context of ethnic conflict – the former Yugoslavia in particular having received much attention in this respect. In Chapter 2, I made the argument that although military-centric insecurities are clearly pertinent in grasping some of the causes of the Yugoslav wars and other ethnic conflicts, maintaining a focus on solely military insecurities nevertheless severely limits the security dilemma concept in terms of its explanatory value. In this regard, Barry Buzan recognises how on the one hand the military sector is able to attract by far the most scholarly attention, because military means can 'dominate outcomes in all the other sectors'. On the other hand, though, he also notes the cost of a military-dominated view, inasmuch as other elements of security are devalued in both analysis and policy. Moreover,

and significantly so, Buzan goes on to argue that 'the insecurities of the military dimension seldom, if ever, arise without being driven by more fundamental insecurities in the other dimensions'.[9]

Accepting Buzan's premise, this also suggests that security dilemmas in the traditional sense are consequent to other factors, potentially located in either the political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. The concept of the security dilemma is often seen as a *cause* of conflict. But if military insecurities are often the manifestation of other fears, this might often not be the case. Of course, traditional security dilemmas may go a long way to explain why conflictual situations become militarised and escalate to the point of war. At the same time, though, the concept may well be hard pressed to explain in any significant sense the origins and dynamics of that prior conflictual situation.

Addressing this problem, I have also refocused the security dilemma away from the state to the Copenhagen School's notion of society. My argument in the book is that shifting the referent object of security from state to society enables a concomitant move from military to non-military security dilemmas.

A non-military security dilemma

The defence of societal identity, particularly when, for example, identity is tied to the safeguarding of the historic homeland, may well best be undertaken using military means: the maintenance of territorial integrity is invariably as important for societal identity as it is for state sovereignty. However, building a societal security dilemma largely predicated on military dynamics arguably changes few, if any, of the concept's fundamental elements: the referent object changes from state to society, and, correspondingly, so too the core value under threat from sovereignty to identity. But the (societal) security dilemma itself is surely manifest in more or less the same way.

Conceptually, though, non-military security dilemmas pose a huge challenge. Core elements of the security dilemma, traditionally informed by military technology and military postures – the indistinguishability between offence and defence, first-strike advantages, and so on – have, as far as possible, to be retained, but nonetheless in a way that is devoid of the crucial role of arms. In this respect, Waever *et al.* point out how strategies of defending societal security can entail what might be described as offensive and defensive means:

> In theory, this defensive approach [to societal identity] could go in either of two directions: it can become exclusivist, requiring ethno-cultural purity and strict territorial identity, or it can be cosmopolitan and multi-cultural, accepting cultural mixture in economic, political and some cultural life, while nevertheless maintaining group identity.[10]

In Chapter 4, I suggested that defending societal security rarely reflects solely either a civic nationalist (defensive) project or an ethnic nationalist (offensive) project; that most nationalist movements will exhibit a mixture of both means. In this way, there may indeed exist ambiguity as to intentions. This indistinguishability between offensive and defensive nationalisms provided me with the critical foundation for the societal security dilemma concept.

Competing nationalisms may indeed be driven by military insecurities. Nationalist projects, especially those that aspire to the achievement of a nation-state, will often require military means to secure the goals of political autonomy and territorial integrity. But not all nations, not all ethnic groups, desire a nation-state. In the book, my focus has mainly been on state–society relations: between the state's majority group and its minority. In such cases, where questions of minority rights are particularly to the fore, security dilemma dynamics tend to take place in a situation where identity is being both threatened and defended by political and/or legal means; where the state either allows or forbids practices, institutions and so forth upon which group identity is built and maintained.

Different to other works that have utilised the (traditional) security dilemma concept, the two cases I have employed in the book, Krajina and Transylvania, demonstrate how societal insecurities can provoke an action–reaction process that *culminates* in violence and hostilities – rather than hostilities inaugurating the action–reaction process.

The societal security dilemma in Krajina and Transylvania

In the Transylvania case, the outbreak of hostilities in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 was for the most part presented as the outcome of a tight societal security dilemma, where there existed an illusory incompatibility between the parties' (societal) security requirements.

In its ten-point plan, issued on 22 December 1989, Romania's provisional, National Salvation Front (NSF) government pledged itself to the reorganis-ation of education. For Transylvania's Hungarians, this denoted that in some cases Hungarian-language teaching was to be re-introduced into what had previously been 'Romanian' schools, while in others schools were to be completely separated, thereby also establishing solely Hungarian educational establishments. For many Romanians, however, reorganisation in this way was by no means as clear cut: school separation endangered (Romanian) jobs, disrupted students' education and was too costly at a time when other matters surely demanded what limited financial resources were available.

When the NSF 'postponed' educational reform, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR) assumed the worst: the blocking of school separation was seen as an unambiguous curtailment of minority rights, and thus a threat to Magyar identity. Likewise, the NSF, together with Romanian nationalist organisations such as *Vatra Romeasca*, viewed Hungarian demands for school separation in terms of a worst-case scenario: that

educational reform was simply a precursor to Hungarian cultural and/or political autonomy within Transylvania, and, most worryingly, to outright secession from Romania itself.

In Chapter 8, although I was unable to conclude with any great certainty as to the NSF's intentions concerning educational reform, what seems more than clear is that at no time did Transylvania's Hungarians express any desire to secede from Romania. Why, then, this misperception?

During the Ceausescu period in particular, Romanian nationalist propaganda had fiercely espoused the view that any expression of Magyarism within Transylvania was indicative of a Hungarian plot to wrest the region away. Thus, many (ethnic) Romanians felt considerable justification in looking on the (Hungarian) Other with fear and suspicion. Moreover, following the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania found itself in almost total political chaos. Few if any mechanisms for political communication existed, let alone for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. With this 'weakness' of the state, in order to legitimise its own regime the NSF turned to populist, nationalist rhetoric, further alienating Hungarians from the government's position and thus only enhancing the existing lack of societal cohesion. In the context of post-revolutionary Romania, in this time of utter confusion, for many the only stable reference point was ethnicity. The language of ethnic identity had resonance: when all around them was chaotic and alien, identity provided something that was innately ordered and familiar. To think in such exclusivist terms gave a great many people comfort in a period of unparalleled change in their lives.

In Croatia, soon after Franjo Tudjman secured the republic's presidency in April 1990, the Zagreb government implemented a programme of 'Croatisation'. Among other measures, dual-language road signs were torn down and Serbs were removed from the bureaucracies and the police. But it was changes to the new Draft Croatian Constitution that, more than anything else, provoked a process of action and reaction between the two sides. Previously a constituent nation in the Republic of Croatia, thus enjoying equal constitutional status alongside the Croats, in the new constitution Serbs were relegated to the category of 'other nations and minorities'. And, for many Serbs, this was indeed a fundamental threat to their identity.

In Chapter 6 my argument was that although the Krajina case exhibits many (societal) security dilemma characteristics, it cannot, unlike Transylvania, be viewed from a tight security dilemma perspective.

The violence that broke out between Serbs and Croats in August 1990 was a direct result of Tudjman's intransigence concerning the new constitution. In meetings with Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) leader Jovan Raskovic, Tudjman made no concessions in this regard, despite repeated warnings from Raskovic that the Serbs' relegation to 'other nations and minorities' was almost certainly the harbinger of troubles. For Tudjman, though, and his governing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Croatian societal security entailed the predominance of ethnic Croats: a 'Croatia for the Croats'. That

is to say, Croatian security necessitated Serb insecurity and thus there was a real incompatibility between security requirements.

The (societal) security dilemma and conflict resolution

The categorisation of the security dilemma into its tight, regular and loose formulations is not just of academic importance. It is also of great value to policy-makers. In the context of ethnic conflict, Snyder and Jervis recognise that the security dilemma is an indispensable tool for third parties considering intervention:

> A full understanding of the role of security fears in causing and perpetuating civil [ethnic] war requires more than just a knowledge of the threatening, anarchical situation facing the combatants. Behavior under the security dilemma is shaped not simply by the strategic situation but also by the participants' perceptions of that situation and their expectations of each others' likely behavior in that situation. Thus, interveners must confront not only the circumstances that constitute the security dilemma – namely, anarchy and offensive advantages – but also the ideas and social forces that produced the dilemma in the first place and that may reproduce it unless the interveners can neutralize them.[11]

In other words, if intervention is to be effective, policy-makers must be aware of the role of the security dilemma in both instigating and exacerbating conflict.

However, as Snyder and Jervis go on to point out, nearly every conflict is marked by a mixture of both 'security fears' and 'predatory goals', which for the most part are very difficult to separate. Yet, as far as is possible, interveners must endeavour to do so. Separating security fears and predatory goals enables policy-makers to discern what kind of actors are involved, what type of conflict they are dealing with, and thus what intervention strategies are best employed.

According to Snyder and Jervis, three 'general types of prescription' are informed by the security dilemma. The first is to 'establish a sovereign authority capable of enforcing hegemonic peace upon all fearfully contending parties'; that is to say, get the new regime in place, and preferably quickly. The second is to 'devise a situation in which the parties can provide for their own security through strictly defensive measures'; in other words, give defence the advantage and first-strike advantages disappear. And finally, the third prescription is 'for the contending parties to lock themselves into an institutional framework that guarantees their mutual self-restraint once they lay their weapons down'.[12]

Like Snyder and Jervis, my own formulation of the security dilemma informs three different kinds of policy prescription. These prescriptions stem from a prior definition of the type of conflict in question. My suggestion is

that tight, regular and loose security dilemmas correspond to conflicts, that I describe respectively as 'resolvable short of war', 'difficult to resolve short of war' and 'irresolvable short of war'.

Conflicts that are resolvable short of war equate to a tight security dilemma formulation. In this regard, relations can be enhanced through mechanisms that can reveal misperception to both sides. Among such measures, 'power sharing enables . . . ethnic groups to influence or determine policy, [because] this reduces their uncertainty concerning the policies' likely impact on their ethnicity'.[13] Other confidence-building measures (CBMs) may also be applicable: clearer information and more effective methods of communication can reduce the ambiguity of actors' intentions. Reference to such CBMs is nothing new; in the existing literature, CBMs are discussed at length when referring to the possibility of mitigating or ameliorating the security dilemma. Still, in cases where the incompatibility between security dilemmas is real, CBMs on their own are likely to be ineffective, and thus other policy prescriptions are also needed.

Conflicts that are difficult to resolve short of war are informed by a regular security dilemma situation. In this scenario, CBMs are largely inapplicable, as there is simply no misperception to be revealed. Instead, although the situation may not be so easy to overcome peaceably, the actors might still be induced to change their security requirements. As Alan Collins points out:

> [I]n some instances it is not possible to mitigate a security dilemma via spiral prescriptions such as confidence-building measures. In other words simply reducing statesmen's uncertainty is not enough, [as] the goal . . . is the cause of the neighbour's insecurity. In this instance it is only possible for all to be secure if the . . . [actor] *reinterprets its criteria for achieving security*.[14]

Appropriate strategies here may include 'positive sanctions', or perhaps more accurately, 'incentives'.

Han Dorussen notes how incentives are usually treated as being in opposition to sanctions, as incentives are largely rewards while sanctions are seen as punishment. Referring to the work of David Cortright, Dorussen defines incentives as 'the granting of a political *or* economic benefit in exchange for a *specific* policy adjustment by the recipient nation'.[15] Incentives seem to be an effective mechanism for inducing change in security requirements. While indeed providing possible means for prompting some shifts in policy, that the recipient state is not seen to be punished is also important, as, after all, it is still a security-seeker. In this way, Dorussen goes on to claim that in the recipient state 'incentives are much less likely to lead to "rallying around the flag"'. Moreover, he suggests that 'incentives are less likely to engender or aggravate misperception, and convey more clearly information'.[16]

Unlike CBMs, incentives are yet to be afforded any significant treatment in the security dilemma literature. This is a crucial gap: in regular security

dilemma situations, incentives may go some way in facilitating the reinterpretation of security requirements.

With loose security dilemmas, given that the parties wish to fight it out between themselves, third parties will likely require some degree of military force in order to resolve the conflict. As such, it seems especially important that loose security dilemmas be clearly distinguished from tight and regular formulations: whereas tight and regular security dilemmas can be addressed through peaceable economic, political and/or legal means, loose security dilemmas invariably warrant a military solution.

Conflict resolution in Krajina and Transylvania

In Transylvania, the hostilities at Tirgu Mures did not come to manifest themselves in wider ethnic war. Several reasons for this arguably are located in more military-centred considerations – the offence–defence balance, and windows of vulnerability and opportunity in relation to so-called 'ethnic islands'[17]. But it is also evident that the lack of escalation beyond localised violence in Transylvania can be accounted for by the successful mitigation of a largely tight (societal) security dilemma.

What followed Tirgu Mures during the 1990s in Romania can in a sense be seen as an attempt to reveal misperception to the parties involved. Several mechanisms have been employed, designed to implement minority rights for Transylvania's Hungarian community. These can be located at the national level: the Council for National Minorities (1993), followed by the Department for the Creation of National Minorities (1997); at the bilateral level: the Basic Treaty between Hungary and Romania (1996); and at the international level: the European Union and, in particular, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The strategy of the OSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, has for the most part been to employ a twin-track approach: the securing of minority rights is an unequivocal goal, but concomitant efforts have nonetheless been made to ensure that any gain for the (Hungarian) minority is not (mis)interpreted as a loss for the (Romanian) majority. In other words, van der Stoel has sought to assure the parties involved that a situation of compatibility in terms of their (societal) security requirements indeed exists.[18]

In the case of Krajina, mechanisms designed to reveal misperception were likely to have been ineffective. In simple terms, this is because there was no misperception to reveal. To be sure, relations between the parties were marked by fear and mistrust. Thus, CBMs may have gone some way in addressing this. However, in the end conflict might only have been resolved had the Croatian government been induced to change its security requirements. In other words, the Log Revolution may well have been averted had Tudjman agreed to Serb demands in amending the new constitution. His failure to do so not only created the conditions for violence between the two parties, but also led to a

radicalisation of the SDS: the moderate Raskovic was marginalised, with the party leadership being taken over by the more nationalist Milan Babic.

Although, as I have indicated, some package of incentives were likely to have been effective in the Krajina, when third party intervention came, in this particular sense it was just too late. The period between the Log Revolution and the eventual June 1991 Serb–Croat War arguably saw a shift from a regular security dilemma to a loose one: Federal Yugoslavia, headed by Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic, was intent on war to prevent Croatian secession and maintain Belgrade's (Serbia's) control over the breakaway Republic. In other words, the time for incentives had passed, and the time for military action had come instead.

The societal security dilemma presents scholars and practitioners alike with an effective tool for analysing the causes, perpetuation and resolution of ethnic violence. Although the concept itself is not unproblematic, many more scholars are nonetheless beginning to turn their attention to security dilemmas between societies.[19] This book is just an initial attempt to explore more fully the dynamics of identity and the role they can play in generating misperceptions, threats and vulnerabilities. These identity dynamics are most likely to manifest themselves in 'weak states', and other weak states are thus surely the future focus for the societal security dilemma concept.

Notes

Introduction

1 P. Hassner, 'Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1993, p. 58.

2 Although Butterfield described what came to be widely recognised as a security dilemma, he did not employ the term itself. Rather, he called it the 'ultimate predicament' and the 'irreducible dilemma'. See H. Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951).

3 See J. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951); *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

4 C. Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, p. 171. Emphasis added.

5 J. Snyder and R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', in B. Walter and J. Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 15.

6 See S. J. Kaufman, 'An "International" Theory of Inter-Ethnic War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1996, pp. 149–72.

7 B. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 43.

8 See K. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 422–31.

9 Glaser, p. 191.

10 J. Snyder and R. Jervis, p. 19.

11 Ibid., p. 20.

12 For a rationalist approach, see V. P. Gagnon, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/1995, pp. 130–66. For a Constructivist account, see B. Arfi, 'Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 1998, pp. 151–203.

13 O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993). Hereafter referred to as *Identity, Migration*.

14 B. Buzan, 'The Changing Security Agenda in Europe', in ibid., p. 2. Emphasis added.

15 B. Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', in *Identity, Migration*, p. 46.

16 T. Gallagher, 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996', *Balkanologie*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1997', p. 87.

17 Ibid., p. 85.
18 Although Croatia became independent of Austria–Hungary following the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, unlike Hungary it did not form a state of its own. Instead, Croatia became part of the newly created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – later Yugoslavia. For its part, prior to being absorbed into the Ottoman (early sixteenth century) and Habsburg (late seventeenth century) empires, for the preceding 500 years Hungary had been a sovereign kingdom.

1 The security dilemma

1 N. J. Wheeler and K. Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in J. Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 29.
2 B. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 28.
3 R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 64.
4 N. J. Wheeler and K. Booth, p. 30.
5 E. Melander, *Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy* (Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999), p. 22. Emphasis added.
6 H. Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951), p. 21.
7 While continuing to share much in common with Butterfield's work, in *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), Herz came to disagree with Butterfield's assertion that the security dilemma lies at the heart of all conflicts, using the example of Nazi Germany's policy of conquest and expansion during the Second World War. See A. Collins, *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 5.
8 J. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), pp. 3–4. While acknowledging the existence of a security dilemma at the individual level, Herz was also keen to distance himself somewhat from classical Realism's often more deterministic view of human nature: 'Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a social one. This *homo homini lupus* situation does not preclude social cooperation as another fundamental fact of social life. But even cooperation and solidarity tend to become elements in the conflict situation, part of their function being the consolidation and the strengthening of particular groups in their competition with other groups.' J. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, Vol. 2, 1950, p. 157. In other words, for Herz the core of the security dilemma was not to be located in the inherent greed of human beings, but in the structure itself of social relations, whether it be between individuals or groups.
9 B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 294–5.
10 B. Posen, p. 28.
11 I am grateful to Robert Jervis for reminding me of this.
12 C. Glaser, 'The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral Models', *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1, July 1992, p. 515.
13 Ibid., pp. 515–16.
14 Ibid., p. 516.

15 See, for example, P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); K. R. Krause (ed.), *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

16 A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 397.

17 Ibid., p. 405.

18 A. L. Wendt's assertion that actors do not bring anything with them to a first encounter is contested by some, however. For instance, Roxanne Lynn Doty writes that Wendt's approach 'belies the empirical evidence that exists from many historical "first encounters", in which there existed no systematic basis for making judgements regarding "others", but in which judgements and presumptions were nonetheless made. . . . First encounters always tend to take place in a context wherein traces or prior meanings and representations are already taking place and become interwoven with new experiences. In an important sense, first encounters have always already happened.' R. L. Doty, 'A Critical Exploration of the Agent–Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 381–2.

19 A. Wendt, p. 407.

20 A. Collins, 'An Intrastate Security Dilemma?', University of Wales, Aberystwyth, unpublished paper, 1996, p. 4.

21 R. Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', in R. K. Betts (ed.), *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1994), p. 315.

22 S. Van Evera, 'Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War', *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 58–9.

23 Snyder, quoted in S. D. Sagan, '1914 Revisited', in R. K. Betts (ed.), *Conflict After the Cold War*, p. 335.

24 Snyder, quoted in ibid., p. 336.

25 B. Buzan and E. Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 83.

26 Ibid., p. 87.

27 Ibid., p. 101.

28 E. Melander, p. 21.

29 Ibid., pp. 21–2. Melander does not, however, claim that his use of the term 'first-strike advantage' always necessarily equates to pre-emptive strike. This is because, for him, first-strike advantage might also include troop mobilisation or acquiring a new weapon system.

30 B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 295.

31 Quoted in A. Collins, *The Security Dilemma and its Mitigation: The Case of the Cold War and the Gorbachev Era* (University of Wales, Aberystwyth: PhD thesis, 1995), p. 18.

32 R. Lieber, *No Common Power: Understanding International Relations* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 5–6.

33 See J. Huysmans, *Making/Unmaking European Disorder: Meta-Theoretical, Theoretical and Empirical Questions of Military Stability After the Cold War* (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit, 1996), p. 39.

34 R. Jervis, 'Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation', *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1992, p. 317. Emphasis added.

35 H. Butterfield, pp. 19–20.

36 Ibid., pp. 9–36.

37 J. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, p. 241. Emphasis added.

38 For an initial, tentative outlining of this threefold categorisation, see P. Roe 'Actors' Responsibility in "Tight", "Regular", and "Loose" Security Dilemmas', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 103–16.

39 K. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 429–30.

40 H. Butterfield, pp. 14, 15.

41 Ibid., p. 10.

42 R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 80.

43 Ibid., p. 74.

44 A. Collins, 'An Intrastate Security Dilemma?', p. 5.

45 R. L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1996, p. 117.

46 R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 75.

47 C. Glaser, p. 501.

48 Ibid., pp. 503–5.

49 Ibid., p. 504.

50 J. W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 2000/01, p. 145.

51 Ibid., p. 128.

52 Ibid., p. 129.

53 R. L. Schweller, p. 117. Emphasis added.

54 J. W. Taliaferro, p. 144.

55 Ibid., pp. 144–5.

56 Ibid., pp. 147–8.

57 R. Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', p. 315.

58 Ibid., p. 316. To a certain degree, Jervis' position rests on a particular definition of a 'status quo power'. The implication of his argument is that some acts of aggression do not produce a change in the status quo and, therefore, those states engaged in them cannot really be seen as revisionist. In terms of an actual shift in the overall balance of power, this may well be so. But for the security dilemma, I would argue, this does not matter so much: whether driven by considerations of power or security, an aggressor is still an aggressor.

59 C. Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford: OUP, 1981), p. 24.

60 J. Snyder, 'Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', in R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow, and J. G. Stein (eds), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 165.

61 Collins, for example, differentiates between those states whose security requires the acquisition of territory from another (expansionism) and those whose aggression manifests itself as the wish to merely dominate others (hegemony). A. Collins, *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

62 J. Snyder, p. 155. Emphasis added.

63 R. Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', p. 316.

64 C. Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, p. 190.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., p. 191.

67 J. Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, 'Evaluating Realist Explanations of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia', *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Spring 2001, p. 199.

68 Ibid., p. 200.

68 J. Snyder and R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', in B. F. Walter and J. Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 19.

69 Ibid., p. 20.
70 Quoted in K. W. Thompson, *Cold War Theories, Volume I: World Polarization, 1943–1953* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1981), p. 12. This is qualified, however, by his subsequent assertion that 'this situation may never exist in its purity'.
71 See R. Jervis 'Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 58–9.

2 The 'ethnic' security dilemma and the former Yugoslavia

1 B. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 27–47.
2 K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
3 S. J. Kaufman, 'An "International" Theory of Inter-ethnic War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1996, p. 149.
4 Ibid., p. 153.
5 Ibid.
6 Quoted in M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: OUP, 1997), p. 6.
7 Quoted in D. Campbell, 'MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1998, p. 269.
8 D. Doder, 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 5, 10.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 42.
11 F. Bieber, 'The Conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a "Fault Line War"? Testing the Validity of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" ', *Balkanologie*, Vol. 3, No. 1, September 1999, p. 33.
12 For an excellent critique of Huntington and other civilizational explanations, see L. Hansen, 'Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the "Third" Balkan War', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2000, pp. 345–62.
13 S. Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/91, cited in S. J. Kaufman, p. 154.
14 S. J. Kaufman, pp. 154–5.
15 V. P. Gagnon, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', in M. Brown *et al.* (eds), *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 137.
16 R. Hislope, 'Intra-Ethnic Flanking in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy', *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, January 1997, pp. 471–94.
17 Gagnon, pp. 137–8.
18 For a critique of Gagnon and other rationalist explanations, see, for example, B. Arfi, 'Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 1998, pp. 151–203; J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, 'Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity', *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, pp. 845–77.
19 J. D. Fearon, 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflicts', in D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 108.
20 Ibid., p. 109.
21 Ibid., p. 116.
22 Ibid., p. 117.

23 C. Kaufman, pp. 169–71.
24 M. Posen, p. 27.
25 Ibid., p. 29.
26 Ibid., p. 31.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 32.
29 Ibid.
30 Given the presence of 'ethnic islands' and their associated first-strike incentives, Chaim Kaufman has provocatively advocated ethnic partition as a means to end such conflicts. This is because, in physically separating the members of the parties to the conflict, territorially defensible identities are created which, if not negating the security dilemma completely, certainly mitigates it by reducing first-strike incentives. See C. Kaufman, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136–75; 'Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't', *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 62–100.
31 M. Posen, p. 34.
32 Ibid., pp. 34–5.
33 Ibid., p. 36.
34 Posen talks of the Serbs and Croats having a 'terrifying oral history of each other's behaviour'; in particular, referring to the 1941–1945 Civil War period. This, combined with Slobodan Milosevic's (apparent) Greater Serbia nationalism and Franjo Tudjman's provocative Ustasha-type symbolism, contrived to produce feelings of great danger within each group. Ibid., p. 36.
35 Ibid., p. 37.
36 C. Kaufman, p. 151.
37 Ibid., p. 162.
38 Ibid., p. 151. Emphasis added.
39 Ibid., p. 157.
40 Ibid., p. 158. Emphasis added.
41 C. Kaufman, 'Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall 1996, p. 109.
42 C. Kaufman, 'An "International" Theory of Inter-ethnic War', p. 160.
43 Ibid., p. 161.
44 Ibid., p. 162.
45 R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75.
46 C. Kaufman, 'An "International" Theory of Inter-ethnic War', p. 158.
47 E. Melander, *Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy* (Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999), p. 120.
48 Ibid., p. 179.
49 Ibid., p. 137.
50 Although for convenience's sake the conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina can be regarded at times as a three-way fight between Serbs, Croats and Muslim forces, a relative minority of Serbs and Croats did join alongside their Muslim neighbours in supporting the position of the Bosnian government.
51 Between November 1991 and January 1992, the Bosnian Croats established three such 'Croatian communities': of the Bosnian Sava Valley (12 November), Herceg-Bosna (18 November) and Middle Bosnia (27 January). Melander, p. 161.
52 By agreeing to a temporary cessation of hostilities, the Bosnian Serbs would gain by having to face only one enemy at a time, thus increasing significantly their chances of a swift victory over the Bosnian Muslims. The advantage for the

Bosnian Croats would be the prospect of no Serbian interference in their attempt to create Croatian autonomous regions.

53 E. Melander, p. 144.
54 M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 149.
55 L. Silber and A. Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 144.
56 E. Melander, p. 162.
57 S. L. Woodward, 'Bosnia and Hercegovina: How Not to End Civil War', in B. F. Walter and J. Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 74.
58 Ibid., p. 89.
59 Ibid., p. 97.
60 B. F. Walter, 'Designing Transitions from Civil War', in ibid., pp. 38–72.
61 S. L. Woodward, pp. 98–9.
62 Ibid., p. 101.
63 Ibid., p. 86.
64 M. Posen, p. 27.
65 S. L. Woodward, pp. 80–1.
66 C. Kaufman, 'An "International" Theory of Inter-ethnic War', p. 151.
67 Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil, 'Revisiting the "National": Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism', in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds), *The Return of Culture in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 109.
68 Ibid., p. 113.
69 M. Posen, p. 29.
70 M. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 16. Emphasis added.
71 E. Melander, p. 231.
72 Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil, p. 115.
73 A. Hyde-Price, 'Reflections on Security and Identity in Europe', in Hyde-Price and L.Aggestam (eds), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 23.
74 Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil, pp. 116–17.
75 Ibid., p. 117.

3 Societal security

1 M. C. Williams, 'Identity and the Politics of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, p. 204.
2 Hereafter, in the text the book will be referred to simply as *Identity, Migration*, and the authors as Waever *et al.*
3 See R. Lipshutz, 'On Security', in R. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 5.
4 See J. Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 1989, pp. 162–77.
5 See K. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1991, pp. 313–26.
6 B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 122–3.
7 B. Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible?', in K. Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 35.
8 Ibid. Buzan did go on to argue, though, that insecurities 'seldom, if ever, arise, without being driven by more fundamental insecurities in other dimensions' (ibid., p. 37). In other words, military confrontation will often arise, and be sustained by political, economic, societal and/or environmental insecurities.

9 While the Buzanian project was essentially concerned with 'widening' the security agenda, what came to be known as 'Critical Security Studies' placed a second emphasis on 'deepening' it as well. See, for example, K. Krause and M. C. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997).

10 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', in O. Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration*, pp. 24–5.

11 Ibid., p. 25.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

13 O. Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, p. 67.

14 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 24.

15 Ibid., p. 17.

16 M. Albert, 'Security as a Boundary Function: Changing Identities and "Securitization" in World Politics', Paper for ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, Canada, 18–23 March 1997, p. 7.

17 A. Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*. Vol. II of *Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 163; cited in O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 19.

18 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 19. Emphasis added.

19 O. Waever, 'Insecurity and Identity Unlimited', *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute* (*COPRI*), Working Paper No. 14, 1994, p. 8.

20 Durkheim conceived of what he called the 'social fact'; where the social is 'a collective phenomenon that constrains and organizes social behaviour and which can be studied in itself without reference to individual psychology'. J. Friedman, *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (London: Sage, 1994), p. 67.

21 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 19.

22 M. Weber, 'The Nation', in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: OUP, 1994), p. 25.

23 H. Lindholm, 'Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion', in H. Lindholm (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Gothenberg: Nordnes, 1993), p. 2.

24 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 121.

25 H. Lindholm, p. 8.

26 Ibid., p. 16. However, many groups that may well be identified as 'nations' today are far from achieving the goal of statehood. Indeed, many such groups harbour no particularly strong desires for it (such as the Welsh and, up until quite recently at least, the Montenegrins). This simply serves to highlight the often-acute terminological/definitional problems associated with nationality and ethnicity.

27 A. D. Smith, 'The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 48–62.

28 Benedict Anderson describes nations as 'imagined communities' because all the members of the group can by no means know each other. Their attachments and commonalities, therefore, have to be imagined. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

29 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 22. Waever points out that while religious identities display many of the same qualities as ethno-national ones, religion is often at a political disadvantage to nationalism as the idea of nation is often more closely linked to the process of government. Notable exceptions to this would be states such as Iran and Afghanistan governed by the rule of Islamic law.

30 Ibid., p. 23.

31 M. C. Williams, 'Modernity, Identity, and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1998, p. 435.

32 B. McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1996, p. 83.

33 Ibid., pp. 82–3.

34 Ibid., p. 85.

35 J. Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1998, p. 489.

36 B. Buzan and O. Waever, 'Slippery, Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 242–3.

37 It is important to keep in mind, though, that ethno-national identities and the like are internally contested. Certain agents/bodies within the group itself struggle with each other in order to produce a version of identity that will be adhered to. Put in more complex terms: identity construction is marked by a battle to create a hegemonic identity discourse, one which facilitates the capture/maintenance of legitimacy and therefore power.

38 H. Wiberg, 'Divided Nations and Divided States as a Security Problem', *COPRI*, Working Paper No. 14, 1992, p. 15.

39 Ibid.

40 B. Hettne, 'Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict', in H. Lindholm (ed.), p. 72.

41 H. Lindholm, pp. 10–11.

42 Ibid., p. 15.

43 B. Hettne, p. 72.

44 O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p. 23. Emphasis added.

45 B. Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', in O. Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration*, p. 43.

46 Ibid. Threats to societal security may not derive only from forbidding something, but also from allowing it. Forbidding something often equates to threats from majority groups (in most cases, the state) to minority groups. By contrast, allowing something can pose a danger to the identity of the majority group instead: granting minority rights, for instance, could threaten the desired homogeneity of the state. For example, at the time of writing, the Slovak National Party is seeking to prevent both cultural and political autonomy for those ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia: it is fervently against allowing both the creation of a state university offering Hungarian-language instruction and a separate Hungarian administrative district in the Komarno region of south-west Slovakia.

47 Ibid.

48 R. Fisk, 'Waging War on History', *The Independent*, 20 June 1990.

49 Quoted in ibid.

50 Quoted in ibid. In much the same way, Ted Robert Gurr also distinguishes between genocide and culturecide: 'In extreme circumstances, systematic discrimination threatens communal groups' most fundamental right, the right to survival. Many groups also face cultural discrimination and the risk of deculturation or so-called cultural genocide in the form of pressures or incentives to adopt a dominant culture, or denial of cultural self-expression'. T. R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 6.

51 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, p. 121.

52 B. Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', p. 46.

53 Ibid., pp. 46–7.

54 Ibid., p. 48.

55 Ibid., pp. 51–5.

56 Ibid., p. 56.

57 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, p. 122.
58 B. Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', pp. 56–7.
59 M. Kelstrup, 'Societal Aspects of European Security', in B. Hansen (ed.), *European Security 2000* (Copenhagen: Political Studies Press, 1995), p. 187.
60 B. McSweeney, p. 84.
61 Ibid., p. 85.
62 M. Pearton, 'Notions in Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, p. 6.
63 M. Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), p. 218.
64 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, draft manuscript for *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, *COPRI*, 1995, p. 46.
65 J. Huysmans, p. 65.
66 Ibid., p. 492.
67 O. Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p. 55.
68 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, p. 23.
69 Ibid., p. 24.
70 Ibid., p. 25.
71 R. L. Doty, 'Immigration and the Politics of Security', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2–3, Winter 1998/Spring 1999, p. 80.
72 Ibid., p. 79. Emphasis added.
73 J. Huysmans, p. 493.
74 J. Eriksson, 'Observers or Advocates? On the Role of the Security Analysts', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1999, p. 314.
75 A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 151.
76 B. Buzan and O. Waever, p. 242.
77 Ibid.

4 The societal security dilemma

1 Milan Kundera, quoted in K. Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 1.
2 B. Buzan 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', in O. Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 46.
3 Ibid.
4 O. Waever *et al.*, 'Societal Security and European Security', in *Identity, Migration*, p. 190.
5 Intra-state conflicts may be of three types: regional, ethnic and political. If group loyalty is expressed in mainly regional terms, the primary security concern will usually be defined in terms of territory. If regional loyalties coincide with ethnic ones, however, a further concern, namely identity, will also have to be taken into account. However, if group loyalty carries no clearly defined regional element with it, identity, much more than territorial integrity, will arguably constitute the fundamental security concern. Moreover, political conflicts often contain a strong ethnic element; this is the case when political parties define themselves along ethnic lines in order to secure a readily available power base. I would like to thank Haakan Wiberg for suggesting these particular categories.
6 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 168.
7 Ibid., p. 169.

8 Some intra-state societies will have associated terrorist organisations (the Basques and ETA). However, terrorist organisations do not safeguard identity through the actual defence of territory, but seek more to strike at government and the majority population in order to extract concessions from the state.

9 R. Hayden, 'Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1996, p. 784.

10 O. Waever *et al.*, p. 191.

11 O. Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 68.

12 J. Hutchinson, 'Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration', in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: OUP, 1994), p. 124.

13 Ibid.

14 P. Alter, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), p. 12.

15 O. Waever, 'Insecurity and Identity Unlimited', *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)*, Working Paper No. 14, 1994, p. 20.

16 Ibid., p. 22.

17 M. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 64.

18 O. Waever, 'Insecurity and Identity Unlimited', p. 19.

19 This type of logic is nonetheless ultimately self-defeating; by getting rid of the Other, one would also be detracting from one's self. If we are dependent on the other for our own sense of identity, then extinguishing this Other will inevitably mean depriving ourselves of something that (partly) constitutes us. See ibid.

21 K. Verdery, 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 52, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 201.

21 Quoted in S. Basic-Hrvatin, 'Television and National/Public Memory', in J. Gow, R. Paterson and A. Preston (eds), *Bosnia by Television* (London: British Films Institute, 1996), p. 66.

22 R. L. Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North–South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 122.

23 D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: MUP, 1992).

24 M. J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 43.

25 Ibid., p. 44.

26 Ibid., p. 45.

27 Ibid.

28 See, for example, J. Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of "Securitizing" Societal Issues', in R. Miles and D. Tharnhardt (eds), *Migration and European Security: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 53–72; 'The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism', *Millennium*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1998, pp. 569–89.

29 K. Pratt Ewing, 'The Violence of Non-Recognition: Becoming a "Conscious" Muslim Woman in Turkey', in A. Robben and M. Suarez-Orozco (eds), *Cultures Under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 250.

30 K. Sengupta, 'No Compromise, No Shame, No Surrender', *The Independent*, 5 July 1998.

31 Ibid.

32 M. Ignatieff, p. 169.

33 This revived a 200-year old Loyalist slogan: 'Croppies were uppity Catholics who took part in the 1798 rebellion against the English. Some of the rebels had cropped their hair in the French revolutionary manner. That rising was partly put down

by the Orange [Order]. . . .' D. McKittrick, 'Why Hardliners Need a Drumcree Showdown', *The Independent*, 12 July 1998.

34 For a brief analysis of identity insecurities in Northern Ireland, see Bill McSweeney, 'Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1996, pp. 167–78.

35 K. Ewing, p. 250.

36 Ibid., pp. 250–1.

37 S. Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1994', pp. 28–9.

38 M. Ignatieff, pp. 5–6.

39 J. Hutchinson, p. 127.

40 H. Lindholm, 'Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion', in Lindholm (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Gothenberg: Nordnes, 1993), p. 24.

41 Quoted in ibid., p. 5. In this particular instance, Smith's remarks were more directed towards the most common theoretical distinction between nationalisms, between ethnic nationalism and 'civic nationalism'. On the one hand, civic nationalism maintains that the nation should contain all those, regardless of language, ethnicity, religion, and so on, who are willing to live by the nation's codes and rules. Civic nationalism envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens. It is necessarily democratic as sovereignty lies in all the people. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, claims that an individual's attachments are inherited, not chosen. The national community defines the individual; the individual does not define the community.

42 J. Hutchinson, p. 125.

43 Ibid.

44 D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall 1996, p. 51.

45 B. L. Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World, in B. L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 12.

46 Ibid., p. 18.

47 Ibid., p. 20.

48 Quoted in ibid., p. 29.

49 J. S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 208.

50 J. Glenn, 'The Interregnum: The South's Insecurity Dilemma', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1997, p. 46.

51 S. Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', p. 10.

52 Ibid., p. 14.

53 Ibid., pp. 15–33.

54 S. J. Kaufman, 'Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War', *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall 1996, p. 112. See also S. J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Chapter 5, 'Elite Conspiracy in Moldova's Civil War.

55 Ibid., p. 113.

56 Ibid., p. 124.

57 S. J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds*, p. 147.

58 B. Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation, p. 43.

59 S. J. Kaufman, 'Spiraling to Ethnic War', p. 116.

60 S. J. Kaufman, 'An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 163–4.

61 S. J. Kaufman, Spiraling to Ethnic War', p. 116.

62 State security requirements are, of course, more complex than this. A nuclear missile strike, for example, is for sure an extreme threat, but without violating territorial integrity in the same strict sense as a conventional armed invasion.

5 Serbs and Croats

1 S. P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 1.

2 Dobrica Cosic, quoted in L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 1.

3 The Yugoslav state was created, at least on paper, by the signing of the Corfu Accord on 20 July 1917. The Accord stated that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 'will be a free and independent kingdom of united territory and unity of citizenship. . . . Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shall enjoy absolutely equal rights in the whole territory of the kingdom.' R. G. D. Laffan, *The Serbs: Guardians of the Gate* (New York: Dorset Press, 1989), p. 266.

4 Serbs together with Montenegrins constituted 42 per cent of the population of Royal Yugoslavia, Croats 23 per cent, Slovenes 8 per cent, Macedonians 5 per cent, the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandzak 5 per cent, and Albanians 4 per cent.

5 Upon entering Royal Yugoslavia, 46.7 per cent of the population were Eastern Orthodox, 39.3 per cent Roman Catholic, and 11.2 per cent Muslim.

6 During the half-century prior to the Battle of Kosovo, the Kingdom of Serbia had reached the peak of its power. After Dusan came to the throne in 1331, Serbia expanded to incorporate much of Byzantine Macedonia (1343), and by 1348 Dusan was in control of much of Albania, Epirus and Thessaly. However, following his death in 1355, Dusan's empire slowly began to disintegrate. Over the coming decades the Turks succeeded in reconquering Serbian territory.

7 H. W. V. Temperley, *History of Serbia* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1919), pp. 102–3.

8 R. G. D. Laffan, p. 23; H. Wiberg, 'Divided Nations and Divided States as a Security Problem: The Case of Yugoslavia', *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)*, Working Paper No. 14, 1992, pp. 17–18.

9 Serbia was not brought under full Turkish control until 1459, with the fall of Smederevo. In 1521, Belgrade also fell to the Ottoman forces under Suleiman the Great. The Austrians wrested control of the city from the Turks in 1688. Two years later, the Turks retook it. And, in 1717, the Austrians wrested Belgrade back again. Finally, in 1739 the Austrians signed an agreement with the Ottomans giving them control once more. It was in this period, 1717–39, when much of northern Serbia was under Habsburg rule, that many Serbs crossed the Danube from Turkish-controlled to Austrian-controlled territory. However, even before this in the fifteenth century many Serbs had begun to emigrate from their homeland in order to escape poverty. A large number of them went to the Dalmatian coast or to southern Hungary (much of what is now Vojvodina). It was only after 1804 that the Serbs, under Karadjordjevic, slowly began to regain some of their lost independence, taking Belgrade themselves in 1806 (before losing it again in the failed 1813 revolt).

10 M. Heppell and F. B. Singleton, *Yugoslavia* (London: Ernest Benn, 1961), p. 112.

11 H. W. V. Temperley, p. 14.

12 M. Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia* (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 255.

13 R. West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Jugoslavia in 1937* (London: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 52–4.

14 H. W. V. Temperley, pp. 6–7.

15 R. G. D. Laffan, p. 90.
16 J. R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: There Was Twice a Country* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p. 44.
17 Starcevic's aim of a Greater Croatia was based on the notion that Croatia had the right to reconstitute the state in its historic lands. Behind this was a theory of state continuity from the Triune Kingdom. As Mark Thompson explains: 'Because the Croats had agreed on union with Hungary in 1102, transferring the throne legally to the Magyar king, they had not been defeated or annexed; their link with Hungary was contractual, and Croatian sovereignty was compromised but intact'. M. Thompson, p. 256.
18 R. Lukic and A. Lynch, *Europe From the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (SIPRI: OUP, 1996), p. 59.
19 M. Heppell and F. B. Singleton, p. 127.
20 Ibid., p. 128.
21 R. G. D. Laffan, p. 111.
22 Quoted in M. Heppell and F. B. Singleton, p. 132.
23 S. K. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918–88* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988), p. 1.
24 M. Thompson, p. 2.
25 M. Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994), p. 116.
26 Quoted in R. Lukic and A. Lynch, p. 62.
27 By 1941, for example, the Yugoslav army had just two Croat generals, compared with 161 Serb generals. Likewise, in the diplomatic service, out of 145 senior diplomats in 1934, Serbs provided 123 while Croats filled only 21 places. In the judiciary, only just over a quarter of the judges were Croats. Almond, p. 128.
28 Quoted in R. Lukic and A. Lynch, p. 62.
29 P. Shoup, quoted in ibid., pp. 63–4.
30 D. Doder, 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 10. Emphasis added.
31 M. Almond, p. 123.
32 The 33 provinces under parliamentary government were replaced by nine regional units (*banovine*), with their names taken from the country's rivers: Varda, Morava, Zeta, Drina, Danube, Littoral, Vrbas, Sava, and Drava. Belgrade became an administrative unit in its own right.
33 There are many views as to who planned and carried out Alexander's assassination. It is likely, though, that the king was killed by a coalition group comprised mainly of Croat and Macedonian separatists, with backing for the group coming from Italy: 'Mussolini believed that with the King's death the country would fall to pieces and would be an easy prey to a foreign invader'. West, p. 19.
34 M. Almond, p. 130. The *Sporazumen* gave Croatia control over all administrative matters except the military, trade and foreign affairs. Macek also became Yugoslavia's vice-premier.
35 Prince Paul had agreed to Yugoslavia acceding to the Tripartite Pact on the provision that the country's territorial integrity would be respected. However, in a military coup of 27 March 1941, and seemingly driven by opposition to the Pact, Paul was deposed by General Dusan Simovic. Curiously though, Simovic subsequently maintained his agreement to the Pact. (It is said that Simovic hoped that the Nazis would allow a Serbian *banovina* similar to that of the 1939 Croatian one.) For Hitler, however, this was all too late. Angered by Serbia's apparent duplicity, he ordered the invasion. Simovic's post as Prime Minister was taken by General Milan Nedic. T. Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 114–15.

36 The Ustashe had not even been the Nazis' first choice to take control in Croatia. Before the invasion, they first approached Macek. Macek, turned the Nazis down. Pavelic, however, was more than ready to accept.

37 P. Lendvai, 'Yugoslavia Without the Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis', *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1991, p. 254.

38 N. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 175.

39 This slogan was borrowed from a speech made by Pavelic's Education Minister, Mile Budak, on 22 June 1941 in the Krajina describing the nature of Ustashe practices.

40 M. Almond, p. 136.

41 Quoted in ibid., p. 137.

42 J. R. Lampe, p. 205.

43 M. Almond, p. 137.

44 R. Fisk, 'Croat Death Camp Gives Hate a New Twist', *The Independent*, 20 June 1994.

45 Many Serbs in Bosnia also turned against the Muslims there as well as the Croats. They regarded Muslim acquiescence to the Ustashe's rule as tantamount to collaboration. Indeed, politically the Bosnian Muslims were far more aligned with Zagreb than they ever were with Belgrade. In April 1941, Pavelic assured religious freedoms for them. Dzafer Kulenovic, a member of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, was even appointed as vice-president on the NDH in November 1941 (although he fervently denied being an Ustashe supporter). Nevertheless, although there was never a pogrom against the Bosnian Muslims, their rights were never respected by the Ustashe and they became more and more opposed to the Pavelic regime. But Serb hostilities against them made it difficult for the Muslims to join actively in resisting the NDH. On the contrary, many Muslims joined the Ustashe instead. N. Malcolm, pp. 184–8.

46 D. Doder, p. 10. Emphasis added.

47 N. Malcolm, p. 184.

48 N. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing* (Texas: A&M University Press, 1995), p. 9. These figures represent the overall number of deaths, including those Croats killed by fellow Croats and those Serbs killed by fellow Serbs, as well as those who were killed by their German and Italian occupiers.

49 According to the 1981 census, Bosnia-Hercegovina contained some 1,321,000 Serbs, compared with 758,000 Croats.

50 W. H. Critchley, 'The Failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia', *International Journal*, Vol. 48, Summer 1993, p. 442.

51 M. Thompson, pp. 296–7.

52 M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 148.

53 Quoted in L. J. Cohen, p. 29.

54 I. Lederer, quoted in S. I. Griffiths, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security* (SIPRI: OUP, 1993), p. 38. Census figures show that the category 'Yugoslav' was never more than 10 per cent. Between 1971 and 1981, the percentage of Yugoslavs increased from 1.3 per cent to 5.4 per cent. But from 1981 to 1991, the figure dropped once more to 3.0 per cent. Generally speaking, though, care should be taken when analysing such figures. The criteria for calling oneself a Yugoslav tended to change from one period of time to another. For example, up until recognition of their status as a constituent nation in 1961, the Bosnian Muslims were given the choice of identifying themselves as Serbs, Croats, or Yugoslavs. The vast majority chose Yugoslav.

55 S. K. Pavlowitch, p. 73.

56 L. J. Cohen, p. 30.
57 H. Wiberg, p. 16.
58 H. Wiberg, 'Former Yugoslavia: Nations Above All', in B. Goralczyk, W. Kostecki and K. Zukrowska (eds), *In Pursuit of Europe: Transformations in Post-Communist States 1989–1994* (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995), p. 94.
59 I. H. Daalder, 'Fear and Loathing in the former Yugoslavia', in M. E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 42.
60 W. H. Critchley, p. 443.
61 H. Wiberg, 'Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia', in O. Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 106.
62 N. Cigar, 'The Serbo–Croatian War, 1991', in S. G. Mestrovic (ed.), *Genocide After Emotion* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 55.
63 L. Silber and A. Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 30.
64 Quoted in N. Cigar, 'The Serbo–Croatian War, 1991', p. 55.
65 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 30.
66 Ibid., p. 31.
67 Ibid., p. 33.
68 Other arguments were more specifically concerned with state, rather than societal, security, although the two clearly overlap: the violation of territorial integrity and the possibility that the Kosovar Albanians may then join with Albania proper. The main point, though, was constitutional: Kosovo could not secede as only 'constituent nations' and not 'nationalities' were allowed to do so.
69 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 37.
70 Ibid.
71 A. Djilas, 'A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 87.
72 N. Malcolm, p. 213.
73 Quoted in L. Silber and A. Little, p. 89.
74 H. Wiberg, 'Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia', p. 106.
75 Ibid.

6 Krajina and the societal security dilemma

1 S. K. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918–88* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1988), p. 77.
2 Throughout this chapter, the Krajina Serbs are referred to interchangeably as Croatia's 'Serb(ian) community', 'Serb(ian) inhabitants', 'Serb(ian) population'. Moreover, the terms 'Serbs' and 'Serbians' are also used synonymously with Krajina Serbs. Where these refer to Yugoslavia's Serbian population in general, this will be indicated.
3 Out of 356 seats in the Sabor, the HDZ won 205 outright, and gained a further four in coalition with other parties, this despite having received just 40–43 per cent of the total vote.
4 The majority of Serb politicians, however, preferred to challenge Tudjman through the reformed Croatian League of Communists, re-named for the election the Party of Democratic Change.
5 In July 1989, Serbs in Knin demonstrated in support of the Kosovo Serbs. Their provocative use of ethnic rhetoric sparked a major confrontation between local Serb leaders and the nationally sensitive Communist government in Zagreb. See L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 130.

6 Some Serb politicians in Croatia accused Tudjman of staging the incident. Veljko Djuric, a founder member of the SDS, claimed that his party had presented evidence to the Zagreb and Split media proving their lack of involvement in the incident. But, as Djuric commented: '[T]hey turned their backs on us. . . . My feeling is that the Benkovacs incident was a pure provocation by the Croats.' Quoted in M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Goes to the Polls', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, 4 May 1990, p. 36.

7 R. Hislope, 'Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy', *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, p. 476.

8 Z. Sabol, *Croatian Parliament* (Zagreb: Zrinski Cakovec, 1994), pp. 123–4. Emphasis added.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 126.

11 In one such meeting, Tudjman is said to have offered Raskovic the position of Deputy Prime Minister. Raskovic declined. Some suggest that the SDS leader simply had no desire to enter government at that time. Others contend that Raskovic was pressured by Belgrade to decline the offer.

12 Quoted in L. Silber and A. Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 103.

13 The Mlinar Affair carried with it a great deal of intimidating symbolism, which was used instrumentally to increase the perception of threat. The words and images associated with the attack on Mlinar, 'knife', 'darkness', 'crimes', ('slit') 'throat', were portrayed as representing the true character of the new Croatia. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the image of the knife in particular was utilised; during the 1941–45 Civil War, the knife had been the favourite weapon of the Ustashe and its mention alone was enough to instill fear.

14 S. Letica, 'The Genesis of the Current Balkan War', in S. G. Mestrovics (ed.), *Genocide After Emotion* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 95.

15 See L. J. Cohen, p. 132.

16 Jovic told the Serbian leadership in Croatia that in his current role of Federal President he would be unable to help them in any 'official' capacity. He instead directed them to Slobodan Milosevic who, Jovic assured them, would be able to offer assistance.

17 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 106.

18 M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, 14 September 1990, pp. 42–3.

19 According to the rules of the referendum, the following categories of people were entitled to vote: every Serb over the age of 18 either a resident in Croatia, born on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, or holding Croatian citizenship but living outside of the republic.

20 The Zagreb daily newspaper *Vjesnik* wryly noted a speech by the Mayor of Obravac, Sergei Veselinovic, who declared that there had been a 100 per cent turnout for the referendum in the town itself, where 125 per cent of the voters had favoured autonomy. See M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)', p. 43.

21 Quoted in L. Silber and A. Little, p. 135.

22 L. J. Cohen, p. 132.

23 R. Hislope, p. 475.

24 Ibid.

25 M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Goes to the Polls', p. 36.

26 D. Doder, 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 18.

27 Quoted in R. Hayden, 'Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 663.

28 Quoted in ibid., p. 671.

29 Ibid., p. 672.

30 Essentially, there were three different visions of an independent Croatia: the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia; the Banovina Hrvatska (the Croatia created by the 1939 *Sporazumen*); and the NDH (the 1941–45 Pavelic state). The NDH vision represented the extreme nationalist view, one held by Dobroslav Paraga's *Hrvatska Stranka Prava* (HSP), or 'Croatian Party of [State] Right'. The Yugoslav Republic of Croatia vision was the least Tudjman could ask for and still get away with it; anything less would have cost him the presidency, given the degree of Croat nationalist sentiment.

31 Quoted in M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 14.

32 Ibid., p. 2.

33 H. Wiberg, 'Divided Nations and Divided States as a Security Problem: The Case of Yugoslavia', *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)*, Working Paper No. 14, 1992, p. 17.

34 M. Glenny, p. 12.

35 Ibid., p. 3.

36 The Krajina Serbs were indeed quite a different proposition to those living in the major cities, who rural Serbs often refer to as *Hrbi*: a mix of *Hrvati* (Croats) and *Srbi* (Serbs). Because Serbs were initially settled in Krajina as fighters, they are said to have always had a close attachment to weaponry. Children are taught to handle weapons at an early age, and a person's standing is enhanced by his or her ability with a gun. 'One piece of folklore tells us how every house in Krajina has three defenders. The first is a snake which lives in the roof of the house . . . the second is a houseleek, a plant which grows on and around the house and is colloquially known throughout Serbia as the guardian of the home (*cuvarkuca*), and the third is the gun of the house. . . . The Krajisnici, as people from Krajina are called, say that a gun was born with this land and will never disappear.' Ibid., pp. 6–7.

37 M. Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994), p. 216.

38 L. J. Cohen, p. 131.

39 M. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 23.

40 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 92.

41 Slaven Letica points out that the key Ustashe symbol, the letter U, was absent from Croatisation, and that most symbols – such as the flag, coat of arms and national anthem, *Lijepa Nasa* ('Beautiful Our Homeland') – are merely traditional expressions of Croatian statehood that date back long before the NDH. S. Letica, p. 111.

42 Many Serbs in Zagreb did see the HDZ's symbolism as threatening. These, however, were mostly Serbs from Serbia proper who had moved to Croatia's major cities after the Second World War in search of work.

43 Quoted in L. Silber and A. Little, p. 98.

44 Ibid., p. 99.

45 M. Glenny, p. 3.

46 Quoted in L. Silber and A. Little, p. 106.

47 M. Glenny, p. 3.

48 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

49 Quoted in Cohen, p. 130.

50 Ibid., p. 132.

51 M. Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia* (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 260.

52 M. Glenny, p. 5. This was only the case until 1870, where Slavonia, Dalmatia and Croatia were divided into civil and military districts. The military districts which made up the *Vojna Krajina* were in Austrian hands. After 1870, Budapest controlled both.

53 Quoted in R. Fisk, 'Embattled Serbs of Krajina have God on Their Side', *The Independent*, 27 June 1994.

54 Quoted in ibid.

55 M. Glenny, p. 19.

56 L. J. Cohen, p. 131.

57 M. Glenny, p. 19.

58 M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)', p. 41.

59 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 103.

60 Quoted in L. J. Cohen, p. 132.

61 Z. Sabol, p. 126. Emphasis added.

62 L. J. Cohen, p. 132.

63 M. Andrejevich, 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)', p. 41.

64 Ibid.

65 L. Silber and A. Little, p. 103.

66 Quoted in M. Thompson, p. 271.

67 Under the previous 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, the Serbs had been a 'constituent nation'. Moreover, the section of the 1974 constitution headed 'Basic Principles', provides for 'the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right of secession'. Quoted in R. Hayden, ' "Imagined Communities" and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 787. This referred not to the citizens of Yugoslavia's republics, but to the ethnically defined nations (*narodi*) of the country. And while these nations each had their own recognised republics, the republics themselves did not have the right to secede. This goes some way to explaining why the 1990 Croatian Constitution defined the Croat nation and the Republic of Croatia as essentially one and the same; it provided the constitutional grounds for secession. It thereby also explains why the Republic's Serb minority was desperately keen to hang on to its status as a *narod* (nation); depriving them of their constitutional status effectively removed their constitutional right to self-determination.

68 M. Thompson, p. 271.

69 Quoted in ibid., pp. 272–3.

70 Quoted in ibid., p. 280.

71 M. Bakic-Hayden and R. Hayden, 'Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1, Spring 1992, p. 5. The authors also cite Slaven Letica, a former close advisor to Tudjman, as epitomising the 'Orientalist' position. For example, in an article in *Danas* in March 1989, Letica asserts that 'two ideal-typical models of political systems (and cultures) have developed in Yugoslavia, a "monistic (one-party) democracy" linked territorially with Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia (the "eastern model"), and a "pluralistic (or parliamentary) democracy" linked territorially with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (the "western model")'. Ibid., pp. 8–9.

72 Ibid., p. 9.

73 R. Hayden, 'Imagined Communities and Real Victims', p. 785.

74 M. Glenny, p. 11.

75 M. Thompson, p. 264.

7 Romanians and Hungarians

1 M. Eliade, *The Romanians: A Concise History* (Bucharest: Roza Vinturilor, 1992), p. 25.
2 C. A. MacCartney, *Hungary* (London: Ernest Benn, 1934), p. 14.
3 A. Otetea, *A Concise History of Romania* (London: Robert Hale, 1985), p. 127.
4 M. Eliade, p. 19.
5 According to Hungarian historian Kalman Benda, 'the ancestors of today's Romanians appeared in the mountains of southern Transylvania toward the end of the twelfth century. They were mountain shepherds, who migrated from Wallachia. . . . Their villages are first mentioned in thirteenth century documents'. K. Benda 'Transylvania: From St Stephen to Post-Caeusescu', *Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 133, Spring 1994, pp. 67–8.
6 There is still some confusion over the true nature of Szekler identity. Some believe they are a Turkic people, loosely related to the Magyars, who arrived in the Carpathians at about the same time as the Hungarians. Others link them far more closely, claiming that the Szeklers are also pure Magyar.
7 S. Pascu, *A History of Transylvania* (New York: Dorset Press, 1990), pp. 47–8; M. Musat and I. Ardeleanu, *From Ancient Dacia to Modern Romania* (Bucharest: Editura, Stiintifica Si Encicopedica, 1985), p. 81. Musat and Ardeleanu argue that the *voivodes* strongly resisted Hungarian expansion. Moreover, after the death of Stephen I, the Romanian *voivodes* took advantage of Hungary's temporary weakness and reconquered their territory. This, according to them, explains why the historical record apparently fails to support Hungarian rule over Transylvania in the eleventh century.
8 R. W. Seton-Watson qualifies this somewhat, noting that after gaining complete control over Transylvania the practice for the next two centuries was to appoint a Hungarian prince to rule, and it was only after this that the Romanian *voivodate* system developed more fully. R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge: CUP, 1934), p. 19.
9 S. Pascu, p. 66.
10 Ibid., p. 67.
11 R. W. Seton-Watson, pp. 9–10.
12 Ibid., p. 8.
13 In 1417, the Turks successfully invaded Wallachia. In 1492, Moldavia met with the same fate.
14 This existing demographic shift was exacerbated by the Habsburg policy of *impopulatio*. This involved the re-settling of people from other parts of the empire into those empty Hungarian lands. The effect was to change Hungary's composition dramatically. When the country was liberated from the Ottomans over 150 years later, around only 50 per cent of the population of the old Hungarian Kingdom was Magyar. By the end of *impopulatio*, which was eventually wound up around 1786, estimates suggest that the Magyars numbered only some 3,350,000, or 35 per cent of the total population of Hungary. Meanwhile, the number of Romanians approached 1,500,000. See C. A. MacCartney, *Hungary: A Short History* (Edinburgh: EUP, 1962), pp. 116–19.
15 I. Volgyes, *Hungary: A Nation of Contradictions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 6.
16 M. Eliade, pp. 23–4.
17 It is acknowledged that at this point in time Buda and Pest were still separate cities. The collective name Budapest is therefore used for convenience's sake (Pest, Buda and Obuda merging to form the single city on 1 January 1873).

18 After a brief period of Turkish resistance, the Ottoman Empire finally resigned itself to the loss of the Hungarian lands, concluding the Peace of Karlowitz with the Habsburgs on 26 January 1699.

19 Quoted in S. Pascu, p. 136. The breakdown of nationalities in Transylvania during the eighteenth century is not conclusively known, but most estimates more or less reflect the following figures: 66 per cent Romanian, 21 per cent Hungarian and Szekler, 11 per cent German, and 2 per cent others.

20 J. M. Cabot, *The Racial Conflict in Transylvania* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1926), p. 175.

21 Ibid., pp. 178–9.

22 S. Pascu, p. 184.

23 C. A. MacCartney, *Hungary: A Short History*, p. 120.

24 Quoted in M. Musat and I. Ardeleanu, p. 256.

25 R. W. Seton-Watson, p. 275. Emphasis added.

26 In July 1863, the Transylvanian Diet had convened in Sibiu. A new electoral law had made the Romanians a majority in the region. On 1 September, the Emperor dissolved the Sibiu Diet and the electoral rules reverted back to the terms of the old law. In November 1863, a new Diet once again dominated by Magyars opened in Cluj.

27 J. G. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary, 1867–1986* (London: Longman, 1989), p. 16.

28 A. Otetea, p. 338.

29 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Moldavia had lost much of its territory. In 1775, Austria purchased part of the region from Turkey, calling it Bucovina. In 1812, Russia invaded Moldavia and took half of it by force, naming this part Bessarabia.

30 J. G. Hoensch, p. 28.

31 R. W. Seton-Watson, p. 397.

32 Quoted in ibid., p. 394.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., pp. 394–5.

35 In addition to the state schools, some primary and secondary schools were run by the churches, of which the Nationalities Law recognised their autonomy. In terms of Romanian schools, these were administered by the Orthodox and Uniate Churches. However, above the secondary level the Romanians had few educational institutions.

36 J. G. Hoensch, p. 46. Between 1868 and 1914, 85 per cent of candidates with university entrance qualifications and 89 per cent of those attending lectures were Magyars or spoke Hungarian as their first language.

37 R. W. Seton-Watson, pp. 407–8.

38 S. Pascu, pp. 227–8.

39 J. M. Cabot, pp. 83–4.

40 In May 1881, the two Romanian National parties of the Banat and Hungary and Transylvania merged under the name of the Romanian National Party of Hungary and Transylvania.

41 J. M. Cabot, p. 90.

42 S. Fischer-Galati, 'Romanian Nationalism', in P. F. Sugar and I. Lederer (eds), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Washington: WUP, 1969), p. 387.

43 I. Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 4.

44 S. Pascu, p. 259.

45 S. Pascu, *The Independence of Romania* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1977), p. 188.

46 R. W. Seton-Watson, p. 521.

47 S. Pascu, *The Independence of Romania*, pp. 191–2.

48 J. G. Hoensch, pp. 102–3.

49 Ibid., pp. 103–4.

50 J. M. Cabot, p. 109.

51 In the Bucovinian capital, Cernauti (Czernowitz), for example, 15 per cent of the population was Romanian, but the university, theatre and most of the high schools and daily newspapers were German.

52 I. Livezeanu, pp. 17–18.

53 Quoted in ibid., p. 41.

54 L. P. Mair, *The Protection of Minorities* (London: Christophers, 1928), p. 164.

55 One popular theory had it that the Szekler population in the east of Transylvania had been significantly complemented by the denationalisation of the Romanians there, that they had been Szeklerised by the Hungarian state. This was largely accepted by those Romanians who simply refused to acknowledge the presence of a large Szekler population.

56 I. Livezeanu, p. 140.

57 Hungarian/Szekler adults were also encouraged to take classes in Romanian language, history and geography taught in Magyar.

58 Quoted in I. Livezeanu, p. 142.

59 Quoted in ibid., pp. 142–3.

60 L. P. Mair, p. 162. The Romanians responded to such accusations by saying that their ill-treatment of Hungarians, which had nevertheless been exaggerated, was not as bad as they had previously suffered at the hand of the Magyars.

61 J. M. Cabot, pp. 173–4.

62 Prior to the acquisition of north-west Transylvania, in return for the promise of support over Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, by the First Vienna Award Hungary had already received a strip of southern (2 November 1938) and western (4 April 1939) Slovakia. Further, on 11 April 1941 it annexed part of Vojvodina – at the time western Banat – from Yugoslavia. Thus, with the support of Nazi Germany Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometres with five million inhabitants, including two million Magyars. The country now comprised over 50 per cent of the ancient Hungarian Kingdom.

63 Quoted in N. A. F. Dreisziger, *Hungary's Road to World War Two* (Toronto: Weller, 1968), p. 138.

64 Quoted in M. Fatu and M. Musat, *Horthyist–Fascist Terror in Northwestern Romania* (Bucharest: Merdiane, 1986), p. 57.

65 Ibid., pp. 59–60.

66 Ibid., pp. 65–6.

67 Ibid., p. 67.

68 Ibid., pp. 75–6.

69 Ibid., pp. 215–41.

70 National communism was also expressed as 'communist nationalism', 'national socialism' and 'socialist nationalism'.

71 T. Gilberg, *Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu's Personal Dictatorship* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 163–4.

72 L. Sebok, 'Transylvania: The Demography of a Minority', *Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 133, Spring 1994, p. 86.

73 D. Deletant, *Ceausescu and the Securitate* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 109. Some disgruntled Hungarians pointed out that the Autonomous Region still only encapsulated a third of all Magyars living in Romania, that its boundaries were drawn to make it as geographically restrictive and as far away from the Hungarian border as possible. Nevertheless the Autonomous Region represented

the most concentrated area of Hungarians within the country, and to locate it any closer to the Hungarian border would surely have presented security problems for the Romanian state.

74 Ibid., p. 110.
75 Ibid., p. 112.
76 Throughout the 1960s, the Hungarian Autonomous Region continued to be eroded. In 1968, for example, two districts with heavy Szekler populations were transferred from the Autonomous Region to the Brasov region and were replaced with three containing a majority of Romanians. The proportion of Hungarians in the revised Autonomous Region was thus reduced from 77 per cent to 62 per cent. Ibid., p. 113.
77 V. G. Baleanu, 'Political Nationalism in Transylvania', *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Report No. G44, May 1995, p. 11.
78 Quoted in D. Deletant, p. 126. The Hungarian counter-argument was that in technical and medical subjects especially, those Hungarians who lived outside predominantly Magyar areas and denied instruction in their own language would be put at a competitive disadvantage with ethnic Romanians. Because of the need to learn a second language, they would be limited in the amount of training in such disciplines.
79 Quoted in J. G. Hoensch, p. 277.
80 S. Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 195.
81 P. Bodor, 'A Minority Under Attack: The Hungarians of Transylvania', *New Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 114, 1989, p. 99.
82 D. Deletant, p. 134.
83 S. Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania*, p. 195.
84 P. Bodor, p. 99.
85 Ibid., pp. 110–20.
86 Quoted in J. G. Baleanu, p. 11.
87 P. Bodor, pp. 118–19.
88 D. Deletant, p. 107. Emphasis added.

8 Transylvania and the societal security dilemma

1 G. Schopflin and H. Poulton, *Romania's Ethnic Hungarians: A Minority Rights Group Report* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1990), p. 6.
2 For simplicity's sake, the terms 'Hungarians', 'ethnic Hungarian', the 'Hungarian community', and the 'Hungarian minority' are used interchangeably to those Hungarians residing in Romania. The term 'Magyar' is occasionally also used in this same sense. Where 'Hungarians' refers to citizens of Hungary proper, this will be made clear.
3 Throughout the chapter, the English acronym HDUR is used rather than the Hungarian (RMDSz) or the Romanian (UDMR), except in those instances of direct quotation.
4 N. Ratesh, *Romania: The Entangled Revolution* (London: Praeger, 1993), p. 56.
5 Other points in the plan were the separation of powers, the abolition of a centrally controlled economy, the reorganisation of agriculture, the restructuring of trade and the halting of food exports, and the conduct of foreign policy 'in the interests of the people'.
6 At the time of the revolution, Iliescu's was a face not well known to most Romanians. By the 1960s, he had risen to become a leading member of the Communist Party: a member of the Central Committee at the age of just 35. Although moved from the capital to a series of posts in Timis County and Iasi at

the beginning of the 1970s, Iliescu continued to rise in the party structure. In 1984, however, he lost favour with Ceausescu and was stripped of all his offices. Iliescu maintains that he was in opposition to Ceausescu from the early 1970s, but many writers dismiss this.

7 Petre Roman is the son of long-time Central Committee member Valter Roman. At the time of the insurrection he was a professor of economics at the University of Bucharest.

8 Quoted in M. Rady, *Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History* (London: IB Taurus, 1992), p. 139.

9 M. Rady, p. 132.

10 Quoted in J. Pataki, 'Free Hungarians in a Free Romania: Dream or Reality?', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, 23 February 1990, p. 18.

11 W. Wyatt, 'Bloodshed Brothers in the Land of Dracula', *The Times*, 2 January 1990.

12 Quoted in ibid., p. 20.

13 For example, *Elore* ('Forward') changed its name to *Romaniai Magyar Szo* ('The Hungarian Word from Romania'), and *Faklya* ('Torch') instead became *Jelen* ('Present').

14 In publications such as *A Het* ('The Week'), the editors asked their readers for forgiveness for the lies that they had been forced to publish in the past and promised to write the truth from now on.

15 On 22 December, Hungarians and Romanians together re-opened the radio station in Tirgu Mures ('Marosvasarhely', in Hungarian). Hungarian broadcasts were also revived in Cluj.

16 T. Gallagher, *Romania After Ceausescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: EUP, 1995), p. 76.

17 Laszlo Toekes, Bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Romania in Timisoara, had, throughout most of the 1980s, been on a collision course with the Ceausescu government because of his outspoken views. It was demonstrations by both Hungarians and Romanians protesting against his removal from the Timisoara diocese in the middle of 1989 that acted as a catalyst for the subsequent uprising.

18 M. Rady, p. 147.

19 Quoted in ibid.

20 T. Gallagher, p. 80.

21 Ibid., p. 83.

22 Ibid. p. 78.

23 J. Pataki, p. 18.

24 In a 21 March statement, which blamed Budapest for the troubles, Prime Minister Roman charged that Magyars from Hungary proper had hoisted the Hungarian national flag on public buildings, desecrated monuments of Romanian national heroes, and replaced official Romanian place names with their Hungarian version. Roman accused ethnic Hungarians of indulging in behaviour that 'took the form of open attacks on the Romanian people's national feeling'. However, many of Roman's claims were certainly contentious: on 15 March, Radio Bucharest had reported the Hungarian flag having been raised on the Catholic cathedral in Satu Mare. This was denied the following day by local county officials. Furthermore, in Oradea and Tirgu Mures reports indicate that Hungarian place names had been added alongside, and not in place of, Romanian ones by the local NSF committees. M. Shafir, 'The Romanian Authorities' Reaction to the Violence in Tirgu Mures', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 15, April 1990, p. 44.

25 V. Socor, 'Forces of Old Resurface in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 15, 13 April 1990, pp. 36–8.

26 Elsewhere in the country, on 18 and 19 March student rallies were organised at universities and other higher education institutions in Bucharest, Iasi, Craiova, Suceava, and Constanta. Romania denounced the demands of the Hungarian students in Tirgu Mures.
27 V. Socor, p. 38.
28 The NSF Council, as distinct from the power-wielding NSF Executive, from which well-known anti-Communists had resigned, had been replaced by a Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC). And although the NSF Executive's declared political opponents were included in the 250-strong body of the PNUC, it was quickly apparent that two-thirds were made up of NSF members or supporters.
29 L. Kurti, 'A Culture of Enmity: Hungary, Romania, and the Transylvania Question', *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)*, Working Paper No. 23, 1993, p. 6.
30 M. Rady, p. 156.
31 See, for example, C. Adams, 'Six Killed in Ethnic Clashes', *The Times*, 22 March 1990; I. Traynor, 'Emergency Clamped on Riot Town', *The Guardian*, 22 March 1990.
32 C. Adams and C. Beck, 'Hungary Appeals to UN over Romanian Clashes', *The Times*, 5 March 1990.
33 P. Jacobsen and P. Binyon, 'Alarm Grows Over Fate of Hungarians in Romania', *The Times*, 22 March 1990.
34 L. Kurti, p. 4.
35 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
36 Ibid., p. 5.
37 J. Pataki, p. 21. Emphasis added.
38 H. Cartner, *Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceausescu Romania* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1993), p. 20.
39 M. Rady, p. 146.
40 T. Gallagher, pp. 86–7.
41 M. Rady, p. 146.
42 T. Gallagher, p. 87.
43 J. Pataki, p. 21.
44 T. Gallagher, p. 78.
45 Ibid., p. 87.
46 T. L. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1992, p. 576.
47 J. Eyal, 'Transylvania Riot Threatens Post-Ceausescu Promises', *Guardian*, 22 March 1990.
48 T. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', p. 576.
49 Speaking in 1991, the leader of Vatra Romaneasca, Radu Ceontea, 'revealed the depth of his suspicion towards Hungarians. As a child he had learnt from his father 'not to have confidence in them'. In 1968, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he fled to the mountains 'out of fear that Hungary would occupy Transylvania'. Since entering the public eye, he had refused to frequent Bucharest restaurants 'since I am not certain that Hungarians will not attempt to poison me'. Meanwhile in Tirgu Mures the police were required to mount a permanent guard on his apartment because 'I do not want my wife and child violated and killed'. T. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and the Resurgent Nationalism in Romania, p. 579.
50 J. Pataki, pp. 23–4.
51 Quoted in M. Rady, pp. 151–2.
52 Quoted in ibid., p. 152.

53 Quoted in T. Gallagher, *Romania After Ceausescu*, p. 82.
54 It is erroneous, however, to say that Romanian nationalist rhetoric only really took hold within the rural population. Those subscribing to Vatra's point of view can also be found among the urban professionals and intelligentsia. And this is reflected in the composition of the organisation's membership, which included doctors, academics and lawyers.
55 During the early months of 1990, as Laszlo Kurti points out, the Romanian economy reached an all-time low: 'Shelves were again emptied [sic], and the black market was once more accepted as a permanent way of life for many, turning citizens against one another in an incessant, futile struggle to make ends meet'. L. Kurti, p. 5.
56 T. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and the Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', p. 573.
57 M. Rady, p. 127.
58 T. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and the Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', p. 573.
59 R. Hislope, 'Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy, *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, p. 472.
60 *The Constitution of Romania* (December 1991), http://guv.ro/english/constitutie.html
61 R. Hayden, 'Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 655.
62 M. Rady, p. 149.
63 J. Pataki, p. 21.
64 J. Eyal, 'Transylvania Riot Threatens Post-Ceausescu Promises'; 'Hungary and Romania Meet Over Ethnic Tensions', *Guardian*, 14 February 1990.
65 T. Gallagher, *Romania After Ceausescu*, p. 75.
66 A further, related argument, and distinctly reminiscent of the Ceausescu era, was that for certain subjects, such as engineering and medicine, all teaching should be conducted in Hungarian, as a particularly fluent grasp of the language would be required in order to pursue a career in these fields.
67 Quoted in M. Shafir, p. 46.
68 It was not only the HDUR that was dismayed at Iliescu's decision to register the NSF. In a statement issued on 23 January (1990), leaders of the emerging opposition centred on Romania's two 'historic parties', the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant's Party, also denounced the NSF: 'Through this decision the NSF has lost its neutrality and capacity as provisional administrator of power and its credibility before public opinion. There can be no free elections and equitable conditions for all political parties when the NSF has a monopoly in a clearly totalitarian way on all state levels.' Quoted in T. Gallagher, *Romania After Ceausescu*, pp. 81–2.
69 R. Bassett, 'Romanian Revolution Fails to Touch the Lives of the Hungarian Minority', *The Times*, 5 March 2000.
70 M. Rady, p. 153.
71 M. Shafir, pp. 43–4. Motiu claimed that Romania's Hungarians wished to split not only schools, but also factories, hospitals, and businesses in order to be in a position to sever Transylvania from the rest of the country.
72 T. Gallagher, *Romania After Ceausescu*, p. 79. Emphasis added.
73 Ibid., p. 81. Emphasis added.
74 Ibid., p. 77.
75 T. Gallagher, 'Vatra Romaneasca and the Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', p. 573.

76 K. Verdery, 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 52, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 193.
77 Ibid., p. 196.
78 Ibid.
79 M. Rady, p. 149.
80 Ibid., pp. 149–50.
81 Ibid., p. 155.

Conclusion

1 See H. Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951).
2 See J. Snyder and R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', in B. Walter and Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)', pp. 9–37.
3 C. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1992, p. 506.
4 Ibid.
5 N. Wheeler and K. Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in J. Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 31.
6 See J. W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking Under Anarchy', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 2000/01', pp. 128–61.
7 R. L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Security Bias: What Security Dilemma?', *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, p. 119.
8 Ibid.
9 B. Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible?', in K. Booth (ed.), *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 36–7.
10 O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre, 'Societal Security and European Security', in Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 192.
11 J. Snyder and R. Jervis, p. 10.
12 Ibid., p. 18.
13 A. Collins, *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 179.
14 Ibid., p. 25.
15 H. Dorussen, 'Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2001, p. 252.
16 Ibid., p. 253.
17 See B. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27–47.
18 For a more detailed account of the role of the OSCE in mitigating the security dilemma in Romania, see P. Roe, 'Misperception and Minority Rights: Romania's Security Dilemma?', in A. Morawa (ed.), *European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Volume I, 2001* (London: Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 349–71.
19 See, for example, G. P. Herd and J. Lofgren, ' "Societal Security", the Baltic States, and EU Integration', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2001, pp. 273–96.

Selected bibliography

Adams, C. 'Six Killed in Ethnic Clashes', *The Times* (22 March 1990).

Adams, C. and Beck, E. 'Hungary Appeals to UN Over Romanian Clashes', *The Times* (21 March 1990).

Almond, M. *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin, 1994).

Alter, P. *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994).

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

Andrejevich, M. 'Nationalist Movements in Yugoslavia', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (23 February 1990), pp. 27–30.

Andrejevich, M. 'Croatia Goes to the Polls', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (4 May 1990), pp. 33–7.

Andrejevich, M. 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (14 September 1990), pp. 38–44.

Andrejevich, M. 'Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part II)', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (28 September 1990), pp. 38–44.

Angstrom, J. and Duyvesteyn, I. 'Evaluating Realist Explanations of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia', *Security Studies*, 10, 3 (2001), pp. 186–218.

Arfi, B. 'Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity', *Security Studies*, 8, 1 (1998), pp. 151–203.

Bakic-Hayden, M. and Hayden, R. 'Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics', *Slavic Review*, 51, 5 (1992), pp. 1–15.

Barber, T. 'What Makes Serbs the Way They Are', *The Independent* (9 May 1993).

Barber, T. 'Tudjman Cashes in on Nazi Past', *The Independent* (15 May 1994).

Barth, F. (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1969).

Basic-Hrvatin, S. 'Television and National/Public Memory', in J. Gow, R. Paterson and A. Preston (eds), *Bosnia by Television* (London: British Film Institute), pp. 63–71.

Bassett, R. 'Romanian Revolution Fails to Touch Lives of the Hungarian Minority', *The Times* (5 March 1990).

Beck, E. 'Bitter Legacy of Age-Old Conflict', *The Times* (22 March 1990).

Benda, K. 'Transylvania: From St Stephen to Post-Ceausescu', *Hungarian Quarterly*, 35, 133 (1994), pp. 67–71.

Benko, S. 'Transylvania: Education, Culture and the Arts', *Hungarian Quarterly*, 35, 133 (1994), pp. 72–81.

Bieber, F. 'The Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia as a "Fault Line War"? Testing the Validity of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization"', *Balkanologie*, 3, 1 (1999), pp. 33–48.

Binyon, M. 'Land Shaped by Centuries of Conflict Endures Another Upheaval', *The Times* (9 August 1995).

Blair, B. *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1993).

Bodor, P. 'A Minority Under Attack: The Hungarians of Transylvania', *New Hungarian Quarterly*, 30, 114 (1989), pp. 93–127.

Booth, K. (ed.) *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991): Buzan, B. 'Is International Security Possible?', pp. 31–55; Dunn, D. J. 'Peace Research Versus Strategic Studies', pp. 56–72; Booth, K. 'War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for a Stable Peace', pp. 335–76.

Booth, K. 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17, 4 (1991), pp. 313–26.

Boulding, K. 'National Images and International Systems', in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 422–31.

Butterfield, H. *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951).

Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold-War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P., Tromer, E. and Waever, O. *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post Cold-War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990).

Buzan, B. and Waever, O. 'Slippery, Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable?: The Copenhagen School Replies', *Review of International Studies*, 23, 2 (1997), pp. 241–50.

Buzan, B., Waever, O. and De Wilde, J. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

Buzan, B. and Herring, E. *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

Cabot, J. M. *The Racial Conflict in Transylvania* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1926).

Campbell, D. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: University Press, 1992).

Campbell, D. 'MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War', *Review of International Studies*, 24, 4 (1998), pp. 261–82.

Cartner, H. *Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceausescu Romania* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1993).

Cigar, N. *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing'* (Texas: A&M University Press, 1995).

Cohen, L. J. *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995).

Collins, A. *The Security Dilemma of Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

Connolly, W. 'Identity and Difference in Global Politics', in J. der Derian and M. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 323–42.

Critchley, W. H. 'The Failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia', *International Journal*, 48 (1993), pp. 434–47.

Cviic, C. 'Croatia's Violent Birth', *Current History*, 92, 577 (1993), pp. 370–5.

Daalder, I. H. 'Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia', in M. E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (London: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 35–68.

Deletant, D. *Ceausescu and the Securitate* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995).

Denitch, B. *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

Deutsch K. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (New York: Greenwood, 1957).

Djilas, A. 'A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 3 (1993), pp. 81–96.

Djilas, A. 'Fear Thy Neighbour: The Breakup of Yugoslavia', in C. A. Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (London: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 85–106.

Djilas, A. 'The Yugoslav Tragedy', *Prospect* (1995), pp. 36–43.

Doder, D. 'Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds', *Foreign Policy*, 91 (1993), pp. 3–23.

Dorussen, H. 'Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38, 2 (2001), pp. 251–62.

Doty, R. L. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North–South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

Doty, R. L. 'A Critical Exploration of the Agent–Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, 3, 3 (1997), pp. 365–92.

Doty, R. L. 'Immigration and the Politics of Security, *Security Studies*, 8, 2–3 (1998/99), pp. 71–93.

Dreiszinger, N. A. F. *Hungary's Way to World War II* (Toronto: Weller, 1968).

Eliade, M. *The Romanians: A Concise History* (Bucharest: Roza Vinturilor, 1992).

Eriksson, J. 'Observers or Advocates? On the Role of the Security Analysts', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34, 3 (1999), pp. 311–30.

Eyal, J. 'Hungary and Romania Meet Over Ethnic Tensions', *The Guardian* (14 February 1990).

Eyal, J. 'Transylvania Riot Threatens Post-Ceausescu Promises', *The Guardian* (22 March 1990).

Fatu, M. and Musat, M. *Horthyist–Fascist Terror in Northwestern Romania* (Bucharest: Merdiane, 1986).

Fearon, D. 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflicts', in D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 107–26.

Fearon, D. and Laitin, D. D. 'Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity', *International Organization*, 54, 4 (2000), pp. 845–77.

Fischer-Galati, S. 'Romanian Nationalism', in P. F. Sugar and I. J. Lederer (eds), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Washington: University Press, 1969), pp. 373–95.

Fischer-Galati, S. *Twentieth Century Rumania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

Fisk, R. 'Waging War on History', *The Independent* (20 June 1994).

Fisk, R. 'Embattled Serbs of Krajina Have God on Their Side', *The Independent* (27 June 1994).

Friedman, J. *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (London: Sage, 1994).

Gagnon, V. P. 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', in M. Brown *et al.* (eds), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 132–68.

Gallagher, T. 'Vatra Romaneasca and Resurgent Nationalism in Romania', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15, 4 (1992), pp. 570–98.

Gallagher, T. *Romania After Ceausescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

Gallagher, T. 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation With Hungary After 1996', *Balkanologie*, 1, 2 (1997), pp. 85–107.

Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

Gillberg, T. *Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu's Personal Dictatorship* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

Glaser, C. 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', *World Politics*, 44, 4 (1992), pp. 497–538.

Glaser, C. 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', *World Politics*, 50, 1 (1997), pp. 171–201.

Glenn, J. 'The Interregnum: The South's Insecurity Dilemma', *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 1 (1997), pp. 45–63.

Glenny, M. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992).

Gow, J. 'Deconstructing Yugoslavia', *Survival*, 33, 4 (1991), pp. 291–311.

Griffiths, S. I. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security* (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Gurr, T. R. *A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

Hansen, L. 'Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the "Third" Balkan War', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37, 3 (2000), pp. 345–62.

Hassner, P. 'Culture and Society', *The International Spectator*, 26, 1 (1991), pp. 136–53.

Hassner, P. 'Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order', *Survival*, 35, 2 (1993), pp. 49–65.

Hayden, R. 'Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics', *Slavic Review*, 51, 4 (1992), pp. 654–73.

Hayden, R. 'Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia', *American Ethnologist*, 23, 4 (1996), pp. 783–801.

Heppell, M. and Singleton, F. B. *Yugoslavia* (London: Ernest Benn, 1961).

Herd, G. P. and Lofgren, J., ' "Societal Security", the Baltic States, and EU Integration', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 36, 3 (2001), pp. 273–96.

Herz, J. *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951).

Herz, J. *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

Hislope, R. 'Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy', *East European Quarterly*, 30, 4 (1997), pp. 471–94.

Hoensch, J. G. *A History of Modern Hungary*, *1867–1986* (London: Longmans, 1989).

Hollis, M. and Smith, S. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Huntington, S. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

Hutchinson, J. 'Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration', in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 122–131.

Huysmans, J. 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of "Securitizing" Societal Issues', in R. Miles and D. Thranhardt (eds), *Migration and European Security: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 53–72.

Huysmans, J. *Making/Unmaking European Disorder: Meta-Theoretical, Theoretical and Empirical Questions of Military Stability after the Cold War* (Leuven: Kathothlieke Universiteit, 1996).

Huysmans, J. 'The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism', *Millennium*, 27, 3 (1998), pp. 569–89.

Huysmans, J. 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 4 (1998), pp. 479–506.

Hyde-Price, A. and Aggestam, L. (eds) *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

Ignatieff, M. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993).

Ionescu, D. 'The National Salvation Front Starts to Implement its Program', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (2 February 1990), pp. 26–9.

Jacobsen, P. and Binyon, M. 'Alarm Grows Over Fate of Hungarians in Romania', *The Times* (22 March 1990).

Jervis, R. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Jervis, R. 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', in R. K. Betts (ed.), *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes of War and Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 312–29.

Jervis, R. 'Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation', *World Politics*, 44, 4 (1992), pp. 317–49.

Jervis, R. 'Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3, 1 (2001), pp. 36–60.

Job, B. L. 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World', in B. L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

Kaldor, M. 'Yugoslavia and the New Nationalism', *New Left Review*, 197 (1993), pp. 96–112.

Kardos, G. 'The Culture of Conflict: Hungary's Role in Resolving Ethnic Disputes', *World Policy Journal*, 12, 1 (1995), pp. 102–6.

Katzenstien, P. J. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Kaufman, C. 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security*, 20, 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–75.

Kaufman, C. 'Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't', *Security Studies*, 6, 1 (1996), pp. 62–100.

Kaufman, S. J. 'An "International" Theory of Inter-Ethnic War', *Review of International Studies*, 22, 2 (1996), pp. 149–72.

Kaufman, S. J., 'Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War', *International Security*, 21, 2 (1996), pp. 108–38.

Kelstrup, M. 'Societal Aspects of European Security', in B. Hansen (ed.), *European Security 2000* (Copenhagen: Political Studies Press, 1995), pp. 172–97.

Krause, K. R. (ed.) *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

Krause, K. R. and Williams, M. C. (ed.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997).

Kurti, L. 'A Culture of Enmity: Hungary, Romania, and the Transylvania Question', *COPRI*, Working Paper No. 23 (1993).

Laffan, R. G. D. *The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate* (New York: Dorset Press, 1989).

Lake, D. A. and Rothchild, D. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', *International Security*, 21, 2 (1996), pp. 41–75.

Lampe, J. R. *Yugoslavia as History: There Was Twice a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. 'Revisiting the "National": Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism, in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds), *The Return of Culture in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 105–26.

Lendvai, P. 'Yugoslavia Without the Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis', *International Affairs*, 67, 2 (1991), pp. 251–62.

Lieber, R. *No Common Power: Understanding International Relations* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).

Lindholm, H. (ed.) *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Gothenberg: Nordnes, 1993): Lindholm, 'Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion', pp. 1–39; Corlin, C. 'Symbols of Mobilization: Ethnicity and Nationalism as Cultural Constructions', pp. 51–67; Hettne, C. 'Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict', pp. 68–89.

Lipschutz, R. D. (ed.) *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): Lipschutz, R. D. 'On Security', pp. 1–23; Waever, O. 'Securitization and Desecuritization', pp. 46–86.

Livezeanu, I. *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1995).

Lukic, R. and Lynch, A. *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1996).

MacCartney, C. A. *Hungary* (London: Ernest Benn, 1934).

MacCartney, C. A. *Hungary: A Short History* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1962).

McSweeney, B. 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies*, 22, 1 (1996), pp. 81–93.

McSweeney, B. 'Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland', *Security Dialogue*, 27, 2 (1996), pp. 167–78.

Mair, L. P. *The Protection of Minorities* (London: Christophers, 1928).

Malcolm, N. *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1994).

McKittrick, D. 'Why Hardliners Need a Drumcree Showdown', *The Independent* (12 July 1998).

Mearsheimer, J. 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security*, 15, 1 (1990), pp. 15–56.

Mearsheimer, J. 'Disorder Restored', in G. T. Allison and G. F. Treverton (eds), *Rethinking America's Security* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), pp. 213–37.

Melander, E. *Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy* (Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research).

Mestrovic, S. G. (ed.) *Genocide After Emotion* (London: Routledge, 1996): Cigar, N. 'The Serbo–Croatian War, 1991', pp. 51–90; Letica, S. 'The Genesis of the Current Balkan War', pp. 91–112.

Migdal, J. S. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Musat, M. and Ardeleanu, I. *From Ancient Dacia to Modern Romania* (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica Si Enciclopedica, 1985).

Neuman, I. 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, 2 (1996), pp. 139–74.

Oteatea, A. *A Concise History of Romania* (London: Robert Hale, 1985).

Pascu, S. *The Independence of Romania* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1977).

Pascu, S. *A History of Transylvania* (New York: Dorset Press, 1990).

Pataki, J. 'Free Hungarians in a Free Romania: Dream or Reality?', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (23 February 1990), pp. 18–26.

Pataki, J. 'The Hungarian Authorities' Reactions to the Violence in Tirgu Mures', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (13 April 1990), pp. 23–5.

Pavlowitch, S. K. *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918–88* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988).

Pearton, M. 'Notions in Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2, 1 (1996), pp. 1–15.

Posen, B. 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, 35, 1 (1993), pp. 27–47.

Posen, B. 'Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power', *International Security*, 18, 2 (1993), pp. 80–124.

Pratt Ewing, K. 'The Violence of Non-Recognition: Becoming a "Conscious" Muslim Woman in Turkey', in A. Robben and M. Suarez-Orozco (eds), *Cultures Under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 248–71.

Rady, M. *Romania in Turmoil*: *A Contemporary History* (London: IB Taurus, 1992).

Ramet, S. P. *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992).

Ratesh, N. *Romania: The Entangled Revolution* (London: Praeger, 1993).

Reynolds C. *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Roe, P. 'Actors' Responsibility in "Tight", "Regular", or "Loose" Security Dilemmas', *Security Dialogue*, 32, 1 (2001), pp. 103–16.

Roe, P. 'Misperception and Minority Rights: Romania's Security Dilemma?', in A. Morawa (ed.), *European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Volume I, 2001* (London: Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 349–71.

Rothschild, E. 'What is Security?', *Daedalus*, 124, 3 (1995), pp. 53–97.

Schopflin, G. and Poulton, H. *Romania's Ethnic Hungarians: A Minority Rights Group Report* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1990).

Schweller, R. L. 'Neorealism's Security Bias: What Security Dilemma?', *Security Studies*, 5, 3 (1996), pp. 90–121.

Sebok, L. 'Transylvania: The Demography of a Minority', *Hungarian Quarterly*, 34, 133 (1994), pp. 83–9.

Sengupta, K. 'No Compromise, No Shame, No Surrender', *The Independent* (5 July 1998).

Seton-Watson, R. W. *A History of the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934).

Shafir, M. 'The Romanian Authorities' Reaction to the Violence in Tirgu Mures', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (13 April 1990), pp. 36–43.

Shapiro, M. J. *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

Silber, L. and Little, A. *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1995).

Smith, A. D. 'The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism', *Survival*, 35, 1 (1993), pp. 48–62.

Smith, A. D. 'Security, Identity, and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: A Comment', *Security Dialogue*, 27, 2 (1996), pp. 179–84.

Snyder, J. 'Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', in R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow and J. Gross Stein (eds), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 153–79.

Snyder, J. 'Averting Anarchy in the New Europe', *International Security*, 14, 4 (1990), pp. 5–41.

Snyder, J. 'The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond', in M. E. Brown (ed.), *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 79–102.

Socor, V. 'Forces of Old Resurface in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures', *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (13 April 1990), pp. 43–8.

Stanovcic, V. 'History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts', in D. Rusinow (ed.), *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1988), pp. 23–40.

Stephen, C. and Traynor, I. 'Bucharest Sends Tanks to Quell Riots', *The Guardian* (21 March 1990).

Tanner, M. 'Old Dreams That Fuel War Lust', *The Independent* (24 April 1994).

Taliaferro, J. W. 'Security Seeking Under Anarchy', *International Security*, 25, 3 (2001), pp. 128–61.

Temperley, H. W. V. *History of Serbia* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1919).

Thomson, K. W. *Cold War Theories, Volume I: World Polarization, 1943–1953* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).

Thompson, M. *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia* (London: Vintage, 1992).

Todorov, T. *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

Todorova, M. *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: OUP, 1997).

Traynor, I. 'Emergency Clamped on Riot Town', *The Guardian* (22 March 1990).

Traynor, I. 'Peasants in Transylvania at One Another's Throats', *Guardian* (3 April 1990).

Traynor I. 'Polling Paranoiacs Paradise', *Guardian* (16 May 1990).

Tuchman Mathews, J. 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, 68, 2 (1989), pp. 162–77.

Van Evera, S. 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', *International Security*, 18, 4 (1994), pp. 5–39.

Van Evera, S. 'Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War', *International Security*, 22, 4 1998, pp. 5–43.

Verdery, K. *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

Verdery, K. 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania', *Slavic Review*, 52, 2 (1993), pp. 179–203.

Volgyes, I. *Hungary: A Nation of Contradictions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993): Buzan, B. 'Introduction: The Changing Security Agenda in Europe', pp. 1–14; Waever, O. 'Societal Security: The Concept', pp. 17–40; Buzan, B. 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', pp. 41–58; Wiberg, H. 'Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia', pp. 93–109; Waever, O. *et al.* 'Societal Security and European Security', pp. 185–99.

Waever, O. 'Insecurity and Identity Unlimited', *COPRI*, Working Paper No. 14 (1994).

Wallensteen, P. and Sollenberg M. 'The End of International War? Armed Conflicts 1989–95', *Journal of Peace Research*, 3 (1996), pp. 353–70.

Walter, B. F. and Snyder, J. (eds) *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999): Snyder, J. and Jervis, R. 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', pp. 15–37; Walter, B. F. 'Designing Transitions from Civil War', pp. 38–72; Woodward, S. L. 'Bosnia and Hercegovina: How Not to End Civil War', pp. 73–115.

Waltz, K. *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Wendt, A. 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46, 2 (1992), pp. 391–25.

West, R. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (London: Macmillan, 1940).

Wheeler, N. J. and Booth, K. 'The Security Dilemma', in J. Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 29–60.

Wiberg, H. 'Yugoslavia: Nations Above All', in W. Kostecki, B. Goralczyck and K. Zukroska (eds), *Transformations in Post-Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 202–22.

Williams, M. C. 'Modernity, Identity, and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy, *Review of International Studies*, 22, 1 (1998), pp. 435–9.

Williams, M. C. 'Identity and the Politics of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 2 (1998), pp. 204–25.

Wolfers, A. *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

Wyatt, W. 'Bloodshed Brothers in the Land of Dracula', *The Times* (2 January 1990).

Zimmerman, W. 'Last Chance for Bosnia?', *New York Review of Books* (19 December 1996), pp. 10–13.

Index